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ABSTRACT
This study examines what effect the movement towards deeper economic and
political integration in the EU has had on the domestic politics of a member country,
Britain. This study argues that this pressure to integrate by joining the single currency, or
European Monetary Union (EMU), and its predecessor, the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM), has exacerbated the cross-cutting cleavages inherent in British party
politics, making them potentially dangerous to party unity and to successful governance
by making party management more challenging. The pressure imposed by the EU on
British parties and governments to follow the path of economic integration to its fullest
extent exacerbates these cross-cutting cleavages in each time period examined in this
study, forcing successive British politicians to seek an accommodation between pro- and
anti-euro forces in their own parties.
In particular this study examines two factors that condition British politicians’
reaction to the pressure to join the euro and the impact that the euro cross-cutting
cleavage has had on the parties and on British government. First, formal British political
institutions, particularly the size of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority but also the
ii

First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system, shape the range of decisions on euro policy
available to a political actor. Second, in keeping with the reiterated problem solving
methodology employed in this study, this work considers the role of actors in managing
the euro cross-cutting cleavages, especially prime ministers and/or party leaders and how
they use their informal powers to manage their party. Examining how these factors and
their interaction with the EU-level integration pressure impacted the decisions Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair, and Labour Party leader Neil
Kinnock, made regarding euro policy provides insight into what range of options a future
prime minister may enjoy when the pressure to integrate rises again.
Finally, this work examines the broader repercussions of the EU impetus to
deeper integration in other member countries currently struggling to balance the EU-level
imperative of economic integration with domestic political realities. The presence of
euroskeptic countries such as Britain gives voice within the EU to alternatives to the
dominant imperative to deeper integration whatever the cost. Thus, Britain’s protracted
political agonizing over whether to join the euro has given the country a broader legacy
in Europe by making the debate over economic and monetary union a more open and
democratic one, allowing this “reluctant European” a key role in shaping the future of the
European Union.
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Chapter One: Introduction, Literature Review and Conceptual Overview
For a long time Britain has maintained a seemingly ambivalent policy on whether
to pursue economic and monetary union within the European Union, regardless of which
party, Labour or Conservative, has been in power. Commentators have often written of
Britain’s “ambivalence” about being a member of the European Union generally and
whether to join the eurozone, or European Monetary Union (EMU), more particularly
(Aspinwall 2004; Baker 2002; Gabel and Hix 2005; Kesselman et al 2008). This
ambivalence has been evident in Britain’s dealings with the European Union (EU) from
the community’s post-World War Two beginnings, when Britain declined to join the
union’s original incarnation. Even after it finally joined in 1973 Britain gained a
reputation, not least among domestic commentators, of being a foot-dragger, always the
last to reluctantly adopt a regulatory advance supported by other EU member states. This
has remained true in the case of membership in the eurozone: Britain is one of only three
EU member states to choose not to join the euro currency.
This project asks why this ambivalence over EMU has persisted over three prime
ministers of different parties, different strengths (in terms of personal leadership styles,
party management skills, and size of their parliamentary majority), and different
ideological positions on whether Britain should give up the pound. The study begins
roughly when the notion of the single currency first began to be considered seriously, not
just as an ideal but also as a concrete goal placed on the EU’s policy agenda, during the
!
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negotiation of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. It ends in 2003, when the British
government effectively dropped any serious attempt to mobilize public support for
joining the eurozone. This project argues that Britain’s seemingly ambivalent stance on
monetary union in this time period is in fact reflective of an active tension between
various elite groups within the British political governing structure whose divergent
opinions on EMU, expressed as a phenomenon Schattschneider (1960) called “crosscutting cleavages”, result in an overall stalemate on the issue. The pressure imposed by
the EU on British parties and governments to follow the path of Europe economic
integration to its fullest extent exacerbates these cross-cutting cleavages in each time
period in this study, forcing successive British politicians to seek an accommodation
between pro- and anti-euro forces in their own parties.
This active tension on the issue reflects what has taken place within each political
party and between parties over this twenty-year time period between those ministers and
backbenchers who have supported Britain’s membership in EMU and those who opposed
it. In reality, however, this elite-level tension over membership in the European Union
has gone on far beyond the twenty years this project will explore. The euro debate is a
new incarnation of older splits among British governing elites over what the proper
degree of the country’s integration with Europe should be. These factions existed (and
still exist) in each party and cut across party lines.

Part I. Methodological approach
This project follows a methodological approach from the historical sociology
tradition known as reiterated problem solving (Haydu 1998). This method envisions a
!
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connected chain of events, a constant unrolling of problem solving over time: actors do
not randomly react to circumstances but also respond to the legacy of their predecessors’
approach to quandaries. These past choices shape the problem as actors encounter it in
their own time as well as the possible range of solutions available to them. This legacy,
when combined with the contingent circumstances of the actor’s own time period,
generates both unique and linked explanations for how actors in each time approach a
continuing problem.
While reiterated problem solving resembles the path dependency model in many
ways, the focus on the actors allows a more multifaceted analysis of a recurring problem,
Haydu argues. For instance, reiterated problem solving shows how switchpoints in
history both enable and limit options for actors in subsequent time periods, something
Haydu claims the path dependency model does not permit. In this method, then, actors
are not just victims of past decisions, though these shape their own options, but actively
problem solve in their own time, which in turn shapes events and options for actors in the
future. Changing the focus from path dependence to solutions to recurring problems over
time provides insight into “how new paths are themselves charted on the basis of
ideological lenses, strategic tools, and pressing problems inherited from prior crises”
(Haydu 1998, 364). The decisions made by actors in the past in regards to the recurring
problem constrain subsequent actors, but also can trigger crises as well as affect the
nature of these crises and the possible decisions future actors consider feasible in
response to these crises. “Reconstructing the problem-solvers’ understandings and
choices—how they make use of the past—enables us to account for trajectories across
multiple periods” (Haydu 1998, 367).
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Furthermore, by concentrating on both “recurrent crises [and] problem-solving
actors”, as well as a resultant layered assessment of the mechanisms that cause problems
over multiple temporal cases, a reiterated problem solving method offers more tools to
provide an analysis of sequences across time periods than one can derive from a narrative
approach, which offers interpretation within the case but not explanations derived from
the case to apply more broadly (Haydu 1998, 366). Using time periods as temporal cases,
as in this methodology, is similar in many ways to comparing institutions or events in
different locations, but has the added benefit of comparing and contrasting how episodes
are sequenced across time, acknowledging “that past problems and solutions have
cumulative influences on later ones” (Haydu 1998, 360). The recurring problem of the
pressure to integrate further in the EU, with its attendant implications for political and
economic sovereignty (as understood, per Haydu, by the actors in each time period),
created problems for parties, political institutions and governments in each time period in
this study that each actor, prime minister or otherwise, had to attempt to solve or at least
mitigate. In this study, for instance, the original decision for Britain to join the EEC in
1973 placed the nation on a path of increased economic integration within Europe over
time, but instead of being locked into this course as a path dependent model would
suggest, the problem-solving methodology recognizes the cumulative impact of decisions
made by actors in different periods to resist this pressure, such as Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher’s galvanization of the Conservative euroskeptic movement in
opposition to European monetary union, which pressured the subsequent John Major
government and fostered a euroskeptic climate that Tony Blair’s Chancellor Gordon
Brown later took advantage of to prevent Britain from joining the eurozone.
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The reiterated problem solving methodology requires a consideration of what the
actors themselves in each time period think about the situations they must confront.
What solutions do they use to tackle their problems? One must consider “the agency of
social actors as they define problems, devise solutions, and take action” as part of the
overall causal explanation (Haydu 1998, 355). The methodology enables an examination
of how actors of different ideologies interpret and attempt to solve the recurring problem,
which can shed light on how the dilemma appears across multiple time periods. Also, it
allows for the fact that short term problem solving attempts create instruments that later
actors tackling the same problem can employ, such as Major’s promise to hold a
referendum on the euro, which Blair as opposition leader then took up and was bound by
as prime minister.
The reiterated problem solving method better allows one to demonstrate “how
outcomes not only set new paths but also fomented new crises” (Haydu 1998, 363). For
instance, Thatcher’s ouster set a new path for the Conservative Party and government but
also engendered new predicaments as the party’s nascent euroskeptic movement began to
solidify as a result. The referendum pledge also opened a policy space for the
establishment of pro-euro and euroskeptic campaigns, which pressured the Blair
government to commit to a policy stance.
In addition, Haydu argues the need to consider not just the role of main policy
actors such as prime ministers but other actors as well, as their combined and varied
interpretations of the recurring problem and their efforts to solve it create a more nuanced
context of the time period and offer more opportunities to analyze similarities across time
periods. Decisions in different time periods are shaped by the conflict between actors
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and their favored solutions, as Schattschneider (1960), discussed in the next section,
argues, as well as how decisions have to be modified in order to accommodate the
differences between the actors and their solutions as one objects to another.
This dynamic is evident in the arguments in each time period of whether Britain
should pursue deeper economic integration in Europe culminating in membership of the
eurozone: the agendas of backbenchers, cabinet ministers, prime ministers and
chancellors, with some contributions from outside forces like campaigns and unions
mixed in, offer a more complete understanding of the policy climate in each temporal
case as well as across the entire era. Thus, in addition to considering the problem-solving
efforts of the four party leaders analyzed in this study, Thatcher, Kinnock, Major, and
Blair, a consideration of the solutions or attempted solutions to the pressure of monetary
integration would be far from complete without considering the rival agendas of actors
like chancellors Nigel Lawson, Kenneth Clarke and Gordon Brown, as well as other
cabinet ministers and the collected efforts of backbenchers, particularly in the Major era.
Finally, Haydu stresses that this method does not claim to identify a grand causal
explanation that explains everything in each time period, but rather that the solution in
each time period is a mix of elements that apply to other temporal cases and those that
pertain only to that particular period. Accordingly, the reiterated problem solving method
is useful in cases where evidence suggests that one should “treat institutional practices as
temporary (and possibly contentious) accommodations for recurrent dilemmas” (Haydu
1998, 358). In this study, “temporary and contentious” institutional practices include the
party management techniques of all three prime ministers (and Kinnock as party leader):
Thatcher and Blair negating any backbench opposition to their policies on European
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economic integration; and Major’s heavy-handed shutdown of backbench opposition by
withdrawing the whip from euroskeptic dissidents and imposing the guillotine on
Maastricht debate. All of these were efforts to accommodate the recurring problem of the
EMU cleavage, with mixed results and repercussions. Ultimately, reiterated problem
solving method is not always the appropriate tool to analyze cases, but it can link and
sequence events across a number of time periods in a way that offers broader insight into
the recurring problem at the same time as it recognizes the unique forces at play in each
individual time period.

Part II. Cross-cutting cleavages
Reiterated problem solving methodology offers insight into how the cross cutting
cleavage over the issue of European economic integration was both the recurring problem
that plagued party leaders over the time period covered in this study, and a particular
problem for the actors in each temporal case, whose ability to resolve or manipulate those
cleavages were constrained by their unique circumstances. Schattschneider (1960)
describes politics as a series of conflicts, each one of which may or may not come to the
fore depending on who or what party or organization supports them. The shifts in sides
that result in a new conflict becoming prominent splits the political cleavages that had
ruled previous conflicts, causing former allies to turn on one another and former enemies
to unite. These are cross-cutting cleavages. They emerge from an issue that cuts across
traditional party ideologies, often creating unlikely allies across party lines as each party
is similarly divided over the issue.

!

(!

Where the division between those on one side of the conflict and those on the
other falls shifts as the battle over the policy goes on, and “Every shift of the line of
cleavage affects the nature of the conflict, produces a new set of winners and losers and a
new kind of result” (Schattschneider 1960, 62-63). However, these shifts create
problems as well as opportunities that party leaders must grapple with, particularly when
the conflict is not one of their choosing. Just as they arise out of conflict, cross-cutting
cleavages create conflict within parties. In this study, often the conflict that arose in
British politics over the progressive stages of European monetary integration—the crosscutting cleavage examined in this work—was not of the choosing of the policy actors
confronting it and who had to deal with its effects on the parties and government as best
as they could. While shifting cross-cutting cleavages produce winners, the policy actors
in much of this study would not have seen the cleavage over European monetary
integration as a victory, as they spent as much of their time trying to ameliorate the
cleavage’s effects on the parties and on British domestic politics as they did trying to
capitalize on the opportunities the cleavage presented. Only in the case of Gordon Brown
could an actor in this study be seen to be fully exploiting the existence of this shift in the
line of battle over European monetary integration to advance his own aims.
Overall, such shifting alliances and efforts to define the lines of battle played
major roles in the UK euro debate, as the Labour and Conservative parties each
substantially altered their positions on European monetary integration. This took place in
large part because during the time period examined in this work, neither Conservative nor
Labour party ideology offered a clear answer to the question of whether Britain should
join the eurozone. Both parties have members touting the importance of parliamentary
!
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sovereignty, which euro membership erodes, while also counting among their numbers
supporters of euro membership. In the Conservative Party expressed free-market
principles warred with the eurozone’s constitutionalist threats to parliamentary
sovereignty and British nationalism (Forster 2002), while in the Labour Party the old
anti-capitalist suspicions of the single market (and euro membership) clashed with a
newer belief that the party’s social policy goals could be met through, rather than
hindered by, economic and monetary union. Thus the issue cuts across the traditional
Labour/Conservative demarcation, even as that definition shifted over time, making the
issue deeply problematic for both parties. To the extent that similar issues arise in the
future, they will continue to challenge the ability of British political parties to develop
coherent ideologies.
Cross-cutting cleavages were evident in all three time periods (the premierships of
Thatcher, Major and Blair respectively, and the party leadership of Kinnock), although
their existence proved challenging for different parties at different times. For example,
cross-cutting cleavages did not become problematic for Thatcher until the end of her
tenure as prime minister, while they split the Labour Party at the beginning of the 1980s.
Similarly, Labour successfully contained its cross-cutting cleavages caused by euro
policy in the Major years1 but cross-cutting cleavages during this time period threatened
to break up the Conservative Party, and certainly caused the Major government to
become ineffectual due to constant squabbling between europhiles and euroskeptics. In
the cases of both parties over time, successful party management minimized the impact of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
At the very least, as Labour Party grandee Peter Mandelson observed, they kept any
such divisions to themselves.
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cross-cutting cleavages, while inexpert party management allowed the divisions to
overshadow the party’s prospects.
The shifting line of the euro cross-cutting cleavage became evident through the
political campaigns established to fight the euro issues during the Blair years: both sides
of the euro debate were cross-party coalitions. Schattschneider’s observations that an
advocate of a new political conflict may peel off elements from other conflict cleavages
in order to form a new alliance thus apply to the pro- and anti-euro campaigns as well:
Prime Minister Blair established pro-euro group Britain in Europe (BiE) in 1999, an
endeavor in which he was joined by Tories Clarke and Heseltine, former members of
Prime Minister Major’s cabinet. Meanwhile, the Green party, citing concerns about
environmental protection regulations at the EU level, aligned itself with Conservatives
and Labourites in the anti-euro ‘no’ campaign. While the split in the Labour Party over
the euro appeared to be less profound in the Blair-era British debate about Europe than
the split in the Conservative Party, a significant minority of Labour Party members
remained anti-euro and suspicious of further or too-rapid integration within the EU.
Meanwhile, the small but significant third party, the Liberal Democrats, remains almost
entirely pro-euro.
Cross-cutting cleavages differ from other divisions within a party both by nature
and (often) by degree of impact on the party. In the context of this study, cross-cutting
cleavages are ideological divisions within a party that otherwise more or less shares the
same broad ideological platform, though particular members may differ in degree of
adherence to particular tenets. This is particularly true in a political system using the
First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral institution, in which the winning party takes all,
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unlike in Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems where coalition
governments are common. Because coalition governments are so rare in Britain as in
other FPTP countries, the two (or three counting the Liberal Democrats) major parties
encompass a “big tent” philosophy in the range of ideological fervor found in its
members. Over the time period discussed in this study one may find “liberal” to “far
right” conservatives (or “wets” and “dries” as they used to be known), and liberal to
conservative Labourites, because of the FPTP system.
A party in a FPTP system will have members who disagree on that issue but
remain in the same party because they broadly agree with other issues across the
spectrum of the party’s policy platform. These cross-cutting cleavages can lie dormant,
in a sense, within a party for years, allowing the members with differing points of view to
coexist easily in order to achieve common goals. As Schattschneider (1960, 67) puts it,
“Every political party consists of discordant elements which are restrained by the fact that
unity is the price of victory. The question always is: Which battle do we want most to
win?” But when an outside event or pressure, or a leadership change, suddenly changes
the party’s stance on that issue or raises the issue’s salience, it can become very divisive.”
Even within the FPTP system in which parties act as large ideological umbrellas
for varying points of view, parties tend to stand for distinct platforms. At the beginning
of the era examined here, Labour was an officially anti-Europe party, while the
Conservatives were known as the “party of Europe”.

But the circumstantial changes

discussed in this study caused the cross-cutting cleavages existing over the issue of
European integration in each party to flare up, and eventually caused the parties to
completely transform on the issue so that by the end of the era in question, Labour was
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officially a pro-Euro party, whereas the Conservatives were solidly euroskeptic. These
circumstances include change in party leadership, change of party in government, and
pressures imposed from outside Britain.
Central to this study of how the EU as an external power system affects domestic
governance, Schattschneider (1960, 125) notes that outside “power concentrations” can
disrupt the balance of power that has existed within domestic politics and can require
domestic political actors to exert considerable energy to return the domestic system to
equilibrium. Observers “have had difficulty perceiving change because we have looked
for the wrong kind of conflict (conflict within the government) and have underestimated
the extent to which the government itself as a whole has been in conflict with other power
systems” Schattschneider 1960, 126). As Britain has struggled to identify and accept its
role within an ever more integrated European Union, the imperative to integrate has
created great pressures on the domestic political system as power has shifted to the
transnational level in exchange for benefits of EU membership.
In the case of the Labour Party, a couple of factors activated the Europe crosscutting cleavage that began to damage the party’s cohesion. When James Callaghan was
prime minister in the late 1970s, Labour was an anti-Europe party, but Callaghan pursued
a fairly moderate approach in Europe policy. This moderation allowed the party’s proEurope members to exist peacefully within an officially anti-Europe party. However,
following the Conservative victory in the 1979 general election and the election of the
extreme left-wing Michael Foot as party leader, the Labour Party began to pursue a much
more actively anti-Europe policy, so much so that the party’s manifesto for the 1983
general election promised an exit from the European Union (then the EEC) entirely.
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This caused the dormant cross-cutting cleavages over Labour’s Europe policy to flare up,
as the party’s europhiles found the new leadership’s stance unacceptable. In this case, the
cross-cutting cleavage led to a party split, as the europhiles left the party altogether to
form what would become the Liberal Democratic party.
In 1983 Labour lost the general election by a decisive margin, which caused the
party to jettison its extreme left leader in favor of a more pragmatic politician, Neil
Kinnock. Kinnock also stirred up the party’s cross-cutting cleavages over European
integration, but in a different way. He decided that the only way that Labour would
become electable again was to persuade the party away from its radical economic policy
in particular, including its attitude about European integration via the single market and,
later, the single currency. Since the party had purged its most europhilic members
earlier, the party consisted mainly of euroskeptics, whom Kinnock now compelled to
adopt a gradually more pro-European stance. By 1992, Kinnock had succeeded in
transforming party attitudes, to such a degree that in the party leadership contest that year
the lone old-style euroskeptic candidate, Bryan Gould, fared poorly. The concurrent
transformation of the Conservative Party on Europe aided Kinnock’s endeavor: Prime
Minister Thatcher’s increasing (and increasingly vocal) euroskepticism made it easier for
Labour euroskeptics to change their tune in order to oppose her. But the cross-cutting
cleavage on European integration made this Labour Party transition a long and difficult
one, and even in the votes on Maastricht Treaty ratification in 1993, a substantial number
of Labour MPs defied the party whip and voted against further European integration.
Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ reputation as the party of Europe was based on the
party’s commitment to achieving deeper economic integration through the Single Market,
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a free market of goods and services across the entire European Economic Community.
Though party members differed in their degree of enthusiasm for this integration and in
their level of concern about the implications for national and parliamentary sovereignty,
this cross-cutting cleavage remained dormant even through passage of the Single
European Act (SEA) in 1986, where the party’s skeptics who objected to the act on
sovereignty grounds had no impact on the Thatcher government’s passage of the
legislation.
At that point, however, Schattschneider’s outside power concentrations began to
stir up the party’s cross-cutting cleavages on European monetary integration. Once a
commitment to create the single market had been achieved, European Community (EC)
members, led by President Jacques Delors, began to press for deeper economic
integration in the form of a single currency union. For a party whose pro-Europe
reputation was predicated on a support for free trade but which also promoted defense of
national and parliamentary sovereignty, this pressure began to cause divisions to emerge.
Some party members supported this move towards deeper integration, considering it a
natural extension of the Europe project and a way for Britain to further its influence in the
EC. But others, led by the prime minister herself, believed that the European integration
project had achieved its objective with the establishment of the Single Market, and that
monetary union entailed too much of a relinquishment of Britain’s ability to govern itself.
Under Thatcher’s active leadership on the issue, the Conservative Party began to reshape
itself as a euroskeptic party, but the party’s longstanding europhiles resisted. This pushpull dynamic continued throughout the 1990s under Thatcher’s successor, John Major,
causing considerable damage to the party along the way.
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In summary, many issues may be considered cross-cutting cleavages in party
politics, causing ideological differences that could potentially split the party or that do not
conform to the official party ideology. But many of them lie dormant, allowing a wide
variety of members to co-exist within the same broad party. However, when an outside
event or force, or a change in leadership or in leadership tactics takes place, these
changes can cause a dormant cross-cutting cleavage to flare up, its salience to rise
dramatically, and its effect on the party and on the government to become serious.
Other factors that affect the power of cross-cutting cleavages to disrupt parties
and governments include formal institutional issues such as whether the party is in or out
of power and the size of the government’s parliamentary majority. Labour’s long years
in opposition arguably gave it a better opportunity to resolve its cross-cutting cleavages
over European economic integration than the Conservative Party had trying to do the
same while in power in the 1990s. At the very least, the conflicts within the Labour Party
were subjected to less fervent media and public attention because the stakes for the
country as a whole were lower.
Moreover, Blair’s massive parliamentary majority minimized the impact of any
opposition to the government’s euro policy from within the party.

However, by Blair’s

era the Labour party had largely resolved its cross-cutting cleavages on EMU. A sizeable
parliamentary majority alone cannot spare a government from damaging effects of
cleavages: Thatcher enjoyed a large parliamentary majority in the late 1980s but that did
not stop the growing cross-cutting cleavages over the pressure to create and join a single
currency from disrupting her party and her government. This was due in large part to the
fact that it was the prime minister herself and her most powerful ministers who were
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leading the divisions, which made the challenge more difficult to face than one arising
from the backbenches, and moreover meant that the large Parliamentary majority meant
relatively little when dealing with intra-cabinet dissent. Then again, it is important to
note that while the government began to suffer the effects of the euro cleavage, the party
did achieve its ultimate aim of remaining in power after the 1992 general election, albeit
with a vastly shrunken parliamentary majority. But after this election the euro crosscutting cleavage begins to seriously damage the Conservative Party in large part because
of its tiny majority, which meant that Prime Minister Major was now vulnerable to
cleavages in the backbenches as well as those in the cabinet, and the mutually reinforcing
effects those might have on each other.
The broad platform of a big tent party means that differences of opinion over
party positions normally take place over how best to achieve these ideological goals
rather than the policy stances themselves. Such differences are not cross-cutting
cleavages. Cross-cutting cleavages are those divisions that, even given the broad tent of
FPTP system parties, challenge the overall ideological stance of the parties. Sometimes,
if the party must transform its ideological stance as a whole, this transformation process
creates cross-cutting cleavages or exacerbates them.2 For instance, there was already a
Labour Party divide over Europe in the early 1980s that contributed to the split that led to
the (re-)creation of the Liberal Democratic party as pro-Europe Labourites defected. But
as the Labour Party transformed, it left some members who had been in the mainstream
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For instance Labour’s transition from official commitment to a socialist Britain in 1983
to adopting a pro-capitalist stance as New Labour in 1997, having finally officially
ditched Clause IV in 1995. Also, see the Conservatives’ transition to euroskepticism
over a similar time period.
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of the euro issue on the outside as Labour went from a stance of anti- to pro-European
integration.
For the Conservatives, the issue of European monetary integration pitted two
Conservative Party ideological positions against each other: the defense of national and
parliamentary sovereignty, on the one hand, and the commitment to advancing free
market integration on the other. This shifted the lines of the conflict within the
Conservative Party, and the issue of European monetary integration began to become
very divisive within the Conservative Party by the end of the 1980s. However, another
issue was also very divisive within the party during that time and also contributed to
Thatcher’s downfall: the prime minister’s determination to impose a community charge,
or “poll tax”. The party was deeply divided over this plan, but it was not a cross-cutting
cleavage. It did not challenge party ideology, and it certainly did not find adherents in
the Labour Party. The party’s differences over the poll tax were a matter of tactics: no
one in the party was suggesting that taxes not be imposed, merely whether or not the
proposed change to the current system was a good idea. But while this issue was not a
cross-cutting cleavage, it did have deep and lasting effects on the Conservative Party.
By contrast, Labour party experienced other ideological cleavages during the
Blair years; for example, the division over Britain’s participation in the Iraq war. This
was a cross-cutting cleavage: the Labour Party was deeply divided over whether Britain
should even participate in this war, and whether it was an appropriate use of British
power. Going into the House of Commons vote on whether to approve British
participation, Blair knew that he could win the overall vote because of Conservative
conviction on the issue, but without winning the votes of the majority of Labour MPs his
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government would be seen to have lost the confidence of his own party (Coldstream
2007). Even though Blair did win the support of a majority of his own MPs, the issue
continued to divide and disrupt the party and government. By contrast, differences
within the Labour Party over public service reform and reform of the House of Lords,
part of the party’s official general election manifesto of 1997, were usually questions
over tactics, not of whether reform should be done at all (Parsons 2009). Again, these
differences could cause divisions within the party, but they were not ideological.
The existence of cross-cutting cleavages in a FPTP electoral system means that
the party leaders must carry on a constant juggling act between the different extremes of
the party on the issue, as Thatcher, Kinnock, and especially Major demonstrate. Even
Blair, with a massive parliamentary majority, had to take into consideration the desires of
both the majority of europhiles and the minority of euroskeptics in his party. But
attempts to balance the desires of both extremes of the party, especially on a high stakes
issue like the euro, sometimes breaks down, and the leader may fail to retain both
extremes within the party. This may literally lead to a split, as happened to the Labour
Party in the early 1980s over Europe, or it may lead to members of the party voting
against their own government or party leader, as happened to Major as well as to the
Labour opposition during the Maastricht Treaty ratification process.
Aspinwall further claims that the nature of the formal electoral institution actually
dictates British policy on EMU and EU integration as a whole: the FPTP system makes
for a more euroskeptic British policy than would be the case if the country had a PR
electoral institution. This is because the need for each party to incorporate both pro- and
anti-EMU viewpoints into government policy when in power means that the ruling party
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must strike a line between moving towards versus pulling away from further integration
in the EU.

On the other hand, PR systems tend to form coalitions around the center,

which means that parties representing more extreme positions on either side (generally
the euroskeptic, since elite ruling parties in many EU member states tend to favor deeper
monetary integration) usually are left out of ruling coalitions entirely, their voice
disregarded in policymaking (Aspinwall 2004).
Denmark, the other EU member who opted out of the single currency during the
Maastricht Treaty negotiations, did not experience the same cross-cutting cleavages that
British parties did over the euro. Aspinwall (2004) argues that the nature of the formal
electoral institutions in the two countries explains why the pressures were worse on
British parties. Denmark’s PR electoral system results in a number of political parties
taking part in ruling, and a government formed regularly from a coalition of parties. On
the other hand, Britain’s FPTP electoral system means that only two (or arguably three
including the Liberal Democrat Party) parties seriously vie for control of the government,
and coalition governments, David Cameron and Nick Clegg notwithstanding, are
exceedingly rare. This means, as discussed above, that ruling British parties must
accommodate a broader range of views on issues such as European monetary integration
in their policy formations, thus increasing the risk of intra-party divisions as the salience
of the issue rises.
In Denmark, by contrast, not only were the majority of parties (certainly the
influential ones) in favor of EMU, but the vast majority of national newspapers were as
well, so that the debate would seem to be closed off from anything other than a pro-euro
position (de Vreese 2004a). But because Danish law requires voter referenda on matters
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that would alter the national constitution, the ruling elite had to put the vote on the single
currency to the people who—narrowly—defeated it. Nonetheless, the issue was not a
cross-cutting cleavage in Danish politics because all the ruling parties were on the same
side, and there were no euroskeptics within the most influential parties. Euroskeptics
existed in fringe parties, which also did not suffer from any cross-cutting cleavages but
were not allowed to take part in the national policy debate on the euro. In the UK, when
both major parties encompassed of a broad range of viewpoints on the issue, cross-cutting
cleavages divided both parties.
The active tension between elites in British government caused by the euro crosscutting cleavage has consistently resulted in a British policy that splits the difference
between full acceptance of the eurozone project and total and permanent rejection of
joining the single currency.3 British policy on monetary union thus, oddly enough,
looked remarkably similar coming from the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, who
vociferously expressed a total rejection of EMU but ended up entering its first stage, the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM); from John Major’s pragmatic attempt to split the
difference between euroskeptics and europhiles in his party while satisfying neither; to
the premiership of Tony Blair, who enthusiastically expressed his ideological support for
joining the euro but who fell back on the same formula of joining “when the time is
right” that had prevailed since 1985. All of these leaders were dealing with cross-cutting
cleavages, and the process of party and elite interest group management trumped their
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Insofar as any Parliament can legally bind a future Parliament’s decisions (Smith 2000).
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own policy views. These outcomes also reflect informal institutional dynamics, which
will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.
Conflicts engendered by the cross-cutting cleavages can arise in three informal
institutions, relationships between prime minister and chancellor, cabinet and backbench
respectively. Informal institutions shape how the cross-cutting cleavages play out within
the party and government. During the Blair years, cross-cutting cleavages were evident
in government even though the party as a whole had largely resolved the conflict. While
ministers are most often on the same side of policy issues in the same government, this
was not always the case on monetary union (Rose 1980). For instance, cross-cutting
cleavages were clearly in existence at the top level of the Blair government, as the euro
issue set prime minister and chancellor at odds with each other. While the two had other
policy differences, by and large they shared common goals, but not on the euro. Their
division over this issue (among others) caused conflict within the government, hampering
its ability to successfully enact policy.
Cross-cutting cleavages were particularly a problem in British politics for formal
institutional reasons as well: until the Major government (followed by the Labour
opposition) pledged to put the euro membership issue to a referendum if it ever came up,
British political actors had no outlet to alleviate the tension caused by the cross-cutting
cleavages within the parties and government. The divisions over the euro had to be dealt
with within the parties and within the unitary parliamentary structure, which led to some
highly damaging and divisive votes during the Major era in particular, but also
contributed to Labour’s difficulties in its long years in opposition in presenting a united
front on European monetary integration to a skeptical electorate. Ironically, as will be
!

#"!

discussed, once the two parties did adopt the referendum option as an outlet for pressure
caused by the intra-party divisions on the euro, both parties ended up resolving the
cleavages without resorting to an extra-institutional remedy.
In this case an important component of reiterated problem-solving sequencing is
salience: the prime minister, other ministers, and back bench factions can try to
downplay (in the case of Blair) or heighten (in the case of Thatcher and Major) the
importance of the issue in the public eye, and thus in the eye of the parliamentarians
seeking re-election (Opperman 2006). The more salient the euro issue becomes, whether
by outside pressure or by actor design, the more problematic the cross-cutting cleavages
regarding the issue become.
According to Opperman (2006), the most important legacy of New Labour’s euro
policy was not something it achieved but rather that it successfully lowered the salience
of European issues, thus removing it from the political argument. In 1997, European
policy, specifically the debate over the euro, was highly salient, a centerpiece of the
Opposition's electoral platform, mentioned all the time by the media, and thus always in
the public eye. Public opinion was primarily euroskeptic while Labour was officially
pro-euro, so in order to minimize damage to its own position in the polls Labour began to
de-emphasize the euro issue. First, it had adopted the Conservative policy of promising a
public referendum on whether to join the euro in 1996. Then New Labour under the
guidance of Gordon Brown made the issue technocratic by creating the five tests model.4
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Brown announced in 1997 that the government would not hold a public referendum on
whether to join the single currency until and unless five economic tests relating to the
euro’s impact on the British economy were passed.
!

##!

This did have the effect of increasing volatility of the issue’s salience, since when an
assessment was due the salience spiked as the media, opposition, and public zeroed in on
the topic, but for the rest of the time the salience dropped. But overall the move removed
the salience of the euro issue until an assessment came due. This was a considerable
accomplishment for the Labour government, since the European policy issue with the
most salience in Britain during the time period examined in this project was the single
currency, with all the issues of national identity and economic sovereignty that came with
it.
Opperman observes a “cognitive miser” quality among the public, in that there are
only so many political issues a person can follow at once, and people tend to follow a
“top of the head” pattern so that whatever that person has heard most recently is likely to
be on his mind when he comes to the polls to vote. Thus the more the opposition (and
government) can keep a topic in the limelight and the more the media promotes it the
more likely it will impact a voter’s decision at the polls. Labour successfully placed
other issues at the forefront of voters’ attention, so that for much of Blair’s first term the
euro issue was not at the top of the public agenda. In addition, voters cannot constantly
monitor the government on every issue, so they use what Opperman describes as a “fire
alarm” approach, where the public relies on the media and the opposition to raise the
alarm when the government makes a misstep on a particular policy, at which point the
public will be alerted to it and act upon it (Opperman 2006). This backfired for the
Conservatives during Blair’s first two terms in office, however, since their constant
harping on the euro membership issue gave the electorate the impression that they had no
other policy proposals.
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Part III. How formal and informal institutions affect British euro policy
This project explores how divisions of power, both formal and informal, affected
the making of British policy on the euro, and the range of possible solutions policy actors
had at their disposal in addressing the cross-cutting cleavages resulting from the pressure
to join EMU. Formal and informal institutions shape the way cross-cutting cleavages
express themselves in parties and government. Accordingly, they shape the nature of the
problem in each time period, since the problem is cross-cutting cleavages over the
European economic integration issue. Also, they shape the range of problem-solving
options for actors in each time period. Actors must act within the formal framework of
parliamentary structure, and informal institutions enable and limit the range of problem
solving options for actors like prime ministers, who have informal powers but also
informal constraints in the nature of their relationships with cabinet ministers and
backbenchers. Institutions limit as well as enable how actors are able to address the euro
cross-cutting cleavage problem.
First, in the parliamentary system the prime minister formally has tremendous
power as leader of the majority party in Parliament and thus as head of government.
However, even the powerful prime minister cannot always get his or her way on policy
regarding the single currency, as is the case for all three of the prime ministers in the time
period examined here. In the case of Thatcher and Blair this is due in large part to a
powerful chancellor exerting his will in a position contrary to the prime minister’s, while
in Major’s case the chancellor exerted a strong influence in one direction, swaying a
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prime minister who was agnostic on the issue, and who had no strongly held ideological
views on euro membership.
This is an example of a cross-cutting cleavage between the two top-ranked
ministers of the realm, but is also in line with informal expectations of the role of prime
minister and chancellor. The chancellor has the power of the purse and often has a power
base of his own within the party. Other ministers can also exert pressure on the prime
minister, as indicated by the battles within the Major cabinet, thus shaping his or her
ability to dictate policy regarding the euro.
The most potentially powerful minister, however, is the chancellor, since he runs
the Treasury. The chancellor can weigh in on an appointment based on this role. As for
appointing the chancellor himself, the prime minister may consider his overall priorities
and how well the chancellor can advance them even if they disagree on some policy
matters. Allen and Ward (2009) speculate that Blair may have traded off Brown’s
objection to euro membership for his support on domestic social policy issues to which
other possible chancellors might have given less support. Brown’s power within the
Labour Party, however, played a key role in his appointment as well.
The chancellors in this time period tended to wield a great deal of power over
Britain’s policy towards economic union with Europe, but Norman Lamont’s lack of
power of during Major’s premiership suggests that a great deal of a chancellor’s
influence lies in the power base he has amassed within the party and with his record of
success in office, not merely in the position itself.
Another informal institution shaping the expression of the euro cross-cutting
cleavages in each time period is the veto power of the two top government ministers over
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the euro issue. The power of the chancellor’s veto depends on the power given to the
Treasury to become involved in policy making (Allen and Ward 2009). Of the
chancellors in this time period, each, with the possible exception of Lamont, acted as a
veto player (Tsebelis 2002) over Britain’s policy on the euro. The strength of veto
players is contingent on the power each minister brings at each particular time:
ministerial strength varies according to events and how well the minister manages them.
The same is true, of course for the prime minister, although he or she can shape the
structure of veto players in the government, since he or she has the power to appoint
ministers. But the prime minister cannot use his or her own veto too often, or it will
erode his or her authority (Allen and Ward 2009). Lawson, Thatcher’s Chancellor, noted,
“There is a limit to the number of resignations that a Prime Minister can wear sensibly”
(Lawson 1994: 44).
In addition to cross-cutting cleavages, formal institutions, particularly that of
electoral and party structures, which shaped each party’s policy on the euro, also shaped
the ambivalence of overall British policy on euro membership. For example, the power of
the unions in the Labour Party, particularly in the 1980s when trade unions held 40
percent of the vote for party leader (Rose 2001) 5, meant that the Labour party leader had
to make sure that the trade unions broadly supported the party’s shift from an antiEuropean integration stance to a pro-integration position. Similarly, Conservative party
rules that held that a challenge to the party leader could only take place at the beginning
of a new parliamentary session in late autumn played a key role in toppling Thatcher
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The party modified its constitution at the 1993 party conference, after which unions
held a third of the vote for electing a new party leader.
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from power and, ironically (since it was a europhile who instigated the rebellion),
opening the door for the party’s newly mobilized euroskeptics to wield a powerful role in
the party. Influential formal institutions also include the FPTP electoral system, discussed
above (Aspinwall 2004).
Another important variable is the existence of informal institutions that shaped the
push-pull dynamic over British euro policy in both parties, resulting in overall
ambivalence. According to Helmke and Levitsky, informal institutions are “socially
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of
officially sanctioned channels,” such as laws, constitutions, legislatures, bureaucracies,
and so on. They continue, “to be considered an informal institution, a behavioral
regularity must respond to an established rule or guideline, the violation of which
generates some kind of external sanction”. Finally, informal institutions are “rooted in
widely shared expectations…about others’ behavior” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 727).
In particular this project will look at two informal institutions: first, the expectations of
relationships between the prime minister and his or her Cabinet members, especially the
Chancellor; and second, the dynamic between back bench parliamentary factions and the
prime minister and cabinet.
Various models have detailed the power relationships, both formal and informal,
in British government over time. The “core executive” literature published in recent
years has depicted greater subtlety in prime ministerial and ministerial power than
previous models allowed. The core executive model looks beyond the prime minister
versus cabinet debate and argues that power is divided among a number of players,
networks and processes, from prime minister to ministers to senior civil servants to the
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mechanisms of branches of the British government (Smith 2000; Dorey 2005). While
power networks exist across Whitehall and Westminster, this project focuses more
narrowly on the informal institution governing interactions between prime minister and
chancellor, and to a lesser extent, other cabinet members affecting the euro debate.
The core executive model argues that no one actor or institution can
singlehandedly shape a “political outcome”, but that an interaction of actors and
institutions in British government determine the direction of policy (Heffernan 2005,
607). In this respect, collegiality, or the degree to which other actors impact prime
ministerial decision making, remains as much a part of the core executive model as it did
of the preceding prime ministerial and cabinet models. However, “[t]he notion that
power was present in both the prime minister and the cabinet—and shifted between
them—was glossed over in the prime ministerial-cabinet government debate” (Heffernan
2005, 607). The core executive model rests on this premise.
The core executive model thus considers the informal institutions inherent in the
relationships and expectations of behavior between ministers. Bevir and Rhodes (2006,
676), for instance, argue that networks—by which they mean “the informal authority
which supplements and supplants the formal authority of government”—play an
important role in British politics. They describe horizontal networks of power as those
between Westminster and Whitehall (the political and bureaucratic arms of government),
which supplement the more traditional vertical power networks. Thus, power centers can
overlie as well as compete with each other, as was the case during the Blair premiership
where, as “the rival courts of Brown and Blair demonstrate, the core executive can be
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seen, not as a single decision centre focused on Blair, but as a set of overlapping
networks” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 676).
However, the prime minister’s power still predominates. Similarly, Heffernan
(2005, 606) points out that the formal powers given to a prime minister derive from his
role as head of government—the “crown prerogatives”: the power to appoint cabinet
ministers and “lead the government”. These formal powers are somewhat limited and
vague. Instead, much of a prime minister’s powers while in office are based on the
informal powers inherent in his position as head of the majority party in Parliament.
Despite the validity of the shared network of power viewpoint, such as that of Bevir and
Rhodes, then, the prime minister’s position as majority party leader alone make him or
her the core of the core executive (Smith 2000).
Sometimes the core executive proponents overstate their case: other models, for
instance, have not suggested an autocratic monopoly on power either by prime ministers
or by cabinet ministers; they merely place the emphasis on the power of one or the other.
The main contribution of the core executive model is to add subtlety to previous models,
teasing out the roles of various actors and institutions that hold power, or “resources”,
with more detail. The core executive model has attempted to model the complexities of
power, the fact that a number of power centers exist in the core executive, not just one
(Heffernan 2003). Because of this, however, the model loses clarity, as each contributor
to the core executive model fuzzes the notion of where exactly the boundaries are drawn
determining who and what, exactly, belong in the core executive.
Nonetheless, use of this model allows this project to uncover the informal powers
of the prime minister in two specific areas. First, it offers a window into the informal
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institutions that both limit and enhance the prime minister’s formal power to appoint
cabinet ministers. Second (and related), it acknowledges space in the prime ministerial
power structure for the prime minister’s informal powers deriving from his position as
leader of the majority party in the House of Commons. Thus, the core executive model in
particular has considered some of the informal power dynamics governing EMU policy.

Part IV. Shaping prime ministerial power
This study examines how informal institutions differ from formal institutions in
constructing prime ministerial power in Britain. For instance, the power to appoint
ministers to the Cabinet is a formal institutional rule; the prime minister has the formal
power to fire ministers as well. But informally, there is an expectation that one cannot
simply hire whomever one chooses, and that firing a minister will have consequences for
the prime minister’s power. Indeed, “A few very senior colleagues may have sufficient
clout to influence appointments and dismissals”, like Willie Whitelaw in Thatcher’s time
and Gordon Brown in Blair’s time (Allen and Ward 2009, 248).
Thus, while the prime minister has formal power to dictate policy, the existence
of informal institutions suggests that the prime minister must negotiate for that power
with various governmental players. This project examines how this appointment ability
is the intersection of formal and informal powers of prime minister and cabinet, and how
these competing powers affect euro policy in each of the three time periods.
Therefore, while it is important for a prime minister to appoint the “right”
minister for the job, doing so is a complex process that incorporates a number of
considerations, such as the minister’s relative power within the party, favors owed, the
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need to keep a rival within the cabinet to neutralize his or her impact in the party; and so
on. Appointing the right minister to the right post can involve not only finding the right
person but also “shift[ing] the pattern of vetoes” in the cabinet” so that a prime minister’s
favored policy is passed by having the right combination of ministers (Allen and Ward
2009, 251).
The second informal institution considered in this project is the relationship
between back benchers and the prime ministers; specifically, to what degree
backbenchers can affect European policy either by toppling the prime minister due to
concerns over electoral success as in the Thatcher period; by controlling a key minority
and thus holding the prime minister hostage over the euro issue as in the Major period; or
by “venue shopping” (Baumgartner and Jones 1991)—going outside the party to
campaigns or think tanks to advance a different agenda from that of the prime minister as
a result of cross-cutting cleavages in the Blair period. Allen and Ward (2009, 245) write,
“If a back-bench revolt of sufficient magnitude is likely to occur, then what the median
member of the House of Commons prefers to the status quo becomes a relevant
consideration, ” as in Major’s time. Rose (2001) points out the rarity of a backbench
revolt against the prime minister, which makes the rebellions, however muted, that took
place in this time period over the government’s euro policy all the more striking.

Part V. Historically contingent variables
While explanatory factors such as cross-cutting cleavages and formal and
informal institutions play key roles across the entire period, from 1983 to 2003, some
historically contingent factors also played a central role in influencing euro policy at
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different times but apply uniquely to one particular temporal case within the overall
historical overview. Historically contingent variables illustrate Haydu’s (1998) claim
that some factors are crucial in shaping the nature of the problem and the range of
problem solving options in a given temporal case, but do not pertain to other time
periods. However, their appearance and effect on problem solving efforts within that
time period do impact the nature of the recurring problem and therefore the range of
possible solutions in subsequent time periods.
Examples include the timing of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, which forced
Major into a decision on the euro that he had rather not taken.6 Another example is the
timing of the Danish public referendum on euro membership: the Danes’ rejection of
euro membership galvanized the British euroskeptics in the Conservative party to fight
their own government on the Maastricht Treaty. Finally, the occurrence of the September
11, 2001 attacks led Blair to switch much of his focus from convincing the British
electorate of the virtues of euro membership to conducting the war on terror.

Part VI. Explanatory concepts
Kingdon (2003) explores factors involved in determining how a policy gets made,
from idea generation to implementation, explaining why some ideas and not others come
to fruition in the policy process. He identifies three key factors in this process, which he
calls policy entrepreneurs, policy windows, and the “softening up” process.
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Though in a classic example of cross-cutting cleavages Major split the difference,
signing the treaty but negotiating an opt-out on the euro.
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First, policy entrepreneurs are “advocates who are willing to invest their
resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon
2003, 179). Policy entrepreneurs are not limited to operating within the formal structures
of power, such as in government, but may function in other parts of the policy world,
such as in the euro referendum advocacy groups of the Major and Blair eras. Kingdon
observes that in case studies policy entrepreneurs stand out at those people, no more than
a handful in any one case, “who were central in moving a subject up on the agenda and
into position for enactment” (Kingdon 2003, 180). In terms of turning euroskepticism
into an active and influential movement, for instance, Thatcher was a key policy
entrepreneur, as was Brown in defining the euro debate in the Blair era.
Policy entrepreneurs become involved in an issue for various reasons, one of
which is “the promotion of personal interests. This might mean the protection of
bureaucratic turf” (Kingdon 2003, 123). This motivation shaped Blair’s desire to find an
issue that could serve as his legacy, though in the end that impulse was not strong enough
in regards to the euro issue to lead him to call for a referendum on the matter. A more
obvious example was Brown’s euroskepticism expressed through the Treasury’s five tests
framework, which gave the Chancellor a great deal more power within the British
political system as he took over the EMU issue, and moreover protected him from the
inevitable loss of this power that would ensue once Britain discarded the pound and
joined the eurozone.
In addition, policy entrepreneurs join the fray out of a purposive incentive, in
order “to promote their values, or affect the shape of public policy” (Kingdon 2003, 123).
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Members of the pro-euro and euroskeptic campaigns, both politicians and policy actors,
became involved in order to affect the outcome of the euro debate in Britain. Thatcher’s
opposition to any form of European monetary union shaped policy in years to come, in
keeping with Haydu’s (1998) causal chains of reiterated problem solving, as did Brown’s
decision to stall whatever limited attempts Blair was making to promote EMU.
Kingdon’s second concept, policy windows, offers insight into the Blair era in
particular, explaining why it is so hard for even the pro-euro prime minister of a pro-euro
party to take Britain into the eurozone. Policy windows are those moments in time when
it is possible for a particular policy to be made because a set of circumstances and actors
have come together to make it possible. Once that window is closed, enacting that policy
becomes unfeasible. Any government has a number of agenda items it wants to
accomplish: the opening of a policy window helps to prioritize which agenda item moves
to the top at that time (Kingdon 2003).
Why do windows open? Essentially, “because of change in the political stream
(e.g., a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats
in Congress, or a shift in national mood)…. A change in administration is probably the
most obvious window in the policy system. … the new administration gives some groups,
legislators, and agencies their opportunity—an open policy window—to push positions
and proposals they did not have the opportunity to push with the previous administration,
and it disadvantages other players” (Kingdon 2003, 168). Europhiles in Britain and on
the continent believed that the entry of Blair as prime minister opened a window that
would make holding and winning a referendum on Britain’s euro membership possible.
But other factors were at play, as discussed in light of the core executive and informal
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institutions literatures, limiting the prime minister’s ability to take advantage of the
window.
The opening of a policy window also allows those vested in the policy topic to
present their version, or frame, of the issue (de Vreese 2004). Pro- and skeptic- euro
campaigns received a lot of attention during the Blair era and were able to pressure the
government on the topic because the window on the euro policy was open. Kingdon
cautions, however, that policy windows only remain open for a short period of time: “An
idea’s time comes, but it also passes. There is no irresistible momentum that builds for a
given initiative” (Kingdon 2003, 169). One of the reasons why a window may close is
because no action takes place on the issue. This can be a result of the end of the
honeymoon period for a new government, when as the prime minister begins to make
decisions and prioritize agenda items, other issues necessarily are pushed back, as
happened to the single currency issue in the Blair years.
Because the window is generally open for such a short time, Kingdon argues, it is
important for participants to act quickly to enact their agenda. A number of europhile
politicians such as Liberal Democrat Leader Paddy Ashdown, Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook and former Labour chancellor Roy Jenkins, urged Blair to hold a referendum on
euro membership soon after his massive electoral triumph in 1997 in order to capitalize
on the positive poll ratings and political momentum he carried from that victory
(Coldstream 2007). But Blair demurred, and he never had a better opportunity to take
Britain into the eurozone for the rest of his ten-year term. Indeed, as will be argued, the
policy window for euro entry effectively closed by the fall of that year, mere months
later, when Chancellor Gordon Brown seized control of the euro agenda and introduced
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his five tests framework for euro membership. It formally closed in June 2003, when
Brown officially declared that the five tests had not all been met.
Meanwhile, Kingdon points out that opponents of a proposed policy, knowing
that a policy window stays open for only a short time, can attempt to dig in for the
duration by hampering progress on the policy. “If one can delay, by studying the issue or
by another expedient, the pressure for the change subsides. The longer people live with a
problem, the less pressing it seems. … It becomes less a problem and more a condition
than it seemed at the beginning” (Kingdon 2003, 170). Coming out of the passage of the
Maastricht Treaty, where Britain and Denmark were the only holdouts among EU
members committing to a single currency, the pressure from the EU for Britain to
conform was high, as was the pressure (and the sense of inevitability) from much of the
British media and governmental elite. Prime Minister Major’s government suffered from
a constant hammering of questions about what its policy would be on euro membership:
Major attempted to alleviate the pressure by refusing to commit to a policy, but this only
redoubled the speculation.
When Blair came into office, as mentioned, it was thought that this pro-euro
prime minister would take the country into EMU. But Brown’s five tests were
effectively a skeptic’s delaying tactic, which he undertook (and which Blair allowed) in
part because the government did not want to use this policy window immediately after
coming into office in 1997 for the euro, but instead wished to carry out other policies
such as public service reform and reform of the House of Lords. But that meant that the
euroskeptic campaigns and politicians had only to pressure the government for a formal
assessment of the five tests, and then wait for that assessment to be negative (which it
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was when Brown delivered it in June 2003), in order to have won. While theirs was not
an easy victory, euroskeptics had the advantage of defending the status quo: once the
euro policy window closed, they knew they had won.7
Finally, Kingdon introduces a concept he refers to as “softening up”, in which
policy entrepreneurs “attempt to ‘soften up’ both policy communities, which tend to be
inertia-bound and resistant to major changes, and larger publics, getting them used to new
ideas and building acceptance for their proposals. Then when a short run opportunity
[policy window] to push their proposals comes, the way has been paved, the important
people softened up. Without this preliminary work, a proposal sprung even at a
propitious time is likely to fall on deaf ears” (Kingdon, 128). This was most clear in this
study during the Blair years, again, when upon first entering office Blair looked at the
public opinion ratings to consider whether it was a good time to hold a euro referendum.
He concluded that it was not, for reasons that will be discussed, but his Foreign Secretary,
Robin Cook, was chief among those who pressured the prime minister to conduct just this
sort of softening up process. Cook argued that the public could be persuaded by a
positive campaign presenting the benefits of euro membership led by the prime minister,
but if the prime minister waited for public opinion regarding the euro to improve on its
own, it never would (Cook 2003). Cook proved to be correct, as Blair never made a
concerted attempt to persuade the public, and public opinion ratings regarding euro
membership failed to become more favorable.
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Based on author’s off the record conversations with ‘no’ campaign staffers.
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A softening up process is also evident in the 1990s with the first proposals to hold
a referendum on the euro. This idea first emerged during the Maastricht Treaty
negotiations with Thatcher, now in the House of Lords, and other former Conservative
leaders arguing that a referendum was necessary in order to allow the public to exercise a
true choice, since the two major parties both agreed that the Treaty should be ratified. At
first Labour was agnostic and the Conservative leadership was opposed, in part on
grounds of violating parliamentary sovereignty. The country had only held a nationwide
referendum once in its history, albeit also on European integration, so there was virtually
no precedent. But groups such as the Bruges Group (highly influenced by Lady
Thatcher) continued to press for a referendum first on the Maastricht Treaty and then on
membership in the single currency area, and as then- Prime Minister Major was forced to
deal with the severe cross-cutting cleavages in his party over the issue he eventually gave
in to the demand in an effort to appease the party’s euroskeptics, despite the still-strong
objection of his chancellor to the referendum.
The Labour Party then followed suit, in part because it could hardly claim to be
the party more representative of the common man if it opposed giving that man a vote on
the matter, and by the end of 1996, both parties were committed to the concept. This
required several years of softening up key politicians and giving the proposal a public
airing, but once the parties committed, it swiftly became expected that Parliament would
not make a decision on the matter without a public referendum taking place first. This
was a big change in British politics, only brought about by several years of softening up.
Kingdon’s concepts fit into the reiterated problem solving methodology because,
first, while they provide insight into all the temporal cases discussed in this work they are
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most applicable to the Blair time period, but are an important component of that period.
As Haydu (1998) stresses, the problem solving methodology incorporates both
explanations that stretch across all temporal cases and explanations that, while rooted in
one time period, when sequenced have consequences for actors addressing the recurring
problem in subsequent time periods. Blair’s decision not to use the policy window on the
euro issue, for instance, meant that the question of Britain’s joining the eurozone still has
not arisen seriously in British politics, eight years after Brown delivered his negative five
tests assessment.
Kingdon’s concepts also tie into the reiterated problem solving methodology
because the policy entrepreneur concept allows us to identify actor-based problem
solving. These entrepreneurs have solutions ready for when the window of opportunity to
address the problem arises. Their efforts to address the recurring problem, in this case
the pressure to integrate in European monetary union, have lasting repercussions down
the causal sequence, affecting the options open to subsequent policy entrepreneurs and
indeed affecting when or if a policy window for European monetary integration will open
again. To continue the abovementioned example, for instance, Brown’s assessment
ensured that the euro policy window would not open again any time soon, a solution to
the problem in his time that has shaped both parties to the present. Brown’s solution (and
Blair’s acquiescence) has allowed Labour to be a pro-euro party without having to take
the trouble of running a referendum campaign, and it has allowed the Conservative Party
finally to move beyond the euro issue: it can be an officially euroskeptic party without
that issue being the only matter that defines it. The public can believe that the party can
govern on a range of other issues because the party no longer has to talk about the euro, a
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transformation that was rewarded in the Conservative victory (however narrow) in the
2010 general election.
Finally, Kingdon makes a similar argument to Haydu’s mix of narrative timespecific particularity and broader cross-period linkages. He argues that the role of the
policy entrepreneur in linking problems with policies and politics “makes sense of the
dispute over personality versus structure. …The window opens because of some factor
beyond the realm of the individual entrepreneur, but the individual takes advantage of the
opportunity. Besides telling us that personalities are important, this formulation tells us
why and when they are” (Kingdon 2003, 182). Kingdon’s insights, too, allow one to take
the actor’s view of the problem into consideration while still considering how larger
structural forces shape the actor’s options in his or her given time period.

Part VII. Conclusion
All of these concepts combine to explain British ambivalence on joining the euro,
with those factors that apply across all three prime ministers, both parties, and the entire
time period in which euro membership was an issue being particularly important. They
explain why in the end British politicians abandoned attempts to join the euro: since
2003, the salience of the issue in British politics has been effectively nonexistent, and
indeed, recent events in Europe may have made the salience negative.
This project explores how the policy agendas of British political elites—
specifically parliamentary party members, both ministers and backbenchers—have
shaped Britain’s policy on euro membership. It does not delve into public opinion,
except to note the effects of upcoming elections on political actors. Nor does it consider,
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except again indirectly, the role of the media in shaping euro policy, though each of these
are important factors in Britain’s policy on the euro. The British media has both pro- and
anti-euro factions, and they do impact public opinion, but ultimately the public’s
“ambivalence” on the euro issue stems from its lack of salience for the public.
Consistently, public opinion polls have shown that the euro issue ranks far down the
public’s priority list, after domestic policy issues such as education and crime. This
project notes parliamentarians’ awareness of public opinion, and assumes for the most
part that this, and media pressure, are folded into MPs’ overall consideration of the euro
issue.

Dissertation Overview
This work examines the cross-cutting cleavages at play in party and government
institutions over several time periods and in both parties. First, the work explores how
the cross-cutting cleavages over European economic integration first flared up and then
became a major divisive force during the latter years of the Thatcher premiership. The
next chapter discusses how in the same time period Neil Kinnock, the Labour Party
leader, forced the party’s cross-cutting cleavage on the issue to play out as he determined
to transform the party from euroskeptic to europhile. Next, the work returns to the
Conservatives under John Major as prime minister, analyze how the cross-cutting
cleavages set in motion under the Thatcher years shaped both the problem Major faced in
the European monetary integration issue and the range of solutions he was able to
attempt, and his degree of success in managing these cleavages. The work continues
chronologically to Major’s successor, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, and how
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Kinnock’s management of the euro cross-cutting cleavage in the party seemingly gave
Blair more room to achieve the party’s officially pro-euro aims, but how in the end he
was prevented from doing so as Blair’s euroskeptic chancellor Gordon Brown blocked
euro membership. Finally, the concluding chapter examines these broader causal
problem-solving sequences for insights across these temporal cases, and considers wider
applications of the insights gained from this consideration of how each actor in each time
period struggled to manage and overcome the euro cross-cutting cleavage.
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Chapter Two: Conservatives 1985 – 1990: Single Market and ERM, the Rise of the
Skeptics

During the 1980s the attitudes of British politicians in all the parties regarding the
European Community (EC, precursor to the European Union or EU) underwent
significant shifts, resulting in, respectively, an effective and real reversal of policy in each
of the two major parties, Conservative and Labour, by the end of the decade. These shifts
in attitude toward European integration were in response to an impetus for further
integration at the European level led by Jacques Delors, who became president of the
European Commission in 1984 (Lawson 1993), but it also reflected the priorities of some
of Britain’s fellow member states. While the overall stance of Britain towards the EC
may have remained the same, one of pragmatic, if skeptical, engagement for much of the
decade, the attitudes of other member states of desire for deeper political and economic
integration acquired an impetus under Delors’ leadership, and thus the beginnings of an
acceleration towards additional political (and as a means to this end, monetary)
integration strained Britain's attitude towards the European project. The passage of the
Single European Act (SEA) in Britain in 1986, the first formal amendment to the 1957
Treaty of Rome that founded the original EC incarnation, likewise proved significant for
Britain’s overall position on the EC.
The strains were most evident in the prime minister herself, Margaret Thatcher,
who governed Britain from 1979 to November 1990, and reverberated throughout her
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party as her willingness to engage in the European integration project reached a high
point with the SEA and abruptly declined thereafter.

Part I. Conservatives’ stance on Europe prior to the SEA
The Conservatives also underwent a change in stance towards European
integration over the course of Thatcher’s premiership, although their struggles over
Europe would not become as pronounced as the Labour party’s in the 1980s were until
John Major’s premiership beginning in late 1990.
As was true of the Labour party, the Conservatives were not as monolithic in their
attitude about European integration as generally portrayed. While the Conservatives
were portrayed as “the Party of Europe”, bringing Britain into the EC in 1972 under thenPrime Minister Edward Heath, there was a consistent presence of euroskeptics in the
party, and most of this pro-European majority were more pragmatic engagers than
instinctively or ideologically pro-European integration (cost benefit analysis). Among
the pragmatic engagers was Thatcher, who became leader of the Conservative party in
1975 and led it to victory in the 1979 general election.
Thus when the Conservatives took power in 1979, the party position toward
Europe was one of engagement, but Thatcher took a pragmatic rather than an ideological
or idealized tone about it. While her party solidly supported her policy of pragmatic
engagement, there remained a number of skeptics in the party. Young has identified
these skeptics as consisting predominantly of two main groups—the fundamentalist
skeptics and the pragmatic skeptics—with a number of subgroups within each of these.
Some members overlapped various subgroups. The fundamentalists were those who
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were ideologically opposed to Britain’s deeper integration with Europe, and included
John Biffen, Teddy Taylor, and former Conservative party member Enoch Powell. These
were not taken seriously in major Europe debates of the 1970s or the 1980s. The
pragmatic ones are as mentioned, those who supported Europe as long as they anticipated
gain from it but were not ideologically wed to the idea of European integration and
Britain’s place in it.
The pragmatic skeptics ignored fundamentalists’ warnings, backed the SEA,
supported integration within the EC at first, but began to oppose it when “their hopes
were frustrated. It was only with the deteriorating benefits of membership that their
position began to alter” (Forster 2002, 70). This group included such MPs as Bill Cash,
later to play a significant role as a Euroskeptic during the single currency debates of the
1990s, Norman Tebbit, Chairman of the Conservative Party from 1985 to 1987, and, in
the end, the prime minister herself.
One of the problems for the skeptics through more than the first half of Thatcher’s
premiership was that they were divided, with the different types of skeptics not sharing
common goals and not working together, nor did they have many opportunities to work
together. Only on the SEA could they have cooperated, and there they did not, as will be
discussed below. The pragmatic skeptics, for the most part, were willing to give the
government position favoring the SEA the benefit of the doubt, to see if it could deliver
as promised, while the fundamentalists remained implacably opposed. Thus, during this
period in the 1980s, not only was there no cross party cooperation among skeptics (the
skeptics from the Labour party were hard left, and Conservative fundamentalist skeptics
tended to be hard right, so it is claimed they were too far apart to be willing to
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cooperate)8, but there was no intra-party skeptic cooperation either.
According to Forster, the two Conservative camps of fundamentalist and
pragmatic skeptics could be broken down into “five broad clusters”, although many
individuals overlapped into different groups. First among the Conservative Euroskeptics
in the Thatcher period were those who had been “Irreconcilable anti-Marketeers from the
start,” such as Richard Body (Forster 2002, p. 70). These included some MPs who had
been “No” campaigners in the 1975 Referendum, thus opposing the policy its own
government had promoted when it brought Britain into the EEC only three years earlier.
Indeed others, like Teddy Taylor, even voted against his own Conservative government
in the 1972 bill proposing that Britain should join the EEC to begin with.
The second subgroup of skeptics, the Constitutionalists, included Bill Cash, James
Cran, Christopher Gill, and Richard Shepherd. These MPs were concerned about “threats
to sovereignty” from EC membership (Forster 2002, 70). Enoch Powell, who left the
Conservative party in 1974 over the Heath government’s decision to take Britain into the
EEC, “provided the intellection reference points for this group” – according to these
MPs, focusing on the financial and economic benefits of the EC overlooked more
fundamental matters such as national sovereignty. As Powell put it, the question of EC
membership was not a “financial calculation of advantage; it was a matter of principle”
(Forster 2002, p. 70).
Third were the Free-Marketeers or Thatcherites such as MPs Michael Spicer and
Nicholas Budgen. These espoused a commitment to the free market, trade liberalization,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This changed somewhat by the late 1990s in the debate over the single currency.
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and other Thatcherite aims. As long as membership in the EC delivered the prime
minister’s goals these people were pro-EC but once it threatened these aims they were
anti-EC.
A subgroup of this type of skeptic were the personally committed Thatcherites,
taking a “whither thou goest” approach to Britain’s degree of integration with Europe.
Among these whose loyalty was primarily to the woman even more than to the principles
for which she stood, Forster claims, were Michael Spicer and Teresa Gorman; these MPs
became even more anti-EC after Thatcher was removed from office out of a desire to
enact revenge on those who had brought their leader down.
A fourth type of Conservative skeptic during this time was the English Populist
Nationalist, those who sought to promote British interests above all else, who saw British
patriotism as their prevailing characteristic in matters European. These, Forster writes,
included such MPs as Shepherd, Nicholas Winterton, John Carlisle, and others (Forster
2002 p. 71).
Finally, there was also a group of skeptics from the left wing of the Conservative
Party, including Peter Walker and Peter Tapsell. These saw the EC not as a free market
but as a trade cartel that shut out the rest of the world. The EC was too homogenous, too
white, denying access to the market to anyone who was not European. Instead, these
skeptics said that Britain’s focus should be on fostering trading ties through the
Commonwealth, which was more multicultural and global in range (Forster 2002).
All of these various types of skeptics remained disunited through the passage of
the SEA in 1986, in part because they were willing to give the Thatcher government the
benefit of the doubt on the promised benefits of the Single Market, in part because
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Thatcher’s government enacted strong party discipline and left little opportunity for
opposition in the ranks. After all, Rose notes, in a parliamentary political system like
Britain’s it is easy to marginalize opponents of the official government line: “The bark of
individual backbenchers is not a threat to a Prime Minister as long as he or she can
dismiss criticism as the views of a handful or group of MPs lacking widespread support
in the governing party.” (Rose 2001, 141).

Part II. The Single European Act (SEA)
In his memoirs, Thatcher’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson wrote,
referring to the SEA, “In retrospect, 1985 was in many respects a watershed year: it was
then that all the elements that were to bring about the downfall of Margaret Thatcher five
years later originally emerged. This was certainly the case with Europe” (Lawson 1993:
888). Few realized the significance of the SEA in this regard at the time, but the next five
years of Thatcher’s premiership, and especially its end, was to hinge to a great degree on
the consequences of this EC treaty.
The SEA aimed to reinvigorate the stalled effort to create a common European
market that moved beyond the customs union that had existed since the 1960s. The act
was one of the key elements in achieving eventual European integration, along with the
European Monetary System (EMS), both of which were to provide impetus to the project
of creating a single European currency during the latter part of the 1980s (Scott 2004). By
establishing new powers for and reforming aspects of the EC institutions the SEA
enabled the shift from a customs union to the single market that was brought into being
by the Maastricht Treaty and took effect on January 1, 1993 (Europa 1986).
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The first important aspect of the SEA was setting a date for completing the EC
internal market: this was not a new idea but rather a renewal of member states’
commitment to achieving it. The act sought to eliminate internal barriers to the free
movement of labor and capital in their various guises (services, goods, etc.) such as
passport controls, different rules and standards in each country, and so on.
Second, the act also allowed for more single market issues to be decided by
qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers rather than by unanimous
consent, expanded powers of the EC and its subordinate organizations, and expressly
stated the intent of establishing both economic and monetary union among the member
states (Scott 2004). Thatcher had opposed extending majority voting during the European
level negotiations but was persuaded that it was necessary to get the single market, and
also consoled herself with the idea that it could be mitigated with use of the Luxembourg
Compromise, (a de Gaulle-inspired informal last-ditch national veto for EC member
states, whose validity in practice, especially for the British, was in some doubt), proved to
be a delusory hope. However, she reassured the House of Commons in December 1985
that “As my hon. Friend is very much aware, the Luxembourg compromise will still be
applied even when there is majority voting, provided that a very important national
interest is involved. (House of Commons Debates, December 5, 1985).
Her deputy in the House of Commons during the SEA debates, Lynda Chalker,
pursued this characterization of the situation, assuring MPs that “This extension of
majority voting should make it harder for a few member states to block the adoption of
measures liberalising air and sea transport, or the common standards for industrial
products which help British firms export to Europe. I should assure the House, however,
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that our special interests are fully safeguarded” (House of Commons Debates, March 5,
1986).
According to Lawson, “The third key provision of the Single European Act was
what was clearly understood by both our major partners and the Commission to be a
commitment to the objective of ‘the progressive realization of Economic and Monetary
Union’” (Lawson 1993: 890). He notes that since this was an EEC goal from 1972 that
had fallen by the wayside, for the European Community member states to resurrect this
aim of monetary union five years after it originally was supposed to have been achieved
was “particularly significant. Moreover, the Act itself contained a chapter providing for
closer economic and monetary co-operation in Europe – which would have been perfectly
acceptable had it not been headed ‘Co-operation in Economic and Monetary Policy
(Economic and Monetary Union)’” (Lawson 1993: 890). While Thatcher scoffed that
such language had no legal power to bind, others, like Lawson, who did not favor
creating a single currency were concerned.
The leaders of the ten (soon to be twelve, with the accession of Spain and
Portugal on January 1, 1986) EC member states completed negotiations on the Single
European Act at the Luxembourg Council December 2-3, 1985. The treaty was signed by
the UK on February 17, 1986, and had its third reading in the House of Commons on July
10, 1986. It came into effect in all twelve member nations on July 1, 1987.
Arguably Thatcher did not even need to sell the SEA to a disinterested public
because she had support from her party and a clear majority to push it through
Parliament. While she faced some pressure from Europe and from the media to further
integrate with Europe, in her autobiography she says nothing about any other domestic
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pressures, and the small size of the Conservative rebellion against the SEA bears this out.
Even most of those MPs who rebelled during the hearings process ended up voting with
the government because, as Euroskeptic MP Bill Cash later explained, they trusted her.
This was an advantage that Major did not enjoy when he too faced a rebellion from
within his own party over the Maastricht Treaty several years later.
So little was the perceived need to rally the party around the SEA, or to head off
opposition from the Labour Opposition that Thatcher spoke in the House of Commons
only one time about the SEA, when she announced that it negotiations on it had been
completed at the Luxembourg Council meeting in December 1985. Even the prime
minister’s questions sessions in the ensuing months when the bill was being debated in
Parliament failed to address the SEA. Furthermore, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe,
the prime minister’s principal deputy on European affairs, spoke in Parliament only one
time about the SEA, when he moved the Second Reading of the bill (the key debate on
any piece of legislation) in the House of Commons in April 1986.
Who was given the task of making the Government’s case for the SEA in
parliament, then? Lynda Chalker, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who had
been a junior minister in the Transport Department until January 1986, was given the task
of advocating the Government position on the SEA for the duration of the SEA’s
progress through parliament. Even Chalker granted, “I might be a little more tentative
when speaking about European matters than when speaking about road lighting” (House
of Commons Debates January 30, 1986). She spoke about the SEA in the House of
Commons at least five times in the six months between the introduction of the bill and its
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passage. But Chalker’s performance was sufficient to the cause: the SEA sailed through
Parliament with negligible opposition from either side of the House.
While Thatcher did not speak more than once in Parliament on the SEA, and
hardly addressed it unless asked in an interview outside Parliament, how she discussed its
key points is significant. While she downplayed the significance of the language on
monetary union, for instance, she nonetheless felt the need to mention it as one of the top
five points addressed at the Luxembourg European Council meeting where the text of the
SEA was agreed. This might indicate that she recognized the importance of monetary
union to other leaders even as she dismissed its likelihood herself. Thus, she told the
House of Commons on December 5, 1985, “on monetary co-operation between member
states, an amendment to the treaty was agreed which describes what has already been
achieved in the Community framework, without entering into new commitments.” …
“Many amendments, such as that on monetary matters, merely describe the state that we
have reached in the Community” (House of Commons Debates December 5, 1985).
Moreover, in response to a question from Labour skeptic MP Tony Benn she confirmed
that they shared the conviction that she did not support a federal Europe and added, as
has been oft-quoted since,
I do not believe in the concept of a united states of Europe, nor do I
believe that it would ever be attainable. The whole history is completely
different, so I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about that matter. I am
constantly saying that I wish that they would talk less about European and
political union. The terms are not understood in this country. In so far as
they are understood over there, they mean a good deal less than some
people over here think they mean. (House of Commons Debates,
December 5, 1985).
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This was, of course, a key problem in Britain’s relations with its European partners: the
terms did seem to mean two different things in Britain and on the mainland, but in this
difference of opinion Thatcher was to find herself by the end of her term in office on the
losing side.
Looked at from a two level game perspective, while during the EC level
negotiations Thatcher spent a great deal of political capital arguing for the economic
benefits of the single market to her European colleagues, some of whom were resistant to
the idea, and compromising on QMV in order to get the market, but at the domestic
political level the prime minister did not spend much time arguing for the SEA at all. In
the case of the SEA, the domestic political level provided little impediment to the
achievement of her aims: all of the battle took place at the European level.
Why was the domestic political level, often in times past and certainly in the years
to come a powder keg over issues of European integration, so uneventful for this SEA
debate? First was the timing: at the same time as the SEA bill was being debated, the
United States had just bombed Libya and the question of whether to impose economic
sanctions on South Africa for its apartheid regime were questions considered more salient
than a dry bill on the European Community.
Second, the Opposition, which normally would have fought the treaty if only to
oppose the Government, was in a state of upheaval. After having been flattened in the
1983 general election for a second straight time after running on a platform of withdrawal
from the EC, Labour was in the midst of reinventing itself, and could not afford to
highlight the divisions on Europe in its own party by opposing the government on the
SEA. Labour party leader Kinnock spoke only three times in Parliament during the SEA
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debates, and each time he did so only to chide the Government for mishandling the
process of the bill’s passage through Parliament and thus delaying its completion. Those
members of the Labour party who would have objected to the extension of the Single
Market either kept a low profile, abstained from the vote, or both.
A third reason was that, quite simply, the SEA failed to resonate with either the
public or members of the ruling party. The Conservative party was also, though less
precipitously, going through an evolution of its position on Europe and as discussed
earlier its members did not want to oppose their leader. Also, the European issue that had
captured public, media and party attention had been the contentious matter of Britain’s
EC budget rebate, which Thatcher had won two years earlier: the SEA, at the time at
least, did not generate the same interest.
Thus, Thatcher made no attempts to persuade the minority of her party that
opposed the SEA on grounds that it amounted to a loss of parliamentary and judicial
sovereignty, with the suppression of the national veto, the extension of qualified majority
voting, and the extension of European Parliament oversight, that such fears were
unwarranted. The Government spokesman Lynda Chalker simply dismissed these fears
as overblown—after all, it did not “detract from the powers of the British Parliament or
create new powers,” arguing instead that the SEA that it was a practical response to the
aims of EC member states in the 1980s (Gunn 1986).
The next part of this chapter delineates the continuing changes in party attitudes
towards Europe for both Labour and the Conservatives. It also considers the European
integration issues that contributed to the growing euroskepticism of and thus division in
the Conservative party as well as the events that helped the Labour leadership transform
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the party’s European policy from extreme euroskepticism to cautious Europhilia by the
end of the 1980s. Of the major events pertaining to the issue of European monetary
integration during the latter half of the Thatcher premiership, the central issue was the
debate over whether Britain should join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and how
the ERM came to be tied to the efforts to create a single European currency through
European Monetary Union (EMU).

Part III. Fixed or floating exchange rate?
When the Conservatives came into office in 1979, Britain had recently come out
of an unsuccessful attempt to peg the pound to a European exchange rate system known
as the Snake. When the successor to this system, the European Monetary System (EMS),
began a few months before the Conservatives took office, the then-Labour government,
mindful of the Snake’s lack of success, entered the EMS but declined to join the part of
the EMS agreement, known as the ERM, that entailed the value of the pound fixed within
a pre-determined band around the values of other European currencies. The Labour
government preferred instead to let the pound float on the open exchange rate markets,
although as a means of placating the Germans, whose currency provided the basis for the
ERM band, it did take some steps to try to manage the value of the pound within a range
similar to that of the ERM. However the then-Prime Minister, James Callaghan, wished
to remain out of the ERM since Britain had more trading ties outside of Europe than its
fellow EC members, which would influence the free market value of the pound (Holden
2002).
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When Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, she decided to continue Labour’s
policy of remaining outside the ERM and letting the pound float. One of the
government’s top priorities was to get inflation, which had been a persistent problem in
Britain in the 1970s and was to reach 18 percent in 1980 before beginning to fall, under
control (House of Commons Library, 1999). As Britain’s economy deteriorated during
the 1970s, first under Conservative and then Labour government, Thatcher had come to
espouse the economic philosophy of monetarism, which asserts that inflation is
exclusively a monetary phenomenon, i.e., a response to the oversupply of money in the
economy, and that the way to combat excessive inflation is to contract the money supply.
In theory, fiscal discipline should accompany this contraction of the money supply,
reducing government borrowing so as to not crowd out private investment in the market,
thus enabling the government to eventually lower interest rates as inflation gets under
control and prices stabilize (Thatcher 1993). Thatcher’s government sought to
accomplish this.
While Thatcher wanted to fight inflation through the money supply, some
members of her cabinet believed that controlling the value of the pound through
membership in the ERM would provide a more precise means of curbing inflation.
Thatcher, however, attributed the Conservative government’s eventual success in
bringing down the rate of inflation to contracting the money supply by manipulating
interest rates, not by trying to hold the pound’s value at a certain exchange rate. She
justified this method of fighting inflation on the grounds that the exchange rate was not as
fundamental to the health of the British economy as interest rates were, since a large
portion of the economy—services—was not traded abroad (Thatcher 1993).
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In addition, some in Thatcher’s first term cabinet were concerned about pursuing
an exchange rate target instead of a monetary policy target since, due to Britain's North
Sea oil holdings the pound was a ‘petro-currency’, and “this had the apparently perverse
result that whereas higher oil prices increased the value of the pound, they would
generally reduce the value of other western European currencies”. Finally, Thatcher
argued that, in 1979, the “appalling condition of the British economy in 1979” was a
“destabilising factor”: she had to tame inflation and bring the public finances back under
control before ERM could be contemplated (Thatcher 1993, 692), not the other way
around. If it had been in ERM at the time, the British government would have had to
intervene in the exchange market significantly, selling a lot of pounds, in order to keep
the value of the pound down and remain within the ERM bands, since the price of the
pound had been driven up by high oil prices in the shocks of the 1970s. Meanwhile, the
currencies of Britain’s would be partners in the ERM would face the opposite pressure
due to the oil shocks. Thus, Thatcher concluded that ERM membership was unsuitable
for Britain as her government took over in 1979, and her opposition to membership
would persist for the next ten years.
Thatcher’s personal economic advisor, Alan Walters, who advised her through her
first term as Prime Minister before leaving to teach at Johns Hopkins University,
supported her advocacy of a floating exchange rate. Walters did not believe that the UK
should join the ERM. On ERM, Thatcher writes, “My caution was reinforced by
powerful advice from Alan Walters. His view was that it was wrong to think of the ERM
as a force for stability. It did not even have the – arguable – merits of a system of fixed
exchange rates. The parities moved within a band.” Worse, realignments within the
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ERM band “were the subject of political horse-trading rather than the workings of the
market – and the market does a better job” (Thatcher 1993, 693).
Walters, however, was not an MP, and while many of Thatcher’s Cabinet
members also sympathized with monetarist theories, these politicians had different ideas
about how to best fight inflation and the importance of fixing the value of the pound or
letting it float. Moreover, Nigel Lawson, Thatcher’s chancellor from 1983 to 1989,
observes that the Prime Minister also supported a strong currency and was not as
indifferent to the weakening of the pound on the open market as some might suppose
from her support of floating regimes. Lawson himself distrusted floating regimes and
advocated what he called in a 1987 IMF speech a “managed float”, in which the pound
would fluctuate within a narrow range around another currency’s value. He believed that
of all the options for a fixed exchange rate regime (such as linking to the value of the
U.S. dollar) the ERM was the most viable option for the UK to control inflation, among
other reasons because much of the UK’s trade took place with European countries. Also,
he believed that the UK should join the ERM to achieve economic stability and meet
targets for lowering inflation (Lawson 1992).
Thatcher disagreed strongly, as was her wont, and this disagreement between
prime minister and chancellor became a matter of central importance in her government
as the years of her premiership went on. In her opinion,
You can either target the money supply or the exchange rate, but not both.
It is an entirely practical issue. The only effective way to control inflation
is by using interest rates to control the money supply. If, on the contrary,
you set interest rates in order to stick at a particular exchange rate you are
steering by a different and potentially more wayward star. As we have
now seen twice – once when, during my time, Nigel shadowed the
deutschmark outside the ERM and interest rates stayed too low; once
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when, under John Major, we tried to hold to an unrealistic parity inside the
ERM and interest rates stayed too high – the result of plotting a course by
this particular star is that you steer straight on to the reefs (Thatcher 1993,
690).
Lawson’s argument, meanwhile, was that with a floating exchange rate he kept missing
his inflation targets just as his predecessor as chancellor, Geoffrey Howe (chancellor in
Thatcher’s first term, 1979-1983), had done, and that fixing the exchange rate to a
stronger currency like the deutschmark gave Britain inflation-fighting credibility. In any
case, the argument over maintaining a fixed, as was effectively the case with the ERM,
versus floating exchange rate ultimately became a key part of Britain’s changing attitudes
about European integration, and a key informal constraint that impeded Thatcher’s ability
to govern as she thought right and eventually contributed to her political demise.
The dispute over Britain’s membership in the ERM was not limited to the
Treasury and Number 10. In the Thatcher government’s first term, Geoffrey Howe, then
Chancellor, opposed joining the ERM along with his Prime Minister. Once Howe
moved to the Foreign Office in the second term, however, his view on ERM changed.
The Foreign Office supported entry into the ERM for political reasons, believing that
Britain’s membership would signal to its European partners its willingness to cooperate
on Community matters. According to Thatcher, the foreign office regarded ERM as a
foreign policy issue, while the Treasury considered it, “rightly”, as an economic policy
matter (Thatcher 1993, 692).

As a compromise, the government developed a policy

pledging that Britain would join the ERM when the “time was right”, a vague promise
that was unsatisfactory to all but served as a placeholder for a debate that the Thatcher

!

&*!

government did not yet wish to have among its own members and as a way of placating
EC partner countries while committing to nothing.
Lawson became chancellor following the Conservatives’ second consecutive
victory in the 1983 General Election. He had long been in favor of a fixed or managed
exchanged rate regime to combat inflation. After the Plaza Accords in September 1985,
when the governments of the US, UK, Japan, West Germany and France agreed to
intervene in the currency markets in order to devalue the dollar, Howe, now foreign
secretary, and Lawson, now chancellor, both supported entry into ERM, believing that
the Plaza Accords had shown how currency values could be manipulated to successfully
achieve policy aims (Lawson 1992). In doing so each opposed their Prime Minister,
Thatcher, who still saw no reason, as she saw it, to effectively relinquish control over
monetary policy to the Bundesbank, since the value of each of the ERM currencies was
essentially determined by the value of the powerful deutschmark. However, political
tides had begun to turn: the Prime Minister was now facing a split cabinet over the ERM
issue and could no longer count on her willpower and the government's electoral success
alone to sway those who disagreed with her, and pressure was mounting on her to change
Britain’s policy on ERM.
Having taken time to summon other potential supporters of ERM, including
Howe, to the meeting, on November 13, 1985 Lawson made his first formal pitch to
Thatcher that Britain should join the ERM. Thatcher reiterated her monetarist preference
for a floating regime as well as the party’s stock position that sterling should join the
ERM when ‘the time is right’. This formula, however, had become “unsatisfactory” to
Thatcher:
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Most of the arguments which persuaded me that we should not now enter
the ERM applied to the principle – not just the circumstances – of entry. I
knew that I was in a very small minority within the Cabinet on this matter,
though most of my colleagues were probably not over-interested in it
anyway. Geoffrey and Nigel, by contrast, were fervent. For Geoffrey
membership of the ERM would be a demonstration of our European
credentials. For Nigel it would provide stability in the turbulent and
confusing world in which decisions about interest rates and monetary
policy had to be made. And there is no doubt that those decisions could
on occasion be extremely difficult” (Thatcher 1993, 697-8).
Thatcher was beginning to consider ERM primarily in terms of a loss of Britain’s
sovereign ability to set monetary policy rather than simply as a technical means of
fighting inflation, and thus her opposition was becoming more entrenched. Meanwhile
Lawson had come to view ERM membership as the only viable means of meeting
inflation targets, and thus was digging in his heels as well for a battle that would continue
between prime minister and chancellor until the latter’s resignation in late 1989, and then
persist until the Prime Minister finally gave in to Lawson’s successor as chancellor in late
1990.
Meanwhile, the dollar’s value had risen dramatically in 1985 then, following the
Plaza Accord, had fallen in 1986, taking sterling’s value down along with it.
(Incidentally this indicated the strong financial and trade ties between the US and the UK,
one argument Callaghan and others had made for keeping the pound out of the ERM.
Lawson, however, was undeterred.) Members of the G7 countries met in February 1987
and, in the Louvre Accord, agreed to collectively intervene to control the value of the
dollar, which had the side effect of stabilizing the value of the pound as well.
The pound’s improved performance after the Louvre Accord went into effect
confirmed Lawson’s conviction that the currency would perform better under an
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exchange rate mechanism, and by March 1987 Lawson quietly had adopted a policy of
shadowing the deutschmark at a rate of roughly three deutschmarks to one pound.
Lawson admitted in his memoirs that he did this not only to improve performance on
inflation targets and other economic goals, but also to show that the pound could function
well in an exchange rate regime, as the Louvre Accord effectively had established a
credible one (Lawson 1992). From Thatcher’s perspective, however, in March 1987
Lawson began to pursue an economic policy that diverged from the one the Cabinet and
Prime Minister had agreed to and publicly promoted, the monetarist approach that had,
seemingly, served Britain and the Conservative Government in good stead for several
years (Thatcher 1993).
On June 11, 1987 the Conservatives won their third straight general election.
Lawson claims that a widespread consensus gave him credit for the victory, and that
Thatcher held this against him. This, and his claim that she went back on a promise to
him to re-examine ERM entry after the election led him to be secretive with her over his
policy of shadowing the deutschmark and other matters (Lawson 1992). In any case,
according to Thatcher she did not find out that her Treasury was pursuing an explicit
policy of shadowing the deutschmark until a Financial Times interviewer questioned her
about the policy in late November 1987 (Thatcher 1993).
Thatcher discovered Lawson’s new policy of shadowing the deutschmark
following the October 19, 1987 stock market crash, because he had to intervene
massively in the market to maintain the exchange rate at his chosen level of three
deutschmarks per pound. Thatcher writes that the scale of the intervention needed made
Bank of England officials nervous about the state of the country’s monetary reserves.
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Lawson had tied his reputation as chancellor to the policy of shadowing the deutschmark,
and to abandon the policy would damage his authority so he had an incentive to continue
despite the cost (Thatcher 1993). Lawson, on the other hand, contends that market
confidence improved when he adopted his shadowing policy, which vindicated his
abandonment of the classic monetarist policy the Thatcher government had adhered to
(Lawson 1992).
Around this time, Lawson and Howe began to air their difference of opinion with
the Prime Minister over ERM more publicly. Howe told reporters that the “time is right”
qualification was increasingly inappropriate given Britain’s underlying commitment to
ERM membership (Young 1999).

Thatcher and Lawson also had become dissatisfied

with the “time is right “ policy (Lawson 1992, Thatcher 1993), and its role as a
compromise tagline that patched over the growing gulf in the Cabinet over both ERM
policy and, increasingly, engagement with the European Community (EC) more broadly
was becoming less convincing.
The disagreement over ERM between the Prime Minister and her two highestranking ministers is an excellent example of the role informal constraints can play in
shaping policy. The chancellor is the second most powerful minister in Britain after the
prime minister, with the power to shape economic policy. Until the Blair government
privatized the Bank of England in 1997, the chancellor had power not only over fiscal
policy but over monetary policy as well. However, different governments have different
power sharing arrangements: the arrangement between Tony Blair and his Chancellor,
Gordon Brown, is unusual in that the Prime Minister ceded virtually all authority over
economic policy to the Chancellor (and what Blair did not cede, Brown took) (The Blair
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Decade, 2007). Thatcher, by contrast, was insistent on retaining the nominal power over
all of her government’s policy, particularly economic policy and especially economic
policy as it pertained to Europe. However, this breadth of power meant that the attention
Thatcher could give to any particular issue area was limited, and explains in part how she
could have missed the fact that her Chancellor was shadowing the deutschmark at the
same rate maintained in the ERM for more than half a year. (For the record, Lawson says
that he had not made a secret of his policy change to shadowing the deutschmark, though
neither did he tell Thatcher explicitly about it (Lawson 1992).)
Because the Prime Minister did not explicitly tell the Chancellor not to shadow
the deutschmark, he took the opportunity to follow his own policy principles. However,
once she did find out, it caused the tension between the prime minister and the ministers
who supported ERM membership to flare even higher, leading to a standoff between
Thatcher on the one hand and Howe and Lawson on the other several months later, which
will be discussed below.
There is also risk in a prime minister standing against a number of her own
ministers, particularly if they are high ranking. At Lawson’s November 1985 meeting,
not only did he and Howe support ERM membership, but so did the Governor of the
Bank of England, Robin Leigh-Pemberton and Conservative Party Chairman Norman
Tebbit. The Leader of the House of Commons, John Biffin, sided with Thatcher. But
when William Whitelaw, Leader of the House of Lords, said that if the chancellor, the
foreign secretary, and the governor of the Bank of England all recommended that Britain
join the ERM “that was good enough for him. Thatcher retorted that it was not good
enough for her”, and said that the government would have to proceed without her if it
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wished to enter ERM (Gowland and Turner 1999). Effectively, that is what Lawson did
when he began to quietly shadow the deutschmark. Moreover, the meeting began to
solidify, at least for Howe and Lawson, the notion that they would not be able to persuade
the prime minister to their beliefs but would have to find ways either to get around her or
to coerce her to agree to the policies they thought best.
Thatcher was also constrained in her response to defections such as Lawson’s
decision to shadow the deutschmark. Even though the government had just won a third
consecutive general election by a wide margin, Thatcher’s credibility would be
undermined by firing a chancellor who had been considered an integral part of her reelection team. It also could have turned the Cabinet against her and led to less
cooperation in achieving her other policy goals, and to have created a powerful enemy
and placed him on the back benches where he could stir up dissatisfaction with her
policies and practices among the rank and file Conservative MPs would have been
dangerous to her ability to achieve her aims as well. Lawson was too powerful to fire: he
could stir up opposition to her and undermined the government’s overall authority in
Parliament. Even firing a low-ranking minister could cause problems for prime
ministers: later, for example, Prime Minister Blair chose not to fire Clare Short, a
relatively unimportant minister, for fear that she might prove more troublesome on the
backbenches where she could rally her fellow old Labourites against Blair, than if he kept
her in the cabinet.
In addition, by 1987 Thatcher had been prime minister for eight years, and
Cabinet colleagues and public alike had begun to tire of her personality and way of
conducting politics. Rose observes,
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Everyone who came in contact with Thatcher during her eleven years in
Downing Street felt the full effect of a very forceful personality. Thatcher
was a non-conformist and propagated a novel political programme of her
own. When under attack at the 1980 Conservative Party conference, she
declared, ‘You turn if you want to; the lady’s not for turning.’ Instead of
being pragmatic, she was ideological; instead of being emollient, she was
combative; and instead of being willing to compromise, she was insistent”
(Rose 2001, 59).
Even those these traits were still getting results in the 1987 general election, cabinet
colleagues were beginning to feel frayed around the edges and began to wonder if other
means of achieving electoral success and accomplishing the Conservative agenda might
be both more palatable and just as successful.
Indeed, Thatcher never held very high public approval ratings, although in the
parliamentary system it was more important that for most of the 1980s the Conservative
party as a whole continued to gain higher popularity numbers than its political opponents
(Rose 2001). But over time, her Cabinet colleagues and even her party as a whole began
to see Thatcher’s style as increasingly more of a liability than an asset in electoral
politics. This meant that while she might face down her foreign secretary, chancellor,
and Governor of the Bank of England in 1985, the effectiveness of her doing so declined
in subsequent years, and by 1988 she was forced to bow to an ultimatum issued by her
foreign secretary and chancellor, of which more below.
Cross-cutting cleavages also caused much of the strife in the Conservative party
over Europe and the ERM in particular. While Thatcher was strongly monetarist, at least
in so far as her determination to use monetary policy rather than exchange rate regimes to
address inflation, not all of her party was as deeply convinced. When Thatcher
announced to the 1980 Conservative Party Conference that “the lady’s not for turning”,
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she had been coming under fire from her own party members for pursuing monetarist
policies to fight inflation, showing that the party was by no means monolithically
monetarist even so early on in her premiership. Part of this divide was due to the fact that
the Conservative Party’s ideology had been undergoing significant changes in the 1970s,
just as Labour’s would in the 1980s. Thatcher came to power by defeating her old boss,
former Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, in a leadership election after the
Conservatives had lost power to Labour in 1974. In the face of a weakening economy in
the 1970s (the British inflation rate reached 24.2 percent in 1975) both parties looked for
new policy solutions, and Thatcher’s monetarism seemed at least a different approach to
Heath’s discredited policies. But it was change, more than monetarism itself, that the
Conservative party embraced, and while the party won the 1983 general election by a
dizzying margin, the party still supported only what seemed to work. The continuing
recession of the early 1980s, which many blamed on Thatcher’s persistence in using the
monetarist approach to fight inflation, meant that even within Thatcher’s own party
people were not persuaded that monetarism was the only solution.
This certainly was the case with Lawson, as discussed above, even though he was
otherwise one of Thatcher’s closest allies in the Cabinet, and had come to power as part
of the new “Thatcherite” wing of the party in the mid- to late-1970s. Even though he
would be considered a free market politician, he was willing to limit the freedom of the
market in areas such as the free setting of prices in the foreign exchange market in favor
of policies he thought more successful. It is likely that he considered ERM more of a
technical argument – what is the best way to control inflation – than an ideological
argument – minimize government involvement in all markets, including the currency
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market. Thatcher’s motivations were more of a mix, with ideological aims
predominating, while Howe’s motivation regarding ERM tended to be more political,
seeing it as a matter of Britain’s need to improve relations with its EC partners, even
though as chancellor he had supported the ideological monetarist approach. These
divisions in how the senior government members looked at ERM policy indicate just one
of many ways in which differences shaped the overall government’s policy and the
constraints operating on the interaction among cabinet members.

Part IV. Delors and the EC
While the Conservative leadership battled over ERM, changes at the EC level
took place that would have a considerable impact on the British domestic debate over
European integration. One such change was the appointment of Frenchman Jacques
Delors as president of the EC in 1984. Delors advocated European federalism and
increasing integration among member states via legislation—covering among other
things social standards—and through a single currency. The British Labour party saw
him as a means of reinventing itself on European policy with his advocacy of
harmonizing social standards among member states, while the same measures caused the
euroskepticism in both the Conservative party and its leader to flourish in the latter half
of Thatcher’s premiership.
Delors was France’s Finance Minister in the Socialist government of Mitterrand,
which had to abandon the practice socialism in Mitterrand's great policy U-turn of 1982.
Offered the position of prime minister of France, he preferred instead to become the
president of the EC Commission in January 1984 because, asserts Lawson, it offered
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more scope for power and gave a new direction to his strong centralizing philosophy after
the retrenchment of socialism at the French national level. Delors embraced European
federalism: Thatcher describes Delors as a man with a strong belief in the need for
centralization of power in the EC (Thatcher 1993). According to Lawson, the EC
Commission presidency was a good post for Delors because “it did not take a great deal
of ingenuity to promote the notion that anyone who questioned the transfer of power to
the Commission in Brussels was ipso facto a bad European. Regrettably, as he came to
identify the sacred cause of Europe with himself, he became increasingly thin-skinned
and intolerant of criticism” (Lawson 1992, 891-2).
Delors was the primary driver behind the inclusion of language in the 1986 Single
European Act that aspired to EMU, language that at the time Thatcher thought
unimportant (though Lawson did not) but later served as the basis for the launch of
economic and monetary union. Clearly Delors got under the skin of both Lawson and
Thatcher, and his federalist aims brought out the worst in the prime minister. The threat
the Conservative leadership perceived in his plans for the EC prompted Thatcher to alter
her formerly more pragmatic expressions of euroskepticism to vociferously ideological
proclamations, a move that was to cause the cross cutting cleavages in her party over
European integration to become much more pronounced. Meanwhile the Labour party
was delighted with Delors, as will be discussed below.
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On January 1, 1988 Germany assumed the rotating Community presidency9 and
announced that its goal for its six-month term in office was to establish an exploratory
group to determine how best the EC might go about creating a European Central Bank.
This was a key precursor to EMU, since a single currency would require a single central
bank to manage it. Now that Germany was explicitly pushing for it, the idea of monetary
union was becoming closer to reality: that the Germans, holding the EC presidency, had
proposed this committee made it harder for the British, who opposed any such step, to put
an end to the initiative. Rather than futilely trying to prevent the establishment of such a
group it would be better, the British decided, to try to control who was on the committee
and thus what its conclusions might be, a plan that met with limited results.
The group’s mandate was to “’study and propose concrete stages towards the
progressive realization of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’” (Lawson 1993, 903).
The committee consisted of all member state central bank governors, with EC President
Delors as chair, and because of his presence the group was already predisposed to be proEMU. The fact that the chair was the EC president also gave the commission more clout
than otherwise it would have. Delors recently had been awarded a second term in office,
against what was then conventional practice of serving only one term, which also
increased his influence on the EMU matter.
In June 1988 the European Council, meeting in Hanover, commissioned the
Delors report on European monetary union, and in September 1988 the Delors
Committee began work. Instead of consisting of Finance Ministers from the member
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
Delors was the president of the European Commission, while the presidency of the
European Community overall rotated among member countries every six months.
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countries, some of whom opposed the EMU plan, at Delors’ suggestion the commission
consisted of the heads of the member states’ central bank, most of whom were politically
independent of their governments. The President of the Bundesbank agreed to this
committee makeup on condition that the resultant European Central Bank would be
independent (European Navigator (ENA), 2009).
In February 1989 the Delors Committee distributed drafts of its report to member
nations. As expected, the UK found that the Committee’s aims differed greatly from
Britain's. In the Delors Report, the British had wished to include clauses “which would
make it clear that EMU was in no way necessary to the completion of the Single Market
and which would enlarge upon the full implications of EMU for the transfer of power and
authority from national institutions to a central bureaucracy” (Thatcher 1993, 708). They
also wanted to prevent the movement for creating EMU from gaining “momentum”.
None of this appeared in the final report.
Thatcher was most unhappy with the Governor of the Bank of England, Robin
Leigh-Pemberton, for not, as she saw it, making a stronger representation of his country’s
interests as the sole British member of the Commission. Leigh- Pemberton said that he
was uncomfortable being the sole voice in opposition to the report while the commission
was meeting, and decided to settle for trying to soften the language in the report and
instead write his own opinion to be appended to the communal draft. He was
unsuccessful in refining the text’s language, and because of what Thatcher viewed as his
squeamishness, Lawson reports that Thatcher never spoke to Leigh-Pemberton about
European matters again (Lawson 1992).
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On April 12, 1989 the Delors Commission delivered its report to member states.
The report primarily addressed European monetary union (EMU), although it also
covered regional and social policy as well. The report recommended a three-stage
process to achieve EMU; according to Thatcher, there had been an understanding that at
the first or second stage a country could stop and decide to proceed no further. Delors
however, insisted that joining the first stage meant that a country had set itself
irrevocably on the path to monetary union. The report also decreed that work on a new
treaty regarding EMU should start immediately (Thatcher 1993).
The Delors report envisioned establishing EMU over three stages. In the first
stage of EMU, all member states would join the ERM within a narrow band, and member
states would complete the financial facets of the Single Market agreed to in the SEA.
Stage Two Lawson calls “Rather vague, but essentially a transitional phase during which
the new institutions required for Stage Three would be developed. In addition, ERM
realignments would become few and far between, and it was implied that the various
national central banks would become independent, as a prelude to their fusion into an
independent European Central Bank in Stage Three” (Lawson 1992, 912).
Finally, in Stage Three exchange rates between all member state currencies would
be fixed and the member state central banks would cede control over monetary policy to
the European Central Bank, which would establish a single currency. As a means of
smoothing any instability that might arise from this transition, the EC would, according
to the Delors Plan, also set restrictions on national fiscal expenditure levels and provide
further subsidies to those countries seen to be needing them (Lawson 1992).
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Delors Report’s Proposed Three Stages to European Monetary Union
Stage One
Stage Two

Stage Three

Join ERM
within Narrow
Band
Minimize ERM
realignments
Fix exchange
rates between
all member
state currencies

Complete
financial
aspects of SEA
Make central
banks
independent
(implied)
Central banks
cede control
over monetary
policy to new
European
Central Bank
(ECB)

Develop new
institutions
required for
Stage Three
ECB
establishes a
new central
currency

Place limits on
member state
fiscal
expenditure
levels to
smooth path to
monetary union

Lawson thought that stages one and two were unproblematic, the second because of its
imprecise language; Thatcher was prepared only to accept the first stage, and in Britain’s
own timing. All three of Britain’s top ministers, including the Europhile Foreign
Secretary Howe, agreed that Stage Three was unacceptable.
Lawson, long a proponent of membership in the ERM, condemned the regime’s
inclusion in Delors’ plan for monetary union. According to Lawson, the Delors Report
had a dual impact on ERM: on the one hand, because it was now the required first step
for any member country wishing to join the single currency, the report strengthened the
regime. On the other hand, Lawson noted, “it also fatally confused the essentially
economic question of the ERM with the fundamentally political argument over EMU;
and linked the hard-earned credibility of the ERM, which had by then been in existence
for a decade, to the speculative and uncertain EMU” (Lawson 1993, 913). It also
strengthened Thatcher’s opposition to ERM, confirming her belief that membership in the
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ERM would put the country on the road to membership in the EMU (Gowland and
Turner 1999).
In any case, despite British objections the Delors Report set the stage for EMU
moving forward. In Maastricht in December 1990 formal negotiations over EMU began
on the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office invited
Delors to give a speech to the Trade Unions Conference (TUC) on September 8, 1988, in
the hopes that it would alleviate trade union and Labour party suspicion of the EC. While
Delors did more than perhaps the Foreign Office hoped in achieving this goal, his speech
worsened relations between Thatcher and Delors.
In his speech, Delors stressed the importance of solidarity and cooperation as
much as competition in bringing about the single market and securing Europe’s future
success. In a direct challenge to Thatcher’s principles he said, “It is impossible to build
Europe only by deregulation” (Delors 1988). He pointed out that the SEA had in addition
to committing to achieving the single market by 1992, also pledged to bring about a
cooperative framework, and that to achieve this vague notion there needed to be “social
dialogue at the European level.” (Delors 1988). He also said that the single market would
have to ensure worker safety and rights and rights to ongoing education to alleviate any
changes the market might force on workers. Finally, he stressed that solidarity and
cooperation among Europeans would ensure the survival of European identity and culture
in a globalized, competitive world (Delors 1988).
Lawson writes that Delors’ speech to the TUC “did more than anything else to
bring about Labour’s Damascene conversion over the European Community. But it was
scarcely a triumph of diplomacy to have been instrumental in greatly widening the
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already dangerous rift between the British prime minister and the President of the
European Commission” (Lawson 1993, 907). Delors assured Labour and union members
that the principle of collective bargaining would be upheld at the EC level and that
workers would receive protections against the depredations of the single market. He said,
“In my opinion, social dialogue and collective bargaining are essential pillars of our
democratic society and social progress.”
Delors’ speech at the Trade Unions Conference reframed the issue of Europe for
the Labour Party, changing the nature of the domestic political level of the two level
game enunciated by Putnam, in which a national leader must build political coalitions at
home, then try to make agreements internationally that will support the domestic
coalition’s agenda (Putnam 1988). Alternatively the national leader must negotiate
agreements at the international level, in this case the EC, and also deal with the
repercussions of such agreements at the domestic level with his or her constituents, then
promote or defend the agreement in Parliament. Such was the case for Thatcher in
negotiating the SEA and other agreements with fellow EC members.
In the case of Labour, Delors’ new interpretation of the single market away from
the more purely capitalist bent Thatcher was promoting allowed a new “agreement” or
middle ground between Labour’s constituency, such as the labor unions, which was now
willing to move toward the center from the left, and the EC. This allowed Labour leaders
like Neil Kinnock to re-frame the party’s position on and attitude about Europe. It gave
the party political cover: to skeptics, especially those within the party, it could point out
that Delors had given them guarantees that would protect workers against any increased
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competition they would experience being part of the EC and as a result of the Single
Market, which they had opposed in 1986.
In addition, as Young points out, Delors’ speech at the TUC gave Labour a new
weapon to use against Thatcher in the domestic electoral battles. He writes of Delors’
TUC appearance, “The occasion marked an important moment in the conversion of the
British left to ‘Europe’, not yet for its internationalist, still less its federalist, potential, but
as the only available hammer that dislodge Margaret Thatcher from her unsettling
ascendancy” (Young 1999, 346). More about Labour’s transition from euroskeptic to
europhilic party will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Part V. Conservative euroskepticism grows
The Bruges Speech, 1988
In September 1988, shortly after Delors presented a statist vision of Europe to
Britain at the TUC conference, Thatcher delivered her free market interpretation of
Europe’s future to an audience in Bruges, Belgium. Delors’ speech in her own backyard
had infuriated Thatcher, particularly his claims of increasing legislative and governing
authority at the EC level. Young notes, “Delors, a subtle as well as a strategic man, saw
this speech as a warning. It was not a mission statement so much as a provocation to
national parliaments, inviting them to consider the political realities likely to flow from
the momentum unleashed by the Single Act. That wasn't how Mrs Thatcher read it. To
her it seems to have come as a straightforward power-grab by a megalomaniac” (Young
1999, 345-6). The prime minister was determined to counter this perceived threat.
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In her memoirs, Thatcher describes what led her to make the Bruges speech,
which was to redefine the British euroskeptic movement away from the Labour left (now
nearly won over by Delors’ guarantees of worker protection against capitalism in the EC)
to the Conservative right. She speaks of the creeping federalism that she saw taking
place over the years through bureaucratic EC measures that seemed benign or even
helpful to member state populaces but that established precedents for EC jurisdiction over
national governments in a broadening number of policy areas. She noted that
government lawyers had warned the Cabinet that while the government could appeal such
policies to the European Court of Justice, the ECJ was likely to interpret EC rules in
favor of a more expansionary view of EC jurisdiction. In other words, Thatcher
concluded, in terms of resisting federalism at the EC level, “The dice were loaded against
us.” She continues,
The more I considered all this, the greater my frustration and the deeper
my anger became. Were British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty,
the common law, our traditional sense of fairness, our ability to run our
own affairs in our own way to be subordinated to the demands of a remote
European bureaucracy, resting on very different traditions? I had by now
heard about as much of the European ‘ideal’ as I could take; I suspected
that many others had too. In the name of this ideal, waste, corruption and
abuse of power were reaching levels which no one who supported, as I had
done, entry to the European Economic Community could have foreseen
(Thatcher 1993, 743).
This long-developing indignation led to Thatcher’s decision to make her case for a nonfederalist, free market European Community of sovereign nations at Bruges.
Her Foreign Office, led by Geoffrey Howe, was horrified by the prime minister’s
intent to deliver an address that Delors and the EC would see as a direct challenge to the
EC’s aims and an affront to other members’ national pride, suggesting as it did that
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Britain was the champion of freedom in Europe. While the Foreign Office was able to
suggest some edits to the speech before the prime minister delivered it, the overall
message was one that it, including Foreign Secretary Howe, did not support (Young
1999). At Bruges the prime minister did begin the speech with an accommodation to her
pro-European Foreign Office by discussing Britain’s “European credentials”—though
this did not alleviate the Foreign Office’s dismay over the overall product—before
proceeding to deliver her own message. But the speech highlighted and exacerbated the
divide over Europe that was deepening in Thatcher’s government between the skeptics,
represented now by the prime minister herself, and those who supported further
cooperation with Europe. The divisions between the two sides were becoming stark.
The prime minister’s speech explicitly rejected the notion of EC federalism that
Delors expounded, instead celebrating the individuality of member states and their
strengths as sovereign nations working together, rather than as future members of a
federal Europe. Thatcher also chided fellow EC members who were reluctant to support
the efforts of their neighbors to the east to gain freedom from communism, declaring that
Warsaw, Budapest and Prague were historically and culturally great European cities
despite their presence behind the Iron Curtain. She asserted that the notion of “Europe”
predated the Treaty of Rome, and could be equally claimed by Britons as well as any
other European nation, whether a member of the EC or not (Thatcher 1993).
Thatcher’s speech caused a stir. According to Lawson, while the content of the
speech was not outrageous, it was the combative tone of the briefing to the media by
Thatcher’s press secretary Bernard Ingham, which reflected Thatcher’s own feelings on
the subject and which was reported by reporters who did not bother to read the text, that
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caused the tumult in Britain and in European circles (Lawson 1992). One important point
that got lost in the resulting fuss over her rejection of Delors federalism and assertion of
sovereign state powers was Thatcher’s attack on the concerted opposition of most of the
EC member states to Britain’s efforts to aid central and eastern European countries which
were trying to win their freedom from communism. Thatcher called for less protection,
more free movement of goods, services and capital, and for the EC to look outside its
own borders at least as much as it looked inward. The rest of the EC largely ignored this
challenge (Thatcher 1993).
The divide between Britain’s goals and those of other EC members continued to
grow, and the reaction of other member states as well as Thatcher’s response to them in
turn did not help. Thatcher wrote, some (such as Young 1998) suggested with glee, “Not
even I would have predicted the furore the Bruges speech unleashed. In Britain, to the
horror of the Euro-enthusiasts who believed that principled opposition to federalism had
been ridiculed or browbeaten into silence, there was a great wave of popular support for
what I had said. … But the reaction in polite European circles – or at least the official
reaction – was one of stunned outrage.” (Thatcher 1993, 746). The Bruges speech
brought to the fore not only differences among EC members but also conflicts within the
British government as some ministers such as Howe, who wished to take a more
accommodating approach to the EC, and Lawson, who wished to join the ERM, began to
increasingly deplore Thatcher’s happily combative approach to the EC. The speech
further isolated Thatcher further from much of her cabinet, including Howe and Lawson
especially, who began to believe that their goals on Europe could only be achieved by
working against rather than with Thatcher.
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On the other hand, Thatcher’s speech also helped conservative skeptics within the
party unite in a single euroskeptic movement, with Thatcher as its standard bearer. After
the Bruges speech, Conservative euroskeptics became an increasingly powerful force
within the party, in large part because Thatcher’s public declaration of skepticism and
continued support thereafter allowed them to put aside their different reasons for
skepticism in pursuit of a common resistance to further integration with Europe (Forster
2002). At the same time, the Bruges speech, like Delors’ address to the trade unions,
changed the nature of the domestic political game in Britain and with similar results: as
Thatcher became more publicly skeptical about Europe, her rhetoric allowed Labour to
define itself against Thatcher’s increasing euroskepticism and made it acceptable for
Labour to become pro-Europe (George and Haythorne 1996).
The end result was a galvanization of the British conservative euroskeptic
movement, an opportunity for Labour to switch to support for the EC since Thatcher had
now begun to encourage euroskepticism in her government, and a new, more ideological
turn for Thatcher in her attitude about the EC. She had moved from pragmatic
engagement to ideological opposition to the threat she saw represented by Delors’
support for European federal state. This enthusiasm on her part was to lead to more
concern from many (though by no means all) of her followers over time that her strident
opposition would make the Conservative party unelectable, a threat that some saw as
being borne out by the Conservatives’ loss in the European Parliamentary elections
several months later.
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1989 European Parliamentary Elections and Leadership Challenge
Thatcher’s Bruges speech marked a turnaround in the prime minister’s and
therefore the Conservative government’s stance towards its membership in the EC. This
became evident not only in what the prime minister said in public about Europe both at
home and abroad but also how the party presented its position in domestic politics.
Following Thatcher’s speech at Bruges in the autumn of 1988, the first opportunity to
gauge the popularity of the Conservative party’s new euroskeptic stance was in the
European Parliamentary (EP) elections, held in June 1989.
The prime minister was further motivated to pursue a skeptical approach due to
the release of the Delors Report in February 1989, which asserted an agenda of European
economic and monetary integration far beyond what she was prepared to accept. This,
combined with Delors’ assertion of a social program to counter the capitalist effects of
the Single Market at the TUC conference a few months earlier, presented such a
challenge to Thatcher’s notion of what the EC ought to be that she enthusiastically
embraced the opportunity to combat it through the government’s EP campaign.
In previous EP elections, both parties had campaigned on domestic policy issues,
ignoring the European element for an opportunity to promote their respective domestic
agendas. British EP elections generally were not considered as significant in themselves
in terms of power at the European level, but the election results were interpreted at the
domestic level as a sign of relative domestic party strength as well as a barometer of
public opinion, at least of those few who actually bothered to vote (Thatcher 1993;
Lawson 1992).
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In 1989, however, for the first time the Conservative government made Europe
the issue of the EP election instead of a de facto referendum on domestic political issues.
Lawson observes, “with Europe having once again elbowed its way to the forefront of the
political debate, there was rather more interest than usual in the 1989 elections” (Lawson
1992, 921). Moreover, the case on Europe that the Conservative government put before
the voters was ideological, not pragmatic, and the party abandoned its reputation as the
“party of Europe” for an outright skeptical stance (Forster 2002). Lawson among other
Conservatives deplored the party’s approach to campaigning for the euro elections, which
“was characterized by a crude and embarrassing anti-European ism which had never
before played any part in the Party’s stance on this constellation of issues. The new tone
and nature was well encapsulated by the ubiquitous poster which simply asked, ‘Do you
want to live on a diet of Brussels?’” (Lawson 1992, 922).
Lawson argued that the Conservatives’ new message confused the voters, who
previously had heard only a pro-Europe message from the government. In addition, the
Conservative party seemed to be campaigning against the EC itself rather than the Labour
party (Lawson 1992). The result was the Conservatives’ first electoral loss since the
party had come into government in 1979. Voter turnout, as was typical for EP elections,
was low, despite Lawson’s observation that the campaign had attracted more interest than
usual, and Conservative candidates won fewer than 28 percent of the votes cast, “the
lowest share of the vote ever recorded by the party in a nationwide election” (Young
1999, 369).
Those involved presented various explanations for the defeat. According to
Lawson, by giving full voice to the Euroskeptic movement within the party for the first
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time, the Conservative campaign not only bewildered the voters, who had not heard this
message from “the party of Europe” in the past, but also aired the party’s dirty laundry in
public. For the first time, the long-running divide in the party over Europe became public
knowledge, Lawson claims, and the result of both of these factors was a sizeable defeat
for the Conservative Government. While granting that the continuing and unpopular rise
in interest rates, for which he was largely responsible, was likely the decisive factor in the
Government’s loss, he asserts that the campaign’s negative tone on Europe further
alienated the public (Lawson 1992).
However, Forster says that the Conservative skeptics did not come to the same
conclusion. “First, it was argued that they had been disadvantaged by the timing of the
European elections in the mid-term cycle of the third consecutive Conservative term in
office. Second, and for some more importantly, it was argued that the failure stemmed
from a reluctance to fully embrace a wholehearted Eurosceptic agenda for fear of
upsetting sitting Conservative MEPs,” who tended to be more pro-European integration
than their MP colleagues (Forster 2002).
The Prime Minister herself likewise attributed some of the election failure to the
euro-philia of the party’s MEP candidates relative both to the rest of the party and to the
Conservatives’ chosen campaign message, though she did grant that a few Conservative
MPs “were uneasy about the line I was taking on Europe” (Thatcher 1993, 754).
Moreover, she rejected the claim that she says the Labour Party “and other foes” put
about, that the election result served as a referendum on not only her leadership but more
particularly the vision about Europe she had articulated in her speech at Bruges. She
granted that the vote was in part a protest against a long-standing incumbent government,
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but denied that this was a rejection of her new euroskeptic tack, much less a popular
expression of support for the EC. She asserts, “I might have accepted that the European
elections were a sort of judgment on Bruges if we had had European candidates who
were Brugesist rather than federalist. With a few notable exceptions that was not the
case” (Thatcher 1993, 749).
Far from considering the election results as a negative referendum result on her Brugesist
ideology, the Prime Minister seemed to view the Party’s EP campaign message as the
way to win back the British electorate. Upon apprehending that the Prime Minister
interpreted the results of the campaign entirely differently than he, Lawson writes,
I suddenly realized, with a shiver of apprehension, that she saw the Eurocampaign as a trial run for the next General Election campaign; and that,
with the short-term economic outlook unpromising, she saw a crude
populist anti-Europeanism as her winning strategy. It was a strategy that
would undoubtedly have evoked a considerable response: xenophobia
always does. But it would have been a disaster for the Party, splitting it
from top to bottom and making no sense to the voters, who would not
have understood what we stood for and indeed, why we wished to remain
within the Community at all if that was how we saw it (Lawson 1992,
922).
The Conservative Party did eventually split over Europe, but not before depriving
Thatcher of the chance to lead it to another election. Meanwhile Thatcher, while
planning to use the Bruges message strategically for electoral victories to come, had also
come to believe in it deeply, which made retreating from it, in her case, unthinkable. As
Forster writes, “Hers was the combative and virulent Euroscepticism of a conviction
politician; it was moreover the product of a convert’s zeal” (Forster 2002, 81). Lawson
remained a pragmatist on this issue, a divide that began to widen in the following months.
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Thatcher also believed that the election results “had revealed a groundswell of
discontent which could not be ignored” but that the most significant discontent lay not in
the voters but in the parliamentary ranks of the Conservative party (Thatcher 1993, 754).
She mainly attributed this discontent to stagnation among the leading positions in
Government and therefore a lack of opportunity for advancement fostering dissatisfaction
in the party ranks. In thus attributing the election loss to the discontent of the
parliamentary party in her memoir, Thatcher establishes an alternative justification for the
cabinet reshuffle that she initiated later that year, in which she moved Geoffrey Howe
from his longstanding position as Foreign Secretary, to what others saw as retaliation for
the stand he took against her over the ERM issue, discussed below (Thatcher 1993;
Lawson 1992; Young 1999).
Meanwhile, the unprecedented election loss caused some in the Conservative
party to begin to doubt Thatcher’s ability to continue to lead them to electoral victory in
the next General Election, to occur by 1992, and her hold over the party began to slip
even as the skeptic wing of the party united under her banner. The Labour Party was
leading the Conservatives in the polls, and Thatcher’s personal approval rating, which
had never been high (her mean public approval rating for her entire premiership was 39
percent (Rose 2001)), had slipped as well (Heppell 2008). While Rose cautions against
the significance of public approval ratings of prime ministers, by this time Thatcher’s
popularity within her own party was diminishing after ten years in power (Rose 2001).
Policies such as the poll tax and rising interest rates accounted for part of the loss
in confidence in the party leader, but after the EP electoral loss some began to point to the
Prime Minister’s euroskeptic Brugesist message as well (Young 1999; Lawson 1992).
!

)&!

Those in the party who objected to Thatcher’s new, ideological skeptical tack on Europe
fell broadly into two categories: those Europe enthusiasts like Howe who supported
deeper integration with Europe, and pragmatists like Lawson, who may not have liked
European integration but thought that Thatcher’s fervently ideological approach to the
issue would lose elections for the party (Lawson 1992). Thatcher had moved from a
pragmatic approach to Europe to an ideological one, and by tying her own political
identity so closely to her euroskepticism, Turner argues, “Thatcher was exposing her
leadership to those in the party who did not see Europe as such a threat. Ultimately, it
would mean a choice between Thatcherism and Europe itself” (Turner 2000, 123).
One Conservative MP had already made his choice. In December 1989,
backbencher Sir Anthony Meyer challenged Thatcher for the party leadership position,
challenging also the premise that a successful, sitting prime minister could be
automatically re-elected, unopposed, to the position of party leader each year (Heppell
2008). While he was easily defeated, the fact that sixty Conservative MPs did not vote
for Thatcher (33 voted for Meyer; 27 abstained) indicated that her leadership of the party
was beginning to be at risk, though she dismissed it as a negligible matter (Thatcher
1993, Heppell 2008). Worse, Tristan Garel-Jones, the Deputy Chief Whip, told Major
that he had had to persuade another 100 MPs to vote for the Prime Minister, and even
after the victory he warned her that the pro-Europeans in the party were unhappy with the
tack she was taking on Europe and would either have to be appeased or would wind up
supporting europhile Michael Heseltine against her in any future leadership contests
(Major 1999). Meyer wrote later that Thatcher’s vociferous dislike of Europe had been
the trigger for his leadership challenge. “It was a harbinger,” writes Young: “Although
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she paid little attention, it rendered thinkable what had previously been viewed with
incredulity” (Young 1999).

Meyer had opened the door for future, more serious

challenges to Thatcher’s predominance.

Lawson and ERM: The standoff worsens
Meanwhile, as the Delors Commission was working out a plan to bring about
European monetary union, Lawson was still endeavoring to bring Britain into the ERM.
However, he did not support the move towards a single currency. Indeed, in a speech at
Chatham House in January 1989, he accused moves towards the EMU by EC members as
being made as a smokescreen to cover the lack of progress the EC had made in achieving
the Single Market promised by the SEA in 1986.
At Chatham House Lawson also articulated what he viewed as “fundamental”
differences between ERM and EMU. He was an enthusiastic supporter of exchange rate
regimes that sovereign nations voluntarily entered into, but not a single currency, in
which nations would lose control over both monetary and fiscal policies.
The ERM is an agreement between independent sovereign states…
Economic and Monetary Union by contrast, is incompatible with
independent sovereign states with control over their own fiscal and
monetary policies. … With a single European monetary policy there
would need to be central control over the size of budget deficits and,
particularly over their financing… What organization would really be the
Government? It is clear that the Economic and Monetary Union implies
nothing less than a European Government – albeit a federal one – and
political union: the United States of Europe. That is simply not on the
agenda now, nor will it be for the future (Lawson 1993, 910).
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This was an assertion of defiance rather than truth, for it was most certainly on Delors’
agenda, at least in terms of federalism and increased political union (though Delors
rejected a direct analogy with the Unites States of America). In a speech in Bruges in
1989, for example, Delors asserted his belief in the importance of federalism to ensure
the future well being of Europe, saying “Indeed, Economic and Monetary Union, because
of its very goals, is at the crossroads between economic and political integration. What is
it, if not the political completion of the convergence of economies? …. And mostly, at a
time when certain political leaders seem to hesitate between the internal strengthening of
the Community and its dilution into a vaster structure, Economic and Monetary Union
turns out to be the only way to reinforce European construction and to ensure its political
dynamism” (Delors 1989). In Britain at the time, this vision was broadly unacceptable to
both major parties.
Lawson also argued that, unlike with the gold standard, a nation could not come
on and off EMU as needed, though he was so persuaded of his own position in the
argument he ignored the fact that in order maintain credibility in the markets, Britain
effectively would be unable to enter and exit the ERM as it suited the national interest
either.

June 1989 Madrid Council
Lawson and Howe, increasingly concerned about the impact that Thatcher’s
growing euroskepticism was having on, respectively, the British economy and Britain’s
relations and influence within the EC, finally decided to force the prime minister to alter
her policy on the ERM. Just prior to the EC Madrid Council in 1989, they jointly insisted
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on a meeting with the prime minister in which they told Thatcher that she was harming
British interests through her continued refusal to consider ERM membership, and that she
must take both a more conciliatory tone at the council and commit to the ERM, or at least
to joining by a specific date. Both threatened to resign if she did not consent.
As the highest-ranking ministers in the cabinet after the prime minister, and as
longstanding heavyweights in the Government, the two were able to force a meeting the
prime minister did not want, and were able to compel her to listen to their concerns in a
way that they had not previously in individual meetings with her. Moreover, their threat
to jointly resign if she refused to comply with their demands placed the prime minister in
a further position of weakness, since such an action would cause a loss of confidence in
her leadership within the Government that could undermine or even topple it. Both
Howe and Lawson had allies of their own in the parliamentary party, and the prime
minister could not be certain of retaining the loyalty of Cabinet and backbenchers if she
allowed the resignations to take place. But in acceding to their demands, she weakened
her own position as party leader, as Conservative MPs saw that her power was no longer
absolute. For a prime minister who had always led from the front and taken great
pleasure in the “Iron Lady” moniker bestowed on her, this was a blow. It was also a
ramification of this very leadership style, as senior ministers like the Chancellor and
Foreign Secretary felt shut out of the decision-making process in this key policy area.
Howe and Lawson’s successful undermining of the prime minister’s authority
does not suggest that the two ministers had not also taken risks by challenging the prime
minister. As Rose observes, “The threat of resignation by a senior minister is a doubleedged sword, for it can end an ambitious minister’s career or destabilize the Prime
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Minister – and it is often not clear in advance what the outcome will be” (Rose 2001,
165). It was for this reason unusual for ministers to connive so directly against their own
prime minister: according to Lawson, this was the first time he and Howe had
collaborated in such a fashion to shape policy. They argued that it was necessary in order
for the UK to be able to influence the debate over EMU at the Council and be seen to be
playing along with the other member states; in other words, they argued that extreme
circumstances dictated their rebellion (Lawson 1992).
In any case, dissatisfaction with the Government’s official “when the time is
right” policy had led the Cabinet’s two most enthusiastic proponents of ERM to demand
a policy of “any time in the next three years”. Thatcher eventually acceded to this
demand, though she refused to commit to naming a particular date at the Madrid meeting.
Ironically, after Britain’s membership in the ERM, which finally took place in October
1990, went spectacularly wrong in September 1992, Lawson quickly accused Thatcher of
having joined up at the “wrong time”, even though it was well within the timeline his
Madrid ultimatum had pressed upon her (Lawson 1992).
At the Madrid Council Thatcher made it clear that Britain would insist on a policy
approach to monetary union that stipulated that achieving one stage does not
automatically oblige a country to go to the next stage. But she was alone in this position
at the meeting. Upon delivering their ultimatum to the Prime Minister, Lawson and
Howe had argued that committing to join the ERM would give Britain more clout in
negotiating at the Madrid summit, but Thatcher’s concession did not affect the
negotiations there. Only later, during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations did Thatcher’s
successor, John Major, attain an opt-out from being obliged to proceed on to stages 2 and
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3 of the Delors plan. Meanwhile Thatcher herself, commenting on the fallout from what
she termed the “nasty little meeting” with Lawson and Howe asserted (Thatcher 1993,
712):
I do not believe that spelling out the Madrid conditions significantly
modified the pace, let alone the direction, of discussions on the Delors
report on EMU. Only someone with a peculiarly naïve view of the world
– the sort cultivated by British Euro-enthusiasts but without any equivalent
among hard-headed continental Euro-opportunists – would have imagined
that it would. In fact, though, the Madrid conditions did allow me to rally
the Conservative Party around our negotiating position and got us away
from the tired and faintly ridiculous formula of ‘when the time was right’.
The outcome of Madrid was widely praised back at home (Thatcher 1993,
713).
In discussing this popular acclaim of the Madrid outcome, Lawson suggests that this
simply displayed the ignorance of the British backbenchers, public and media, and
Thatcher’s skill in spinning results (Lawson 1992). In reality, Britain’s relations with the
rest of the EC continued to be rocky as Britain’s interests continued to diverge from those
of its partners. Thatcher’s belated promise that Britain would at some point join the ERM
was no longer of interest: the agenda, led by Delors, had moved swiftly on to monetary
union, which even Lawson and Howe were unwilling at that point to countenance. As for
the acclaim of the backbenchers, then-Home Secretary Hurd noted the fickleness of
backbenchers: while they might cheer a leader on one day, they might well turn on her
the next (Hurd 2003).
While Thatcher had to accept Howe and Lawson’s conditionality in June 1989,
the repercussions of rebellion soon made themselves known as she reshuffled the Cabinet
the following month. While she felt she could not risk removing both Howe and Lawson
from their positions, she did remove Howe from the Foreign Office, a position he had
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held for six years. Though she offered him another of the top posts, that of Home
Secretary, Howe declined it, settling instead for Leader of the House of Commons and
Deputy Prime Minister, neither of which he much valued (Hurd 2003, Lawson 1992,
Young 1999). Among the worst blows to his ego was the loss of the grace-and-favor
country estate given to the foreign secretary for official and private use, Chevening.
While Thatcher gave him the deputy prime minister’s country estate to use instead (thus
unseating an annoyed Lawson, whose family had been enjoying its use for several years
now), Howe was unappeased (Lawson 1992). Thatcher had kept her longtime lieutenant
in a top position in the cabinet, but she had created an enemy who was now biding his
time.
As mentioned earlier, Thatcher considered these Cabinet changes an opportunity
to promote younger MPs in order to alleviate unrest in the party ranks: at this time, for
instance, she made John Major the Foreign Secretary, which was a significant promotion
for him. While granting that her reshuffling of Howe and others had moved the Cabinet
further to the left, she believed that this would not present a problem as long as any
“crises which threatened my authority could be avoided” (Thatcher 1993, 758). Crises,
however, were soon to come.

Lawson resigns
In May 1989 economist Alan Walters, who had served as Thatcher’s personal
economic advisor from 1981 to 1983, returned to 10 Downing Street. At neither time
was he a member of parliament or even of the traditional civil service, but was brought in
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by the prime minister herself.10 Walters had long opposed membership in the ERM and
more particularly the single currency. As a classic-style monetarist, Walters believed that
Britain should pursue a floating exchange rate policy, for reasons delineated above. In
addition, however, he particularly deplored the EMS as a way to pursue a fixed or
managed exchange rate regime because in it European politics persisted in influencing
decisions regarding monetary policy, which Walters believed should be determined on
economic grounds alone. “In Britain’s Economic Renaissance, Walters described the
EMS as ‘rather messy’ and remarked that the periodic exchange rate realignments, far
from being determined in an economically rational way, were ‘grand political events
which present many opportunities for horse-trading, threats, counter threats, bluff, etc.’.
In his view, it would be best if the UK had nothing to do with it” (Congdon 2007, 166).
Meanwhile, Chancellor Lawson had pursued a policy of shadowing the
deutschmark, with the idea of eventually joining ERM, for several years. But in order to
maintain this link with the deutschmark he had to continue to raise British interest rates,
which increased to 13 percent in November 1988, 14 percent in May 1989, and 15
percent in autumn 1989 (Lawson 1992). Walters warned that this policy could send the
British economy into a recession, an opinion that the Chancellor hardly welcomed
(Thatcher 1993).
Moreover, Walters’ support of Thatcher’s decision not to join ERM upset
Lawson, who felt that the Prime Minister was disregarding the weight his status as
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
This practice of prime ministers bringing personal advisors into high level positions in
10 Downing Street became more prevalent in subsequent premierships, most notably that
of Tony Blair.
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chancellor ought to give to his policy recommendations. The final straw for Lawson
occurred when on October 18, 1989 the Financial Times published excerpts from an
article Walters had written in which he described the ERM as “’half-baked’”, even as
Lawson continued to advocate it (Thatcher 1993, 715). Since the Financial Times did not
mention that Walters had first published the article in 1988, well before he returned to
Downing Street as Thatcher’s advisor, it appeared as a public refutation of the
Chancellor’s policy. This was more than Lawson could stand. Thus on October 25, once
Thatcher had returned from a trip to Malaysia, Lawson gave Thatcher another ultimatum:
either she must fire Walters or he himself would resign. She declined to fire Walters; he
carried out his threat. Immediately after, upon Thatcher’s informing him of Lawson’s
resignation, Walters resigned as well.
Of Walters’ resignation Thatcher said only that upon her telephoning Walters to
tell him of Lawson’s resignation, Walters “told me that Nigel’s resignation had put him
in an impossible situation and so he insisted, against all my attempts to persuade him, on
resigning too” (Thatcher 1993, 718). As for Lawson’s resignation, she thought he was
overreacting: as a minister he had the power to “decide” policy, unlike Walters who was
merely an advisor. Also, Walters had written the cited observations about ERM well
before he returned to 10 Downing Street and could not control when papers chose to
publish them (Thatcher 1993). Lawson was well aware, however, of the fact that Walters
continued to hold such strong opinions, and that his presence in Thatcher’s so-called
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“kitchen cabinet”11 strengthened the Prime Minister’s continued opposition to ERM
membership (Lawson 1992).
Ironically, Lawson notes, he himself was Thatcher’s closest political ally: his
resignation left her more isolated within the Cabinet and thus more vulnerable to
challenges to her leadership. The resignation of Walters, upon whom she depended for
intellectual support, especially in this key matter of ERM membership, weakened her
position still further. This came just months after Thatcher had reshuffled her Cabinet to
remove Howe from the Foreign Office: Thatcher grants that if she had known that
Lawson was going to resign in Oct 1989, she probably would not have reshuffled Howe
from Foreign Secretary in July 1989, because Lawson’s resignation was another blow to
her authority and she would have been better off avoiding Howe’s dissatisfaction to boot
(Thatcher 1993). Without Lawson and Howe on her side, Thatcher’s authority over the
Cabinet and the Party was less assured than in the preceding years of her premiership.
Thatcher responded to this chain of events, Lawson claimed, by shutting herself off
further inside her circle of advisors, virtually none of whom were MPs either in the
cabinet or on the backbenches (Lawson 1992).
Discussing the ultimatum Lawson gave Thatcher in his memoirs, Thatcher’s
successor, John Major, further pinpointed some of the informal constraints on a prime
minister’s power that began to impede Thatcher to an increasing extent in the last few
years of her tenure. Thatcher had put Lawson in an untenable position, he writes, by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Term used to describe those advisors of a prime minister who were neither Members of
Parliament or of the civil service. The term was used to describe advisors in the service
of prime ministers other than Thatcher, notably Blair.
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appointing and then clearly supporting an economic advisor who publicly denounced the
policies her chancellor advocated, particularly regarding ERM.

But by bluntly stating ‘He goes or I go,’ he [Lawson] placed Margaret in
an equally cruel impasse – even if, by appointing Walters, it was of her
making. She agreed with Walters and not with her chancellor. She could
not back away from that, nor did she wish to. If she sacked Walters it
would be clear she had done so with a pistol at her head. She had relied
on him far too long for his departure, if it occurred, to be seen as anything
other than a climbdown. She remembered the Madrid summit of June
1989, when Nigel and Geoffrey Howe had combined to compel her to
agree to join the ERM when certain conditions were met. To capitulate
and sack Walters would have destroyed her authority (Major 1999, 131).
Thus in order to preserve her authority Thatcher neither fired Walters nor persuaded
Lawson to remain, and through forced inaction lost both. Nonetheless, the consequences
of losing both were still less than if it had been shown that, once again, her chancellor
had compelled her to do his bidding.
Lawson further discusses the informal constraints at play in the power plays
taking place over Europe in the top ranks of Government. He said that some people
questioned his decision to resign over the comments of a “part-time adviser to the Prime
Minister”, but he said his resignation was due rather to the Prime Minister’s handling of
the ERM disagreement overall:
Essentially, the point is that Prime Ministers have an unfettered right to
dismiss any Cabinet Minister they like, however, senior – including the
Chancellor – for whatever reason they like. That I always accepted. What
is unacceptable conduct in a Prime Minister, however, is to recoil from
sacking a Minister, and systematically to undermine him instead. Walters
was a principal instrument of the undermining process, a process that
made my job impossible (Lawson 1992, 971).
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Lawson’s decision to make a public gesture over the ERM by resigning rather than
continue to try to persuade Thatcher to join from within the Government undermined the
Prime Minister’s position on the ERM and made it more difficult for her to resist future
efforts by her ministers to persuade her to change her mind. It also reflected the informal
constraints on a prime minister’s power. Though prime minister does have the right to
fire anyone she wants, the reaction of the minister involved or of one who chooses to
resign can erode confidence in the prime minister’s leadership and thus undermine her
ability to pursue her chosen policy agenda. As Major observed in this case, “Nigel’s
resignation speech attacked the Prime Minister’s whole style of government, reflecting
the quiet opinion of a growing number of Tories” (Major 1999, 139). The growing
unrest in her own party meant that Thatcher should tread more carefully in how she
governed.
With few cabinet allies left, Thatcher could ill afford to lose another one, but on
July 1990 she did, and again over Europe. With other cabinet ministers feeling alienated
and/or doubting her ability to lead them to victory at the next general election (even one
of her supporters, Major, doubted her ability to do so (1999); see also Lawson (1992)),
Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Thatcher’s closest ally in
the cabinet (Thatcher 1993), claimed in an interview with The Spectator magazine that
the single currency was just a way for Germany to gain predominance in Europe, and that
giving up sovereignty in the European Community would be as bad as giving it to Hitler
(Spectator 1990). These comments compelled even Thatcher to, however reluctantly, ask
Ridley to resign, which he did on July 14, 1990 (Major 1999). Lawson claimed that
Thatcher had no doubt expressed much the same sentiments to Ridley herself in private
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(Lawson, 1992). Certainly, Young (1999) claims, her attitude about the Germans and
reluctance to endorse German reunification reflected the suspicions created by her
childhood experiences during World War II.

Britain joins the ERM
Once Lawson resigned as chancellor in October 1989, it was not long before his
successor, John Major, also began to suggest to Thatcher that Britain should join the
ERM. Major had worked under Lawson at the Treasury as Financial Secretary, believed
in the ERM as an inflation-fighting tool, and was among those who became persuaded
that Britain would wield more influence over the EMU negotiations, set to begin in
December 1990, if sterling belonged to the ERM (Major 1999). Thatcher resisted again,
but by the fall of 1990, with interest rates still unpopularly high, she began to see the
merit of being able to join and lower interest rates in time for the Conservatives’ annual
conference in October. Also, she had fewer allies in her cabinet than previously and felt
to some degree compelled to accept this change in order to hold her ground on other
issues. As Thatcher herself observed, “On ERM, much as I continued to dislike the
system and distrust its purpose, I had agreed the principle at Madrid subject to the
conditions expressed. Eventually, I was to go along with what John wanted. On EMU,
which for me went to the very heart not just of the debate about Europe’s future but about
Britain's future as a democratic, sovereign state, I was not prepared to compromise”
(Thatcher 1993, 719). On the latter point British politicians largely agreed, although
some, like Howe, would advocate compromise on the issue of the single currency as well
(House of Commons Debates October 15, 1991).
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Finally, on October 5, 1990, Major prevailed on Thatcher to join the ERM. His
argument remained that ERM membership would give Britain’s economy some borrowed
stability, and would lower inflation. At Madrid, Thatcher had listed several conditions
that would have to be met before she would bring Britain into the ERM, chief among
these being a decline in the inflation rate. While this had not happened yet, she and
Major reported trends indicating that it would soon occur or, as Major told the House of
Commons, “it is now clear that we are moving away from divergence in inflation to
convergence in inflation” (Hansard 15 October 1990). This was enough for the
Government to declare that “the time was right” for the country to join, although
Thatcher noted later, “Unfortunately, in a sense the time would never be ‘right’ – because
the ERM, particularly now that the Delors objective of EMU had come out into the open,
would never be ‘right’. But that was something I could do little about” (Thatcher 1993,
713).
Many, including members of the press and the Opposition, suggested the ERM
move was a political ploy, since it coincided with a one point reduction in the interest rate
that the Chancellor had long felt unable to make for fear that the markets would interpret
it to mean that the Government was not serious about fighting inflation (Lawson 1992).
Both the ERM membership and the interest rate rise took place shortly before the annual
Conservative party conference, which occurred in mid-October, 1990. In any case, by
1990 even the opposition Labour Party advocated Britain’s membership in the ERM, and
despite the growing enthusiasm of the euroskeptics in the Conservative Party
backbenches Thatcher lacked the support in the Cabinet she would have needed to
continue to defy the general will of the establishment. As Thatcher put it, she gave in
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because “I had too few allies to continue to resist and win the day” (Thatcher 1993, 722).
For five years she had had to fight the senior members of her own Cabinet over ERM
membership, and this battle had cost her both Lawson and Walters. In a couple of
weeks, it was to cost her Howe as well.

Part VI. EMU triggers Thatcher’s downfall
Although Thatcher had agreed to take sterling into the ERM, she remained
skeptical about the system, and determined to fight further steps towards monetary union
(Gowland and Turner 1999). Meanwhile, the EC was pushing to extend ERM into a
single currency. Major’s “hard ecu” proposal, in which market competition determined
the use of a currency rather than eliminating all currencies to make way for one single
one, was batted about by the British but not taken seriously by other European members.
Hurd reflected “I do not know whether it would have worked if we had introduced it
earlier and pushed it harder. What is certain is that by June 1990 it was too late. Our
partners regarded it as a device of the ingenious British to evade an uncomfortable
decision. As a Spanish minister remarked: ‘Good proposal, wrong country’” (Hurd
2003, 397). Most other countries had shown willingness to pursue Delors’ dream of
monetary union. Despite the conviction of many of her ministers, including Howe,
Lawson, Major and Hurd, that a change in Britain’s negotiating style at the EC level
would make other countries more willing to go along with British ideas, the
fundamentally different interests of most of the other members regarding monetary union
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would continue to mean that Britain remained at odds with the others well after Thatcher
had left office.
Italy held the rotating EC presidency in the second half of 1990 and as, at that
time, the EC’s strongest voice for European integration wanted the EC members to
commit to a date for achieving Stage Two of EMU (a transitional stage from ERM to
EMU) and to move ahead to Stage Three, the single currency. In an effort to achieve this
breakthrough during Italy’s presidency, Italian Prime Minister Andreotti convened a
special EC summit in October 1990 in Rome to discuss these matters. Unsurprisingly,
Britain resisted this attempt at hastening integration, particularly the drive towards a
single currency. While Thatcher was vociferous, as usual, in her objections—Foreign
Secretary Hurd notes, “The exchanges round the table were bad-tempered, her press
conference that afternoon worse”—her policy stance was one that other British
politicians also held (Hurd 2003, 398). It was not the stance, but the delivery, that
Thatcher’s fellow ministers found objectionable.
Returning to Britain, Thatcher reported to the House of Commons on the results
of the summit, a statement that Hurd calls “balanced”, before observing tactfully that she
“lost that balance when answering questions from MPs afterwards” (Hurd 2003, 398). In
a contentious exchange in the House of Commons, Thatcher objected strongly to
European federalism as represented by Delors, declaring to the Parliament “No. No.
No” (House of Commons Debates October 30, 1990). While defending the government’s
decision to join the ERM, she made her objection to monetary union plain, declaring,
“The European monetary system to which we belong is designed for 12 sovereign states,
in co-operation with one another, to come to an exchange rate mechanism. What is being
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proposed now—economic and monetary union—is the back door to a federal Europe,
which we totally and utterly reject. We prefer greater economic and monetary cooperation, which can be achieved by keeping our sovereignty” (House of Commons
Debates October 30, 1990). This combative and defiant exchange finally alienated
Geoffrey Howe to such a degree that he resigned shortly after, on November 1, 1990
(Gowland and Turner 1999).
Howe was the highest-ranking Europhile in the Conservative cabinet, and
Thatcher’s speech underlined the width of the divide that had grown between himself and
the Prime Minister on the subject. Not all of Thatcher’s ministers objected as strongly to
her strong euroskepticism as Howe did, however. Foreign Secretary Hurd, who had had
a career as a diplomat before entering politics and who was by nature and background
pro-Europe, nonetheless wrote,
My diary shows that I sympathised with her main position. I have never
conjured up any personal enthusiasm for the single currency, and in 1990
accepted entirely the case for delay and avoiding fixed dates. Whereas on
German unification the Prime Minister was plain wrong, on this I thought
she was broadly right – but that her tactics, in particular her occasional
rough and overstated arguments, would produce the wrong results (Hurd
2003, 398).
Major, now Chancellor, was also cautious about the single currency, though he wished to
keep an open mind. But, like Hurd, Lawson and Howe, among others, he disapproved of
the Prime Minister’s combative approach to the issue of European monetary integration,
which each thought needlessly antagonized those with whom Britain would need to
negotiate (Major 1999; also Lawson 1992).
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It would seem that others in the party were thinking along similar lines. “The
paradox in autumn 1990 was that the harsh immediate reaction to her tactics did not come
from the continent but from our own backbenchers. Many cheered her loudly on that
raucous afternoon in the Commons on 30 October. They agreed with the substance of
what she stood for, but on reflection a few days later were no longer ready to back her
judgement” (Hurd 2003, 398). The party’s faith in Thatcher as a leader had eroded, and
when on November 13 Howe finally delivered his resignation speech in the House of
Commons, it was with damning effect.
Chief among his reasons for leaving Government, he said, was not so much a
matter of objecting to Thatcher’s style, which both he and others deplored, but rather
increasing disagreements on substance, most particularly on EC policy. This reasoning
was somewhat the reverse of Lawson’s, who said that he had resigned because of
Thatcher’s style of government rather than over policy differences (Lawson 1992). Howe
argued that in the European Community Britain was best served not by taking absolute
stances but by seeking to be in the middle of any negotiation without ruling out any
particular proposal. In language that deliberately echoed, then rejected Thatcher’s
language from the October 30 debate, he declared,
We must at all costs avoid presenting ourselves yet again with an oversimplified choice, a false antithesis, a bogus dilemma, between one
alternative, starkly labelled "co-operation between independent sovereign
states" and a second, equally crudely labelled alternative, "centralised,
federal super-state", as if there were no middle way in between. We
commit a serious error if we think always in terms of "surrendering"
sovereignty and seek to stand pat for all time on a given deal—by
proclaiming, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister did two weeks
ago, that we have "surrendered enough". The European enterprise is not
and should not be seen like that—as some kind of zero sum game (House
of Commons Debates November 13, 1990).
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The House of Commons received Howe’s speech warmly, and his thinly veiled call for a
change in leadership badly undermined the Prime Minister’s authority (Heppell 2008).
Many in the Cabinet, including Lawson and Major, deplored Thatcher’s treatment
of Howe which had led to this final alienation, although Howe’s behavior before the
Madrid EC summit had shown Thatcher that she could no longer trust him. She felt
betrayed by a loyal lieutenant; others, not to mention Howe himself, felt that her
subsequent treatment of him—coldness, dismissiveness—was unwarranted (Thatcher
1993; Lawson 1992; Major 1999). Moreover, Hurd felt that Thatcher’s mistreatment of
an ally was politically foolish: “He had stood by her with courage when Chancellor of
the Exchequer and scored some of the most important successes of her Government. The
scorn with which she later treated him not only offended him; it was proof of her failing
political judgement” (Hurd 2003, 400).
Howe’s denouement reflects again the informal constraints on a prime minister, in
which he or she might hire and fire ministers as she chooses and treat them as she wishes.
However, doing so risks the negative repercussions that arise from such decisions,
particularly when it leads ministers to employ their most powerful weapon, resignation.
Traditionally, a resignation speech is heard in silence in the House of Commons, which
offers a more attentive audience than any minister, including the prime minister, might
enjoy under any other circumstance. Howe used this stage to full effect in his
condemnation of Thatcher (Lawson 1992; Major 1999).
After Howe’s speech, Hurd reports that even the indomitable Thatcher was
subdued, both by Howe’s denunciation and by what it suggested for her leadership. Hurd
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urged Thatcher to “’Stay and change,’ particularly by uniting the party on Europe,”
which the Foreign Secretary considered the most damaging part of the growing divide in
the Conservative Party (Hurd 2003, 400). He felt that Thatcher was still a viable leader,
but that she would have to alter her leadership style, and be willing to listen to others’
opinions rather than simply ride roughshod over them. Hurd decried the fact that Howe’s
job as Deputy Prime Minister was the very one that was meant to press for the changes he
laid out, but that Howe and Thatcher’s relationship made that impossible (Hurd 2003).
Moreover, he believed that it was Thatcher’s very record of accomplishments
over the years that led to her downfall, because it “was spoiling her judgement. She was
less inclined to listen to anything except applause. In her the brake which in all of us
imposes a pause between what we think and what we say was wearing dangerously thin”
(Hurd 2003, 399). She needed to change, but after eleven years as Prime Minister and
sixteen as Conservative Party leader, this would be difficult—and might in any case be
too late.

Leadership challenge
The morning after Howe delivered his powerful resignation speech, Michael
Heseltine, an influential backbencher who had resigned from the Cabinet in 1985,
challenged Thatcher for the party leadership on the last day of the window Conservative
Party rules allowed for formal leadership challenges (Heppell 2008). In the first round of
balloting that followed, the Prime Minister won a majority of the votes cast, but failed by
only four votes to gain the 15 percent margin of victory necessary to prevent the voting
from going to a second round, “because a majority of backbench MPs had refused to vote
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for her” (Rose 2001, 84). Overall, roughly forty five percent of Conservative MPs,
ministers and backbenchers alike no longer wanted their own long-standing Prime
Minister to remain in that office. This was why the result of the first ballot was so
harmful to Thatcher’s leadership and why, even if she prevailed in the second ballot, it
would still undermine her authority in the party. Worse, it would give the Labour Party a
huge advantage in campaigning for the next general election. Even if Thatcher was not
the electoral liability to the party that many thought, Labour would hammer home the fact
that she had failed to win the support of forty-five percent of her own party – if that was
the case, why should the electorate support her? (Heppell 2008).
While Thatcher initially vowed to fight on after the first ballot results came out,
after conferring with campaigners and her Cabinet, both of which collectively advised
that she would not have the votes to prevail, she announced on November 22, 1990 that
she would not contest the second ballot, and thus resigned (Thatcher 1993). This opened
the way for two of her ministers, who would not stand against her in a leadership contest,
to enter the race against Heseltine. These were the Chancellor, John Major, and the
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd (Major 1999, Hurd 2003).
Heseltine, like Howe, was considered to be pro-European and more open to the
notion of Britain joining a single currency than most of the Conservative Party leadership
(Aspinwall 2003). Hurd, while pro-Europe, was as yet unpersuaded of the need for a
single currency, while Major at this time was seen to be the euroskeptic successor to the
Thatcherite legacy (Hurd 2003). The euroskeptic/europhile divide in the party became a
factor in the leadership race (Heppell 2008).
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Mainly, however, the parliamentary Conservative Party was concerned about how
Thatcher’s policies, European or otherwise, were affecting members’ ability to win reelection. In the spring of 1990, a Gallup Poll showed the Labour Party 23 points ahead of
the ruling Conservative Party in popularity with voters (Rose 2001). Thatcher was
personally unpopular because of rising inflation rates amid economic recession; her
unwillingness to revoke the hugely unpopular poll tax; and also her policy on European
integration insofar as it highlighted the divide between euroskeptics and europhiles,
within the Cabinet especially, but also in the broader Conservative Party. By 1990
Thatcher was the most unpopular prime minister in polling history (Heppell 2008).
Understandably, Conservative MPs were worried.
The Government had hoped to bring inflation under control by joining the ERM,
and in this decision Thatcher showed some of her old pragmatism that had brought so
much success. But Major, among others, argued that in other areas she had “lost her
political agility; the Poll Tax and crude anti-Europeanism were the policies that resulted”
(Major 1999, 169). Indeed, Major blames these two issues for the Prime Minister’s
demise, particularly when both occurred at the same time. The poll tax had stirred up the
voters, while her anti-EC ideology fostered splits in the party. Between the two of them,
Major writes, “she was trapped” (Major 1999, 167).
Major points out that despite the prevailing impression of Thatcher as a stalwart
foe of Europe, for the majority of her term in office she was a pragmatic engager in
Europe, and was one of the key progenitors of the Single European Act, which brought
about closer union among EC members. Even on the ERM, while she resisted it for
years, she ultimately came around to the counsels of her ministers and joined. “Overall,
!

"+(!

the Prime Minister was undeniably ‘on board’ the European train, even though she was
uneasy about where it was heading and complained loudly at every stop. The trouble was
that there was another Margaret Thatcher, usually confined to private quarters, whose gut
reaction was much more hostile to Europe” (Major 1999, 174-5). This Thatcher became
more evident in the latter part of her premiership, and is part of what brought about her
demise (Lawson 1992, Hurd 2003).
The downfall of Thatcher shows some of the informal constraints that shaped the
Prime Minister’s approach to European issues. She took an ideologically skeptical
approach that was acceptable, if barely to some—Major notes that for a long time, the
decisions she came to satisfied even those who deplored her palpable hostility to Europe
(Major 1999). But when her combative tone came to be seen as having eroded her
Cabinet support and thus her ability to lead the party to the next election, when
Conservatives began trailing in the polls, her tone went from privately grating to publicly
unacceptable (Lawson 1992; Rose 2001).
It is not too much to say that ERM in the end was the catalyst for Thatcher’s
demise. The friction that built up between her and her top allies, Lawson and Howe, was
over ERM, and their respective resignations weakened and destabilized her leadership
(Lawson 1992; Major 1999). Major observes that Lawson’s departure over ERM was
particularly damaging to Thatcher because the two agreed on everything except ERM,
and they had accomplished a great deal while working together (Major 1999). A similar
comment could be made of Howe and Thatcher, that while a growing divide over
European policy was the main force that drove them apart, they had achieved many
successes for Thatcherism in the eleven years the party had been in power (Hurd 2003).
!

"+)!

But disagreements over Europe, in slightly different guises, did divide them, and Howe’s
resignation over Thatcher’s European policies played a large part in toppling her (Rose
2001). Indeed, some consider Europe to be the main reason for Thatcher's demise
(Young 1999). Lawson too points to Europe, not because of Thatcher’s euroskepticism
in itself, but because while not all MPs or the Party was as enthusiastic about European
integration as Howe or Heseltine, “they sensed that she was handling Europe badly, and
feared that she would split the Party over it” (Lawson 1993, 1001).
But even though European policy, and Thatcher's approach to it, triggered the
leadership challenge, Thatcher’s approach to European policy was merely one, and not
even the main, reason why Thatcher lost the support of much of her party. Major
concludes that one cannot attribute Thatcher’s downfall to europhiles within the party
toppling her because of her euroskepticism. Conservative parliamentarians had other
reasons for concern. Besides, even though her attitude about Europe had been combative,
most Conservative politicians supported the decisions she ultimately took (Major 1999).
Hurd concurs: While there was unhappiness in the party over Europe, he argues, the
biggest factor was the poll tax, the mass public protests against it and Thatcher’s stated
refusal to get rid of it that constituted the bigger electoral problem. The fact that 70 per
cent of eligible voters hated it and “approximately half of those polled regarded it as the
most likely determinant of their future voting behavior” (Heppell 2008) worried
Conservative MPs into rebellion against their leader of sixteen years (Hurd 2003).
Europe triggered the revolt within the party, but the poll tax—and the economic
recession—drove it to remove the Prime Minister from power.
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Because Heseltine was the one who had challenged Thatcher, the sitting Prime
Minister, his gamble to succeed her as the head of the party was chancy. His gamble was
an example of the other side of the informal constraints that allowed Lawson and Howe
to give an ultimatum to Thatcher over ERM policy and Lawson to shadow the
deutschmark without his Prime Minister’s permission and without being fired. The
danger in a minister rebelling against the prime minister is that if he fails, his political
prospects may be over. As Rose observes,
It is risky to take on a sitting prime minister: if the minister loses, he has
acquired a powerful enemy. If he wins, he still may not be the one to gain
the premiership, as Heseltine learned. Harold Wilson [former British
Prime Minister] took comfort in knowing that while half a dozen Cabinet
colleagues were intriguing against him, they were playing ‘the game of
musical daggers’ in which the rule was ‘never be left holding the dagger
when the music stops’. Wilson then quoted one of Lord Beaverbrook’s
laws on conspiracy, ‘The man who wields the dagger never wears the
crown’ (Rose 2001, 84).
Both Hurd and Major said they believed that a prime minister should not be ousted by a
party revolt, but through a general election or House of Commons vote (Hurd 2003,
Major 1999). It was partly for this reason that they refused to stand up against her in a
leadership contest. But Major adds a political objection to the philosophical one which
gives weight to Rose’s assessment: “I thought it bad politics to attempt to remove a
sitting prime minister, and in no circumstances would I have stood against her” (Major
1999, 181).
On the other hand, the prime minister must be seen as capable of leading her party
to victory, or she will face rebellion. MPs will tolerate a publicly unpopular prime
minister as long as the party’s overall public ratings exceed those of its opponent’s, as
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was the case for most of Thatcher’s tenure. But once her personal unpopularity was seen
to be a driving force behind the party’s unfavorability ratings, Thatcher lost support from
the backbenches. Moreover as Lawson points out, she had already lost virtually all of her
allies in the Cabinet, so when the time came when she needed the support of her
ministers, they advised her instead to resign (Lawson 1992). Informal constraints thus
led to this remarkable event: “Despite her impressive electoral record, a commanding
parliamentary majority, no significant parliamentary defeats and an overwhelmingly [sic]
desire to continue, Thatcher was forcibly evicted from Downing Street, not at the behest
of the electorate but due to her own parliamentary and ministerial colleagues” (Heppell
2008, 72). A similar turn of events would happen to another successful prime minister
nearly twenty years later, when his own party forced Tony Blair out of office.
Major won the leadership contest, in part, because he was seen to be a strong
Thatcherite. As his premiership wore on, euroskeptics in the party began to be
disappointed in his policies and to feel betrayed that their vote for what had seemed to be
Thatcher’s heir (a belief Major used to his advantage in his leadership campaign) had
been misplaced (Heppell 2008). In hindsight, Major gave another reason why Thatcher
should not have been challenged but should have been allowed to contest another general
election. Major suggests that if Thatcher had won enough votes (perhaps with him as
chief whip, as he almost was) to survive the leadership challenge, they might still have
lost the next election, when the electorate rather than just her party was able to pass
judgment on her government, “but it would have been a more fitting end for a longserving prime minister than removal by her own colleagues. Moreover, it would never
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have given rise to the bitterness that has scarred the Conservative Party ever since. Nor
would Europe have become such a divisive issue” (Major 1999, 98).
Because Thatcher almost reached the 15 percent threshold on the first ballot, her
embittered supporters in Parliament were able to say, after she was gone, that she had
more support from Conservative MPs than Major did. This was because, after the results
of the second ballot showed Major with a sizable lead over Hurd and Heseltine, the latter
two withdrew from the leadership competition and threw their support behind Major.
The party then decided to skip the formality of a third ballot, which would have come
back with a nearly unanimous vote in favor of Major, since it was in practical terms
unnecessary. But as time went on some disgruntled euroskeptics encouraged the
perception that Thatcher had been ousted as Conservative Party leader despite winning a
majority of votes from her peers, while Major was acclaimed leader with a minority of
votes (Heppell 2008). It proved another weapon in the increasingly bitter battle over
Europe that, begun under Thatcher’s rule, would engulf the Conservative Party in the
years to come.

Part VII. Conclusion
Europe may not have been the only reason Thatcher lost her leadership position,
but it became the lasting legacy of that party rebellion. Informal constraints shaped
Britain’s Europe policy by helping to bring down Thatcher. But Thatcher had already
inspired euroskeptics on the backbenches to carry on her European agenda once she no
longer led the party (Forster 2002). Of the three main issues that brought Thatcher down,
Major jettisoned the poll tax and eventually inflation rates were brought under control,
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but with the negotiations over European Union about to begin in December 1990, Europe
remained an immediate issue of contention in the party. In the end, the party rebellion
did bring in a less euroskeptic prime minister, but he was then plagued by the growing
skepticism of the party as a whole.
Meanwhile, in terms of negotiations at the European level, Thatcher’s negative
approach was part of what Conservative parliamentarians thought made them
unelectable. Domestically this may have been true, and the ouster may have ensured
them another, albeit weakened, term in office that they could not have won with Thatcher
as prime minister. At the European level, though, however much some EC leaders
personally welcomed the departure of Thatcher, the net result of Major’s more
conciliatory approach was the same because Britain was still unwilling to join the single
currency along with the rest of the EC member states, as became clear in the Maastricht
Treaty negotiations that began days after Thatcher’s ouster. In negotiating with other EC
member states, Britain was utterly unsuccessful in promoting its agenda on the issue of
monetary integration with Thatcher in charge, but it was no better with Major or indeed,
ultimately, with Blair.
In December 1990 negotiations began on the Treaty on European Union (the
Maastricht Treaty), in which European monetary union would be enshrined, to be
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three: Labour 1983 – 1990: Labour Changes Course on Europe
Part I. Introduction
In the 1980s Labour’s Europe policy changed completely from outright rejection
of the European Community (EC) to, after 1987, a grudging non-commitment to EC
membership to finally, by the end of the decade, enthusiastic acceptance of it. At first,
the party embarked on its change of policy on the EC because it saw it to be an obligatory
political step that must be taken, but eventually came to see—and use—it as a tool to
bring about the party’s own political and economic objectives (Daniels 1998). Part of
this evolution involved a transformation of Labour’s policy on European monetary
integration, from denunciation in 1983 to an endorsement of membership of the ERM by
1989.
The Labour Party’s change on European policy was both pragmatic and
ideological, involving a change in party institutions as well as ideas. The pragmatic
change was of two kinds: first, the party leadership, led by Neil Kinnock after the 1983
election, recognized that the party would have to distance itself from its avid opposition
to EC membership in order to become electorally credible again. While the British
public was not particularly enthusiastic about the EC, it had shown in the 1983 election
that it did not approve of Labour’s pledge to leave. This reinforced the public’s decision
in the 1975 nationwide referendum to remain in the EC (Featherstone 1999). However,
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European policy remained only one of the many areas where Labour recognized a need to
change in order to win votes.
Second, the leadership recognized that its Europe policy was an issue of party
management: the rank and file of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP, the Labour
Members of Parliament) and to a lesser degree the broader Labour Party should become
convinced of the need to accept an increasingly positive approach to Europe. More
importantly, it should accept and abide by the leadership’s decision to do so. In order to
achieve this, the new “soft left” leadership after the 1983 general election, led by party
leader Neil Kinnock, had to defeat its “hard left” opponents, which had led the Labour
Party from 1979 to 1983, and the unions, some of whom remained resistant to changes in
Labour policy towards the European Community (Heffernan 2000).
The Labour Party also had to evolve its ideological principles in a way that would
allow it to square membership in the EC with its party standards. This happened in two
ways: First, Labour had to (and did) abandon its commitment to national economic selfsufficiency and accept the international trade relationships inherent in the EC. Second,
changes within the EC itself allowed Labour to cross the rest of the way to a pro-EC
stance as under the presidency of Jacques Delors the EC began to advocate a social
element to what formerly had been presented as predominantly free market economic
alliance. By promising social protections for workers, Delors invited the British left to
support the EC, and the party leadership accepted (Tindale 1992).
Part of this ideological change was pragmatic as well, however. In the postBretton Woods world, capital was increasingly globalized and free flowing, making it
more difficult to maintain a socialist state (outside factor). This was especially true—as
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French President Mitterrand discovered in 1982—within the confines of the EC, which
was established specifically in order to provide an area for open economic exchange
among its members.12 Seeing this example of the French retraction and having
experienced a massive defeat in 1983 on a socialist platform, Kinnock and the Labour
leadership realized a need to backtrack from its commitment to achieving a socialist state
(Tindale 1992).
Thus, in order to change Labour’s policy on Europe Kinnock had to change the
party from within, abandoning strict socialist principles, doing so in part through
increased ties with continental counterpart parties and receiving a guarantee from Delors
on social measures that would mitigate the effects of the single European market, which
would come into effect in 1992. While it required time, electoral losses, and internal
party struggle, the Labour party accomplished its transition from a socialist party to a
European-style social democratic party invested in the EC by the end of the decade
(Tindale 1992).
Daniels attributes Labour’s reversal of its policy on Europe over the course of the
1980s to five major factors: “The pressures of domestic political competition, a change
in trade union attitudes on Europe, the dynamics of the European integration process, and
important changes in the party’s approach to economic policy and the role of the nation!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
French President Mitterrand’s experience showed how international economic
conditions limited the ability of a nation-state to pursue an independent economic policy,
particularly true for members of an economic club like the EC. Mitterrand’s Socialist
party tried to reflate the French economy just when its EC partners were enacting
deflationary policies. The French policy failed and Mitterrand was forced to reverse
course. Since the British Labour party also advocated a policy of reflation, France’s
experience proved particularly instructive for the party (Daniels 1998).
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state” (Daniels 1998, 79). According to Tindale (1992) the Labour party’s policy went
through two stages in this progression from anti- to pro-European integration, “each one
sparked off by electoral defeat” (Tindale 1992, 277). The first period was 1983 to 1987:
following Labour’s shattering loss in the 1983 general election, Kinnock, a pragmatist,
recognized the need for Labour to end its opposition to the EC, among other policy
changes, but no one in the party felt much enthusiasm for doing so (Daniels 1998). The
second stage, from 1987-90, was achieved through the party’s comprehensive Policy
Review, which overhauled all of the party’s policies, including its stance on Europe, in a
bid to persuade the British public of its electability (Tindale 1992).
For the Opposition Labour Party, by contrast, European integration offered an
opportunity to become competitive again on the domestic political front, for by the end of
Thatcher’s tenure the Labour party had lost three straight elections to the Conservatives,
the second loss in 1983 being so comprehensive that it had triggered fundamental
changes in Labour’s platform, including the party’s position on Europe. Overall, these
forces shaping Britain’s political climate during the Thatcher years set the stage on which
Britain’s battles over joining the single currency would play out under future prime
ministers, and tracing the reaction of British politicians to the beginnings of the serious
push towards the single currency under Delors’ management provides important insight
into the ongoing ambivalence of Britain’s stance towards monetary union. This section,
which is the first half of the chapter, will first trace the change in attitudes towards the EC
in the Labour and Conservative parties respectively, consider the details and implications
of the SEA for Britain, and assess the state of Britain’s engagement with the EC at the
turning point of the SEA passage in 1986.
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Part II. Labour Party realignments up to the SEA
The Labour party was in power from 1974 to 1979, and during this time its policy
on the EC (or, as it was known at the time, the European Economic Community or EEC)
was one of skeptical engagement. Indeed, the entire party was a mix of those who were
prepared to engage with the EC and those who were skeptical about the entire endeavor.
Such was the mix that the Labour government held a nationwide referendum, giving the
public the choice over whether Britain should remain in the EEC, into which the previous
Conservatives government under Edward Heath had taken the country in 1972. Such was
the divide in the Labour party over EEC membership that then-Prime Minister Harold
Wilson took the unprecedented step of allowing even his Cabinet ministers to campaign
publicly against each other in support of their respective positions. Even though the
referendum was the government’s initiative, seven of the 23 Cabinet ministers supported
leaving the EEC.
The lukewarm support for EEC membership in the Labour party can be seen in
the response of then-Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who would become prime
minister in 1976 following Wilson’s resignation, in a 1975 radio interview with the BBC.
When interviewer Robin Day asked him about the Labour government’s support for
Britain’s EEC membership in the national referendum Callaghan replied:
Callaghan: I am not pro, nor am I anti.
Day: What are you doing on this programme?
Callaghan: I’m here because you asked me.
Day: You’re here to advise people to vote Yes, aren’t you?
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Callaghan: I am here, and the Prime Minister has taken the same line; it is
our job to advise the British people on what we think is the right result.
Now there are a lot of other people who’ve always been emotionally
committed to the Market. A lot of other people have been, always been,
totally opposed to the Market. I don’t think the Prime Minister or myself
have ever been in either category and that is not our position today. I’m
trying to present the facts as I see them and why we have decided in
favour of – now Britain is in, we should stay in. (Rose 2001: 209).
The referendum passed handily and Britain stayed in the EEC, but the Labour party
continued to contain a significant number of members, including members of Parliament,
who wanted Britain out. However, the Labour government soon faced far more serious
problems than Europe as the economic situation in Britain declined in the late 1970s,
leading the public to reject Callaghan’s bid for re-election and return the Conservatives,
now under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, to power in 1979.
This general election defeat and the discrediting of the Callaghan government’s
handling of the economic situation provided an opening for the socialist left of the party
to gain power. When Callaghan stepped down as party leader, three of the four
candidates who stood to replace him were ideologically to the far right of the party, and
when one of these, Michael Foot, won, this wing of the party exploited the window of
opportunity provided by the election to reshape Labour’s policies on a number of issues,
including Europe. Since the hard left was where most of the party’s Euroskeptics
resided, the party returned to a more unambiguously skeptical policy on the EC.
In this move away from the center, a substantial portion of the party as a whole
supported Foot. In October 1980 annual Labour Party conference, the entire party voted
by a margin of 5 million to two million votes to leave the EC altogether (Forster 2002).
This led some pro-European Labour party members such as Roy Jenkins and Shirley
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Williams and some two dozen others to split with Labour altogether to form the Social
Democratic Party (which in 1988 would merge with the Liberal Party to become the
Liberal Democratic Party). While Young (1999) cautions that Labour’s change in policy
on Europe was not the only cause of the split, the departure of these europhiles from the
Labour ranks further marginalized those pro-Europe MPs who stayed behind in the
Labour party, leaving them with virtually no voice and the Labour party even more
stringently anti-Europe than it might have been (Gowland and Turner 1999). However,
given the margin of victory of three million votes in the Labour party’s decision to
advocate pulling Britain out of the EC, these pro-Europe remnants would not have had
much of a voice even had the small number of secessionists (though some, like Williams
and Jenkins, were influential) remained.
The Labour Party maintained its strong opposition to European integration
throughout Thatcher’s first term; indeed, the party’s manifesto for the 1983 general
election, entitled A New Hope for Britain, declared among other aims that if Labour won
it would begin steps to remove Britain from the EC. The public was unimpressed: the
election result was a landslide returning Thatcher’s Conservatives to power. The Labour
party had not lost so many seats in Parliament since the election of 1935 and barely
preserved its second place standing, winning 27.6 percent of the overall vote to 25.3
percent for the Liberal-SDP Alliance. Among other judgments, “Labour had been
severely punished for its chronic disunity. But the electorate's verdict also represented a
decisive rejection of the programme offered by the ‘hard left’ or ‘Bennite’ wing of the
party” (Gowland and Turner 1999: 237). With this huge electoral loss the credibility of
the hard left that had governed the party since 1979 diminished. Gerald Kaufman, a
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Labour MP and cabinet minister in the 1970s, famously referred to Labour’s election
manifesto as “the longest suicide note in history” (Gowland and Turner 1999: 237). The
Labour party platform had rested on three main planks: Britain’s unilateral nuclear
disarmament, restoration of trade union rights within the party structure, and withdrawal
from the European Community. While Europe may not have been the dominant issue in
the election, since the entire party platform was so thoroughly rejected, it along with the
other two planks was slated for reform. The “scene was set for yet another reversal of
policy over Europe” (Gowland and Turner 1999: 237).
Following the 1983 election defeat Neil Kinnock succeeded Foot as party leader.
While the hard left Foot had been Kinnock’s mentor, Kinnock saw the need for a return
of the party toward the political center, including a departure from the pledge to remove
the country from the EC. Kinnock’s election to the party leader post was made easier due
to the fact that Tony Benn, the influential leader of the hard left in the Labour party, lost
his seat in the 1983 election so he could not challenge for the party leadership.13
Kinnock was apparently reluctant to abandon the principle of unilateral nuclear
disarmament, which he held dear, but he reported later that he was glad to have
abandoned Labour’s promise to bring Britain out of the EC if elected, saying that he had
had doubts about the EC policy even prior to the 1983 election. Thus, while official party
policy remained exit from Europe through the 1987 general election, Kinnock
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13
A similar fate was to befall Conservative MP Michael Portillo in 1997. Portillo had
been considered the frontrunner to become the leader of the Conservative Party should
John Major step down, but he lost his seat in the landslide Labour victory in the General
Election of 1997 and the post went to the young William Hague.
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immediately began to move away from that formal stance, most strikingly by not
opposing the SEA in 1985-6, to be discussed below.

Part III. Stage One: 1983-1987
Because the party had lost by such a wide margin to the Conservatives in the 1983
election, most party members recognized the need for comprehensive change, although
there remained a stalwart few hard left members, such as Tony Benn, Dennis Skinner,
Austin Mitchell, and Peter Shore, who continued to express animosity towards the
European policy shift (George and Haythorne 1996). Following this blowout defeat in
the 1983 general election, the Labour leadership had to begin to rebuild the party’s
standing in the eyes of skeptical voters. After the last Labour government had been
forced to call in the IMF to rescue the country from its dire financial situation in the mid
1970s, Labour needed to prove to the voters that it could be trusted to run the country’s
economy. Also, after the Labour party split in 1981 it needed to prove that its internal
divisions had ended, and thus restore public confidence in its political viability (Holden
2002).
The size of the Conservative victory over Labour in 1983 meant that Labour was
a particularly weak Opposition party between 1983 and 1987. Indeed, the party barely
held onto its position as the official Opposition (the Social Democrat/Liberal alliance
nearly placed second in the polls, garnering 25.4% of the vote to Labour’s 27.6%).
Thus, as the party began to change in several policy areas, on Europe Labour adopted a
policy-making strategy of “’preference accommodation’” rather than “’preference
shaping’” (Dunleavy 1991): rather than try to create its own terms of the debate over
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Europe, the party decided to reserve its limited political power to contesting the
Conservatives on the latter’s own ground. In other words, Labour allowed the
Conservatives to set the terms of the European debate, a strategy the party continued well
into the Blair years (Holden 2002). At this time, the Conservative government was the
“party of Europe” and pursued a pro-EC policy, focusing on issues such as achieving
Britain’s budget rebate from the EC, which Labour supported, and creating a single
market, which Labour did not.
Europe was not only one of many policy areas in which the Labour leadership
recognized it needed comprehensive change; in a sense, Holden argues, European policy
provided the spark for the comprehensive policy changes Labour enacted. This was in
part because the Conservative majority was so large that Thatcher’s government blocked
any way for the discredited Labour Party to influence domestic policy. Only at the
European level did Labour have a chance to gain influence, something the party gradually
recognized in the mid 1980s as British unions engaged with continental counterparts in
the EC, and after Delors’ invitation in 1988 to embrace a social element to the single
market, discussed below (Holden 2002).
From 1983 to 1987 Labour began to move away from complete disavowal of EC
membership, recognizing that the party’s 1983 electoral platform of immediate
withdrawal had been unpopular with voters. By 1984 Labour had ceased to advocate
withdrawal from the EC, and party leadership began instead to promote reform of the EC
from within as the party’s European policy, which they did in the 1984 European
Parliamentary (EP) elections. According to Tindale, this policy revision on Europe “was
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necessary, but probably also sufficient, to remove the issue as an embarrassment to the
party” (Tindale 1992, 281).
However, while Labour leadership recognized a pragmatic need to change the
party position on Europe, their first efforts after 1983 to revise European policy were
unfocused and halfhearted. The party was not enthusiastic about integrating within the
EC and still advocated withdrawal if EC did not reform. Moreover, the party demanded
that Britain reclaim parliamentary powers for Westminster that it had ceded to the EC, an
ironic instance of cross-cutting cleavage, since this was to become a rallying cry for
Conservative euroskeptics in the 1990s and beyond. For now, however, it was Labour
that articulated fears regarding loss of national parliamentary sovereignty to EC
institutions (Daniels 1998). Ideologically, the party was not yet willing to make the
transition to a more favorable EC policy.
Not only was the party leadership’s decision to remove withdrawal from the EC
as a policy goal after 1983 a bid to appease voters, it was also a party management issue,
as Kinnock set about defeating the hard left within the party, led primarily by Tony Benn
(Tindale 1992). Indeed, party management was the main issue for Kinnock after 1983,
as he had to reunite the party and consolidate his own authority over it. Attitudes about
European integration were so divided within the party that EC policy was tangled up in
the battles among party factions over which would determine the party’s overall
ideological approach (Daniels 1998).
Thus, in the immediate years after 1983 Europe was more of a party management
issue than an ideological one. Kinnock said that once his grip strengthened on party
management, he could change the European policy fairly readily (Daniels 1998). But the
!

"#%!

battle to persuade the rest of the party to go along with this pragmatic change in policy
would not be easy. Because the party’s pledge to withdraw from the EC had contributed
to such a disastrous political defeat it was on the chopping block along with other Labour
policies as Kinnock sought to overhaul the party. This was a particularly delicate area of
reform because in 1981 the party had split in part over its policy on Europe, with proEuropean party leaders forming the new Social Democratic Party. Kinnock had been an
“anti-marketeer” before 1983 and he defeated a pro-European, Roy Hattersley, in the
1983 party leadership contest. But Kinnock had to balance the far left in the party as
well. While the “soft” left helped Kinnock win the party over and consolidate his hold on
party power, the hard left, which had been controlled by Foot and then Benn, remained
opposed to the EC (Daniels 1998).14 Therefore, Kinnock had to tread carefully on the
Europe issue, balancing the various stances while articulating a new one for himself
(Featherstone 1999), though some believed he had already begun to change his opinion
on Europe both ideologically as well as pragmatically (Gowland and Turner 1999).
In the mid 1980s Labour’s shift on European policy was subtle, often a matter of
tone, under- rather than over-statement on the issue, as Kinnock and Hattersley, the
deputy party leader, gradually shifted attitudes within the party. This understated
approach led to the impression that “the shift on Europe was tactical and opportunistic
and the early policy statements seemed to lack a genuine commitment”, in keeping with
the reading that at this stage the change was for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons
(Featherstone 1999, 4). All in all, Labour’s policy change from anti- to pro-EC was not
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14
Benn lost his seat in parliament in 1983 but returned to Parliament in a by-election in
1984 and reasserted leadership over the hard left of the Labour Party.
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a smooth progression: “In 1983-1987, Kinnock guided the party away from withdrawal to
acceptance, albeit conditional and unenthusiastic. All talk of withdrawal was quietly
dropped after 1984; although official party policy remained that withdrawal was an
option, there was no mention of it after the 1987 general election manifesto. But neither
was there any sense of enthusiasm” (Tindale 1992, 277).

Labour’s SEA policy
When debate on the Single European Act began in Parliament in 1986, Kinnock
was still struggling to bring the bulk of the party around to a pro-Europe stance; in any
case, Labour was not prepared to support the free market agenda inherent in the Single
European Act. The SEA aimed to establish a single internal market of goods, labor,
services and capital in the EC by 1992, which necessitated a greater level of political and
economic union among member states in the EC (European NAvigator 2010). The
party’s hard left still objected not only to the SEA’s free market intent but also to the loss
of “Westminster sovereignty” that enacting the single market would entail (Holden
2002), though some suggest that by then Kinnock and others in the party were beginning
to see the benefits of pooling sovereignty at the EC level in order to achieve Labour’s
greater agenda (Tindale 1992, Gowland and Turner 1999).
At this stage, however, the Labour Party was still caught up in battles among
factions and the aftermath of the miners’ union strikes of 1985, and if it was concerned
about anything at the EC level, it was about the need for reform of the EC’s Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and getting Britain’s rebate from the EC budget. Unusually in
the combative Westminster parliamentary system, the Labour Party was in agreement
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with the Government’s policy on these two issues. Labour also wished to focus on
getting more social funding as well as regional aid from the EC, the latter in part because
it gave the party, which controlled many of the local councils in Britain, an opportunity to
extend its power at least at one level in Britain, since it was shut out at the national level
(Tindale 1992, Gowland and Turner 1999).
Labour was not, therefore, focused on the Single European Act, which George
Robertson, Labour’s Foreign Affairs spokesman, declared to be “‘wholly irrelevant’”,
and “’a diversion from the real task before us’”—that is, the agenda mentioned above
(Featherstone 1999, 4-5). In any case, the party opposed the SEA in 1986 on the
grounds, at least as Kinnock explained in 1992, that it did not contain any social
protections for workers and others assumed to be adversely affected by the single market
(House of Commons Debates May 20, 1992). In fact, the SEA did contain a pledge that
member states would work together to achieve democracy as understood under the
European Social Charter, among other measures, but this was not binding. Signatories to
the SEA pledged to improve working conditions, worker health and safety, and
harmonize these standards across the Community. Article 21 Title 5 of the treaty called
for a new measure to increase both “economic and social cohesion”, to harmonize among
member states.
Compliance with SEA mandates was to be enforced by directives but these had no
teeth, as Kinnock suggested: in fact, the text emphasized that the pursuit of such
standards should not impose an administrative, legal or financial burden that would
hamper small and mid-size business development (SEA Article 21). Even Article 25, on
environmental protection, cautioned that any actions taken on environmental issues must
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first take into account, among other considerations, “the economic and social
development of the Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions”
(SEA 2/17/86).
But while Kinnock in 1992 may have characterized the lack of enforcement of a
social charter as the reason for Labour’s opposition to the SEA, he did not voice this
objection during the SEA debates in the House of Commons in 1986, when the bill was
under consideration. At the time, his sole remark on the bill was that the Government
was mismanaging the process of pushing the bill through Parliament and was not
providing enough time for debate on such an important measure:
I see that the Government are now in such a complete muddle with their
business that progress on the remaining stages of the European
Communities (Amendment) Bill is to be taken on Friday as well as on
Thursday. That is really not satisfactory for legislation that has such
serious constitutional implications for this country's relations with the
Community; will the right hon. Gentleman guarantee that Third Reading
will be taken separately, so that hon. Members on both sides of the House
can fully contest the dangerous provisions of the Bill, which will result in
a loss of powers by this Parliament if that legislation is ever enacted?
(House of Commons Debates June 19, 1986)
Indeed, this suggests that Kinnock’s concern at this point was the loss of Westminster
sovereignty implicit in the SEA; whether this was his main ideological concern at the
time or whether it was an expression of the delicate party management he was then in the
midst of is unclear. In any case, this was the only time in all the debates over such a
momentous bill that the leader of the Opposition spoke out about the measure. Despite
Kinnock’s call for time to debate such “serious constitutional implications” he was
nowhere to be found for the “serious” debates that did take place, either in April 1986 for
the second reading of the bill, or in July for the third reading of the bill, when the
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Government did in fact give the time Kinnock demanded above. Nor, despite the bill’s
“dangerous provisions”, did either Kinnock or his shadow chancellor, Roy Hattersley,
vote either on the second or on the third reading of the bill—although future notables
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown did vote against the SEA on the key second reading
(Hansard 1986).
These absences suggest that Kinnock chose not to engage in this particular battle.
All of this seems to confirm Robertson’s assertion that the SEA, despite its ideological
implications for the party (both in terms of diminishment of parliamentary sovereignty
and establishing a sweeping free market agenda in the EC, both of which the party
opposed), was, oddly enough, simply not that important to Labour. This no doubt had to
do with the weakness of being a tiny Opposition, thus according with Dunleavy’s (1991)
argument of preference accommodation: Labour had to accept the playing field imposed
by the ruling Conservative Government on SEA ratification—since the Government
would be able to ratify the treaty even with Labour’s objections, Labour did not even
try—while saving strength for other battles. Still, at this time this was a central
ideological issue for Labour. In 1986 Kinnock also seemed reluctant to draw public
attention to Labour’s opposition to European integration (Forster 2002). Holden (2002)
suggests that this was done in order to maintain cohesion among the various groups under
the Labour Party umbrella while Kinnock gradually undertook change on the European
issue. Overall, it seems that in 1986 it was process (or party management) that shaped
Labour’s response to the ideological threat presented by the SEA, not substance.

!

"#*!

Ties with ideological partners in Europe
One of the advantages to engagement with Europe that the Labour party discovered as it
began to change its outlook about the EC in the 1980s was the possibility of cooperation
with its counterparts in socialist parties in other EC member countries. Some, such as the
journal Opportunity Britain, suggested that this could be an advantage Labour held over
the Conservatives, collaborating with fellow European Socialists and Social Democrats in
order “‘to defend Britain’s interests and build a stronger Community’, specifically in the
area of tackling unemployment through “European economic growth”. (George and
Haythorne 1996, 117) More importantly, meetings with its European counterparts gave
the Labour party, long in opposition at home, a forum in which to articulate its policy
aims (George and Haythorne 1996).
Labour had been isolated from mainland leftist parties: in 1979, for instance, the
Party had been unwilling to sign a common manifesto with other socialist parties in the
European Parliament elections. By 1984 Kinnock was willing to do so, although Labour
promptly made it clear that it disagreed with the mainland socialist parties on a number of
issues, including the EC budget, the EP, and the European Monetary System (EMS). Still,
it was a substantial step towards cooperation (Featherstone 1999).
Change came in part as Labour realized that it could cooperate with its continental
counterparts, and became convinced that their enthusiasm for EC integration was both
laudable and workable in the British context. Labour both wanted to learn from social
democratic practices in Europe, but also to improve British practices, aided by growing
links between British and continental trade unions. Increased contact with mainland
counterparts was to play a substantial role in what Tindale calls “the Europeanisation of
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the British Labour movement”, although the Europeanization, at heart, “was primarily a
response to prolonged and serious failure” in the party (Tindale 1992, 288).

Part IV. Unions
British trade unions came, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to support
engagement with the EC because of: loss of political power at the national level;
increased interaction with mainland counterparts, where they realized an ability to wield
some influence while being shut out at the national power level; and because Delors’
promise of a social charter allowed them political cover, a necessary bridge between their
position and the otherwise free market European economic integration.

Unions shift on Europe
Unions have played a significant role in the Labour party since its inception,
generally providing a majority of the party’s funding and wielding a large block vote at
party conferences—though in general unions have been willing to accede to the policy
direction established by the party leadership. This had changed in the late 1970s as the
unions turned further to the left, but by the mid 1980s the unions had rejoined the more
centrist coalition put together by Kinnock, supporting the leader as he sought to reorient
the party in a more electable direction (Shaw 1994, Tindale 1992).
Just as with the Labour Party in general, wherein euroskeptics voiced a concern
about retaining Westminster sovereignty in order to achieve socialist aims, within the
trade union movement those opposed to EC membership argued that parliamentary
sovereignty was required to achieve their socialist agenda. Not all unions were opposed
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to EC membership in the early 1980s: some promoted membership as an opportunity to
access new markets. However, the former, skeptical, position predominated among
union members. Prior to the 1983 general election, “the bulk of British trade unions
advanced the argument that the reconstruction of the British economy could only be
accomplished with the reclamation of full economic sovereignty”. By withdrawing from
the EC, the British government could impose import controls and use “extensive
government intervention” in order to restore the British economy (Rosamond 1998, 133).
After the 1983 election, the issue of Europe was rarely discussed formally among
unions, but nonetheless union attitudes about Europe began to change. First, unions
began to realize that working within EC institutions could be beneficial to union interests.
Unions expressed concern over the SEA when it was signed in 1986 – it was seen as “an
instrument of capitalism” that needed a “human side” (George and Haythorne 1996, 118).
Like their European counterparts, trade unionists began to lobby for a social charter to
accompany the SEA, which would not, they feared, adequately protect workers’ rights.
For them, as for others in the Labour movement who came to support the EC, a single
market was insufficient: one must have a single community as well, one in which the
market served the people, advocates such as Labour MP George Foulkes claimed
(George and Haythorne 1996).
Among the unions, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) first began to say that it
might be prepared to accept the move towards a single market if social provisions were
put in place (Rosamond 1998). As the decade wore on, “For union leaders, EU-level
activism came to be seen as a major, maybe the only, route forward” (Josselin 2001, 69).
Unions had been shut out of domestic political decision-making upon the Conservatives’
!

"$#!

election, so they gradually began to see the EC as a place to have influence and develop
coordinated economic policies (Josselin 2001).
Unions saw Europe as a way to regain some of the political power they had lost
when Conservatives won in 1979, so by the late 1980s most unions, led by the TUC,
wanted the Labour party to take on a more pro-European policy. The TUC’s
determination to display a Europeanist slant was shown by “the enthusiastic reception it
gave to the rather anodyne speech given to its congress by Jacques Delors in September
1988”, to be discussed later (Featherstone 1999, 6).
In general, union attitudes towards European integration depended on what sector
the union belonged to (for example, export- or import-based) as well as other factors
(Josselin 2001). But because the British labor movement is relatively centralized (in
comparison to many mainland European labor movements), it had a relatively uniform
take on the EC and, later, EMU (Josselin 2001). Rosamond argues that it was
“remarkable” just how unified the unions were in eventually accepting the single market
with the social dimension, given how disparate unions’ interests and attitudes about
European integration were. Rosamond attributes this uniformity to the leadership of the
Trades Union Congress’ General Council and the fact that so many of the unions had
decided for themselves how well Europe might be used strategically to achieve their aims
(Rosamond 1998).
The key element in the British unions change in attitude towards the EC in the
1980s was the TUC secretariat changing tack and adopting a pro-Europe stance. Prior to
the 1979 General Election the TUC had opposed ERM membership, fearing that it would
harm British growth and employment. In the 1980s the TUC began to thaw towards the
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EC, but remained opposed to EC membership until the late 1980s when the Delors
Report advocated a social contract mitigating the free market implications of the Single
Market. Then the TUC Congress welcomed, with some reservations, the Delors Report
and then backed ERM membership in 1989 (Josselin 2001).
According to Rosamond, Delors’ speech to the 1988 TUC Congress “was a very
public signal of the ‘new’ trade union approach to European integration” (Rosamond
1998, 134). At the same Congress, the General Council delivered to the Congress a
report that developed the means of achieving TUC goals within the coming single
market. Among other things, it acknowledged that the TUC would need to consider the
European element in everything it did, and that, increasingly, issues that were central to
union interests, including collective bargaining, would fall under European authority. It
was important that unions continue to cooperate with counterparts to smooth the shift in
practices to a more European model, especially since they recognized “that effective
exploitation by unions of the new European agenda could have an important part to play
in undermining the dominance of Thatcherism in the UK” (Rosamond 1998, 135).
In advocating the “social dimension” to the single market, Delors gave the unions
an opening that to some degree legitimated their conversion to support for the EC from a
socialist perspective. Delors’ proposal allowed them a justification for the gradual lean
towards more EC engagement that many of the unions had been undertaking throughout
the mid 1980s, tying in with classical left concerns about social justice incorporated into
the impending reality of the single market, to be enacted in 1992. By allowing the unions
to oppose the Conservative Government—which rejected the notion of a social
dimension as intervention in the market—while still supporting increased engagement in
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the EC, it also gave the unions a means of solidifying their position on Europe in the
domestic political milieu (Rosamond 1998).
Following the unions’ Delors conversion, the TUC began to advocate that the EC
gain more authority in social policy. The unions began both to lobby EC institutions and
to extend ties with continental counterparts (Rosamond 1998). In 1989 the TUC
supported ERM as long as it included inter-EC cooperation on economic growth
strategies. The unions were willing to support membership of the ERM on the basis of its
presumed ability to manage inflation and stave off recession (Rosamond 1998). The
TUC felt it would have more power within Europe than without (Daniels 1998).

Comparison of best practices
Unions began to adopt continental-style social democratic means of achieving
“social progress”, turning away from the more uniquely British socialist approaches that
the electorate had rejected in 1983. One way in which British trade unions were able to
evolve from a position opposed to EC membership in 1983 to support of it by the end of
the decade was through a comparison of best practices with continental trade unions.
Both the Labour Party and the trade unions wanted to learn from social democratic
practices in Europe, but also to improve British practices, an endeavor that was aided by
growing links between British and continental trade unions (Tindale 1992). Rather than
question, after 1983, whether the UK should be a member of the EC, unions began to ask
instead how best to maximize the benefits of membership (Rosamond 1998).
By the end of the 1980s, unions were taking Europe into account in all their
decision-making and strategizing. According to Rosamond, “‘union preoccupations have
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become ‘Europeanized’”, something that became particularly clear in the acceptance
across a range of unions of the notion of “workplace rights which constitutes a major
break with the ‘voluntarist’ traditions of British industrial relations” (Rosamond 1998,
138). In addition, British unions became more reactive to Europe in how it affected
sectoral interests, accepting a change, through their debates with German unionists over
the differing models of workplace relations “from the promotion of British style
‘collective laissez-faire’ industrial relations towards a more ‘continental’ rights-based
conception of the regulation of the labour market” (Rosamond 1998, 144). This shift by
the unions allowed the Labour Party the political opportunity to move from advocacy of
“collective rights (such as the ‘closed shop’) to guaranteeing individual rights, on the
European model” (Tindale 1992, 291). This entailed an acceptance by both the unions
and the Labour Party of how more than a decade of Conservative government had altered
the political landscape to favor a more individualist outlook, a confirmation of Holden’s
(2002) observation about how, particularly in matters pertaining to Europe, Labour
preferred to pursue a policy of preference accommodation, or accepting the Conservative
playing field, rather than continue to try to shape their own (Tindale 1992).

Political pragmatism
The unions recognized that under Thatcher their domestic political power had
drastically waned, and saw Europe as a possible avenue for maintaining power by a
different means. Moreover, the EC actively sought out British trades unionists as part of
the EC’s “consensual framework”, unlike the adversarial nature of British politics. The
unions needed the EC to wield influence somewhere, but the EC, particularly under
!

"$'!

Delors needed British trade unions to foster the integrationist project. As Tony Benn
observed: “‘The TUC never gets invited to tea at No. 10 these days, but it is invited to
three-course lunches in Brussels because M. Delors needs the TUC’” (George and
Haythorne, 1996, 118). A widespread perception held that a hostile prime minister drove
British trade unions into the arms of Europe. TWGU General Secretary, Ron Todd, said
in 1988: “’In the short term we have not a cat in hell’s chance of achieving [worker
participation and industrial democracy] in Westminster. The only card game in town is
in a town called Brussels’” (Rosamond 1998, 143). But it was not just about the clash
with the Thatcher government; the launch of the single market by 1992 was such a
transformational matter that trade unions would have had to respond to its advent no
matter what the nature of the government and its “rhetoric” (Rosamond 1998).
Thus, unions became pro-EC in large part because they sought a new avenue of
power after the domestic national political path had been closed by the continuing reelection of Thatcher and the Conservatives into national office. The TUC Asst General
Secretary advocated a position of working from within the EC to make sure that the
single market contained a social protection element (Josselin 2001). Still, going down
this path altered the unions’ perception of the EC “and their own role in its construction”
(Josselin 2001, 68). Overall, unions pursued a type of two-level game in this context,
considering whether and how best domestic political influence might be achieved through
engagement at the European level (Rosamond 1998).
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Labour and the unions
From 1983 to 1987, Kinnock and his allies in the party leadership sought to
disentangle Labour’s fortunes from those of the more militant unions, which had become
perceived as partly to blame for Britain’s economic malaise. This perception
strengthened as Arthur Scargill, head of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), led
the nation’s coalminers out on a prolonged strike in 1985, in a faceoff with the Thatcher
government over mine closures that the Government would eventually win. The
“militant” Scargill was part of the party’s radical left, and his “total dedication and
unblinking dogmatism” directly contradicted the carefully centrist line that Kinnock was
trying to take in reshaping the party (Shaw 1996, 172). While Kinnock could do little
during the strike without risking further fissures in the fragile party, a key result of the
strike was that many in the party began to believe that a return to more moderate policies
was the party’s only viable option. While Kinnock’s personal reputation took a knock for
his unwillingness to take on Scargill and the other militants at the time, his agenda for the
party began to take hold (Shaw 1996).
In a speech at the 1985 Labour Party Conference, Kinnock solidified this shift by
attacking Militant, an extreme left group in the Labour Party, saying that the party needed
to relinquish divisionary, unrealistic tactics in order to succeed. The hard left denounced
Kinnock, but most of the soft left supported his stance (Shaw 1996). His speech was
passionate and stirring and was seen as a “key turning point” in the party’s turnaround,
though Featherstone notes that Kinnock was careful not to denounce Militant until he was
certain that he had the backing of the bulk of the party structure (Featherstone 1999, 4).
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The British trade unions gradually accompanied the overall Party’s shift to the
center, including the progressively more pro-European policy, although some remained
skeptical (Josselin 2001). Even the skeptical unions, however, accepted the fact that
Europe now played a key shaping role in their operating environment (Rosamond 1998).
The willingness of the unions and most of the left in the Labour Party to at least go along
with the new enthusiasm for EC integration was key for Labour's future prospects: the
significant divisions that were developing at this time in the Conservative party over
Europe came to cripple that party’s ability to govern, and undermined its standing with
the public (Forster 2002).
While the Labour Party increasingly could be considered pro-European as the
decade wound down, the trade unions were “less wholeheartedly converted” (Tindale
1992, 299). But with Kinnock’s efforts to diversify the party’s support base, he no longer
had to depend so thoroughly on unions as previous Labour leaders had (Tindale 1992).
Labour had embraced EC integration, including ERM, in part because it had to broaden
its electoral base beyond just the working class, which it could no longer solely depend
on to be elected (Shaw 1996). Kinnock had to persuade the broad middle class that their
interests would be safe under a Labour government, which no longer would be looking
out only for trade union interests, as had been the widespread perception. In other words,
Labour “set out, successfully, to convert itself into a mass party rather than a class party”
(Tindale 1992, 300). On Europe, the Labour party leadership found that the willingness
of many unions to accept Delors’ overture on the social charter made it easier for the
party to adopt a pro-European stance, but it was not going to allow the continuing
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skepticism of other unions to turn the party away from its new—and increasing—
Europhilia (Tindale 1992).

Part V. Stage Two: 1987-1990
Labour’s huge defeat in the 1987 election persuaded the party of the need for
radical and thorough policy change, including the conviction that it was time to fully
support Britain’s membership of the EC (Featherstone 1999). Delors allowed Labour a
political opening by promising social modifiers for the single market (George and
Haythorne, 1996). The ERM, touted as an anti-inflationary and economic stability
measure, promised a way for Labour to build a reputation for sound economic judgment
(Shaw 1996). John Smith, a longtime europhile, became shadow Chancellor after 1987
election, which helped influence the direction Kinnock was already preparing to take.
Taking a pro-European stance at the 1989 EP elections allowed Labour to take advantage
of Thatcher’s growing unpopularity and anti-European platform, and the success Labour
enjoyed there encouraged it to proceed along the pro-EC path (Featherstone 1999). But
the transition was not simple: the party had to change its ideology along the way, and
there were groups that still resisted, though more were willing to go along than had been
the case in the earlier part of the decade (Tindale 1992).

Electoral defeat and Policy Review
In 1987, Labour lost to the Conservatives for the third consecutive general
election, by nearly as wide a margin as it had in 1983 (Cronin 2004). The loss devastated
the party, since it indicated that its well-run campaign and, more importantly, the policy
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changes it had made so far, had not persuaded voters to shift any support from the
Conservative to the Labour Party (Featherstone 1999). Although they had not expected
to win, Labour party members were dismayed to find that they had gained only 20 seats
in Parliament raising its total to 229, its second lowest number since 1945 (Shaw 1994).
While Kinnock and his allies had undertaken some changes in policies following the
1983 general election defeat, Labour's 1987 general election loss confirmed the growing
sense among party members, parliamentarians, media, and public that the party had to
change comprehensively in order to convince the electorate that it would not pursue
socialist economic policies if elected (Daniels 1998).
The party still had not done enough to convince voters of Labour’s credibility, so
Kinnock went for comprehensive reform, the most thorough overhaul of policy that the
Labour Party had ever undertaken (Tindale 1992). One of the policy areas where change
was considered necessary was Europe. The second stage of Labour’s transition to a proEuropean party began with the launch in 1988 of a Policy Review process in which the
party undertook assessments of its policies in every issue area, including Europe. As a
result of the policy review process, Labour began to pursue a yet more positive approach
to European integration. Because the reviews undertaken were so comprehensive, the
party’s transition on Europe policy gained credence with observers (Daniels 1998).
Labour’s policy of withdrawal from the EC in its 1983 election manifesto had
suggested a party that was not in sync with voter interests, not trusted to govern, and that
was controlled by the hard left. While after 1983 Labour had abandoned its pledge to take
Britain out of the EC if it came into power, its attitude about European integration had
remained lukewarm rather than supportive. Its 1987 electoral manifesto had barely
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mentioned Europe at all, but when it had, it had been unenthusiastic (George and
Haythorne 1996). No longer discussing withdrawal, Labour promised instead to be
“constructive” in Europe and that it would represent “British interests”, but warned that it
would “reject EEC interference” in any part of its plans to rebuild the British economy
(Featherstone 1999, 5). But this pledge, too, had been part of a manifesto roundly
rejected by the voters. After losing the 1987 election, again by a wide margin, many
commentators considered Labour’s attitude about Europe to be a significant part of why
Labour lost in 1987 (George and Haythorne 1996). Labour leadership now tried to infuse
its European policy with a little more enthusiasm for the project (Gowland and Turner
1999).
Indeed, the EC became a focal point of Labour party transformation, rather just
one of many issue areas in the party’s platform that needed to be changed. In part this
was because European policy by the late 1980s had become a salient point of contention
between the two political parties in their battle for political power (Daniels 1998). In
Labour’s European policy transition, growing Tory divisions over Europe would aid the
Labour party leadership. By contrasting its new pro-European policy with the newly
ideological rhetoric coming from some Conservatives, most notably the Prime Minister,
Labour found a way to tactically exploit a weakness in what had previously been an area
of Conservative electoral dominance and to bring itself back towards the electoral center
ground (Featherstone 1999).
The Labour Party published its policy review in four parts: the second, released in
1989, offered the most thorough explication of Labour party policies, and among its
results was a strongly pro-European stance (Shaw 1996). Entitled Meet the Challenge,
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Make the Change, this part of the policy review “accepted the Single European Market”
but also urged increased member state cooperation on social and environmental
protections (Featherstone 1999, 5). After the 1987 defeat, Labour also became more
willing to let go of some of the ideological concerns that used to constrain the party in
return for domestic political gain. The policy review, for instance, indicated that the
Labour Party was less concerned about the potential loss of Westminster sovereignty:
more important was the fact that its leadership saw ways of defeating the Conservatives
through engagement with the EC. Labour Party policy on Europe also became more
flexible about the national veto, though the party still urged protection of this prerogative
(Featherstone 1999, Daniels 1998). Overall, however, as Tindale observed in 1992, “The
EC is now seen explicitly as a forum which can be used to further Labour’s reformist
social democratic goals” rather than as an impediment to them (Tindale 1992, 277).
The 1989 Labour Party conference endorsed Meet the Challenge, Make the
Change by a solid majority (Cronin 2004), but no amendments had been allowed,
suggesting that the party leadership had been concerned that some party members would
not fully accept the changes recommended in the report (Featherstone 1999). In fact, the
policy review process had been slow by necessity because party leaders had had to fight
the party’s hard left, which opposed the changes. But the left’s power in the party
diminished after the middle of the decade as the once straightforward cleavages in the
party began to break apart into more complex, shifting “lines of demarcation”, while
“attachment to factional groupings abated” (Shaw 1996, 219). The left was neither as
cohesive nor as powerful as it had been at the beginning of the decade, as Kinnock’s

!

"%$!

pragmatic reshaping of party structure and policy had taken much of the strength out of
traditional ideological stances.
As a party management issue, the positive approach signaled by the policy review
indicated a victory of Kinnock’s centrist strategy over the hard left in the party (Cronin
2004). In October 1988 the left made one last attempt to challenge the more moderate
direction Kinnock was taking the party as Tony Benn issued a leadership challenge. He
was trounced solidly, and that miscalculation and the continuing refusal to budge on
ideological stances cause some leftist Labour politicians such as Clare Short, Margaret
Beckett and Jo Richardson, who had been on the fence between the hard and soft left, to
decamp to the latter (Shaw 1994). The hard left had officially lost sway over the party
and therefore over the party’s European policy.
Supporting this notion of an ideological shift in the party as a whole, Tindale
suggests that electoral opportunism could account for much of the shift in European
policy between 1983 and 1987, but the shift after 1987 “from sullen acceptance to
enthusiasm” involved more through changes in the party’s ideology as well as its strategy
(Tindale 1992, 278). Among other policies, the policy review officially put an end to
Labour’s goal of achieving a socialist economy through national economic selfsufficiency and thus resolved the dichotomy between that Labour goal and the EC’s
raison d'être of international economic cooperation. Now, there was no ideological
barrier to Labour’s new enthusiasm for EC integration (Tindale 1992).
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Delors at the TUC Conference
EC president Jacques Delors came to the TUC’s conference in Bournemouth in
1988 and proposed to include social protections to modify the effects of the Single
Market. The party’s strong approval of Delors’ proposal smoothed the way for Labour’s
acceptance of Britain’s membership in the EC (George and Haythorne, 1996). The
Labour Party welcomed Delors’ proposed social charter, which pledged to improve
workers’ quality of life and workplace standards. Tony Blair, then the party’s
employment spokesman, called the measure “‘just and fair’”, while the TUC described it
as “‘a shorthand description of a decent society’” (Tindale 1992, 294). British trade
unions’ largely positive response was aided by the fact that much of the agenda of the
social charter respected national traditions, thus leaving room in British industrial
relations for collective bargaining. Due to Delors’ direction, the European Community
changed from being a more purely market oriented endeavor to one with more of a social
focus, which made the entire enterprise more acceptable to Labour. Indeed, it allowed
Labour to move from acceptance of EC to enthusiasm for it (Tindale 1992).
Not everyone in the party, however, accepted Delors’ overture. The far left of the
party rejected Delors’ social charter as “a fig-leaf to cover the competitive free-for-all of
1992”, when the single market was due to come into effect (Tindale 1992, 294). But by
1988, the hard left’s ability to influence the direction of the party had diminished
substantially (Daniels 1998). Likewise, some of the response from party members to
Delors was a reflection of political opportunism rather than straightforward ideological
conversion: for many, it was a pragmatic recognition that “The time was ripe and the
atmosphere propitious for Labour and the unions to fete Delors. The Bournemouth
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appearance was stage-managed; most of the delegates could not hear or understand
Delors’ broken English, but they gave him three standing ovations nevertheless. At other
times and in other circumstances, Delors might have been ignored” (Tindale 1992, 294).
Anti-Europeanism was no longer a political winner in Britain, and Labour had to move
beyond it.
At the same time, however, one cannot dismiss the ideological shift that genuinely
had taken place within the bulk of the Labour Party. Delors articulated a vision of
European society that Labour could support. Political opportunism alone was insufficient
to shape the party’s policy on Europe. While Labour’s embrace of Europe after 1987
partly resulted from Labour’s wish to take advantage of Conservatives’ growing divisions
on Europe, it was only able to exploit this opportunity because by this time Labour itself
had largely eliminated or silenced its own divisions on Europe. If the party had not been
in agreement with Delors’ goals, it could not have taken advantage of the Conservative
Party’s European woes, just as it had not set itself against the government on budget
rebates and CAP reform earlier in the decade because it agreed in principle with the
government position (Tindale 1992).
Thus, Labour could not have taken political advantage of Conservative
weaknesses without the ideological shift to a pro-EC position, which in turn could not
have been made without Delors’ social charter. But as mentioned above, the hard left of
the Labour party still rejected Delos’ proposals as a mere “fig leaf” that attempted to hide
the free market agenda inherent in the single market. Had the Labour party been the
same socialist party it had been at the 1983 general election, it would, like the left of the
party in 1988, have spurned Delors’ advances. But the Labour leadership did accept
!

"%'!

Delors’ proposals; it even “welcomed them as paralleling its own political aims. In the
space of a decade, Labour had gone from British socialism to European social
democracy” (Tindale 1992, 281-282).
Conservative divisions over European policy became more explicit after Prime
Minister Thatcher delivered her famous speech at Bruges in 1988, in which she
challenged Delors’ vision of the future direction of the EC. Thatcher’s Bruges speech
and the changes in Conservative policy that followed also let the Labour Party draw a
distinction between itself and the Conservative Party’s splits over Europe. Labour
painted itself as the reasonable, moderate party representing Britain’s interests in Europe,
a tactic the Conservatives once enjoyed (Lawson 1992).
The speech not only gave Labour an opportunity to exploit Conservative divisions
on Europe, it also allowed the party to attack the prime minister herself directly on the
issue. Thatcher quickly came to personify a new form of euroskepticism that Labour
could define itself against, since it sprang from a source that was the opposite of the
foundation of Labour’s euroskepticism. Thatcher objected to the growing interference of
the European-level state in the marketplace, while Labour skeptics on the left of the party
objected that European-level interference would impede the achievement of an
economically self-sufficient socialist Britain. Indeed, “When Thatcher talked of the
European Commission introducing ‘socialism through the back door’, there were many in
the Labour Party who wanted to believe it, since there appeared to be little chance of
getting it through the front” (Tindale 1992, 287). By this time the Labour party as a
whole was willing to put aside its concerns about a loss of Westminster sovereignty to the
EC because Westminster sovereignty was in the hands of Margaret Thatcher, and had
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been for the last decade. Labour was becoming desperate to oust the Conservatives and
their leader, and this political contest fueled the growth of the party’s new pro-European
policies (Featherstone 1999).
Nonetheless, Tindale argues that ideological change outpaced pragmatic electoral
appeal: that while part of the shift in Labour’s policy on Europe and its exploitation of
the euroskeptic divide in the Conservative party was based on electoral aims, this was not
a sufficient explanation for the party’s motives. Labour did not always oppose
Thatcher’s Europe policies between 1983-87; indeed, the party frequently supported the
Government, on issues such as CAP reform and the budget rebate, in a “bipartisan
defence of British interests” (Tindale 1992, 277). It was only when the parties stopped
agreeing that Labour began to take advantage of Tory divisions. Tindale adds, “And
although the threat to withdraw was a vote loser in 1983, it is not clear that Labour’s
support after 1987 for a Brussels-based Frenchman is guaranteed to improve its standing
with the notoriously nationalistic British electorate” (Tindale 1992, 278). From an
electoral standpoint, Labour may even have become too pro-Europe by the end of the
decade for public taste, as by the beginning of the 1990s polls suggested that Labour’s
support for Economic and Monetary Union well exceeded that of the public (Tindale
1992).

1989 European Parliamentary elections
By 1989 Labour had recast itself as the party of Europe, a moniker the
Conservative party had long held. This rebranding was made easier due to Prime
Minister Thatcher’s concurrent turn against European integration, stated to great effect in
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her Bruges speech the previous autumn. Her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, argued that it
had always been the Labour party that had been characterized by its “hesitancy and
bitterly divided counsels” over Europe: now, the Conservatives took on that unenviable
characterization (Lawson 1992, 922). The reversal of policy both parties were
undertaking became more evident in the course of the 1989 European Parliamentary
elections.
In 1984 the Labour Party had campaigned in the elections for European
Parliament on a platform advocating reform of the EC from within. By 1989, the party
was prepared to be significantly more positive about the institution. In 1989, therefore,
Labour presented itself as the pro-European party and claimed that the Conservatives’
anti-EC policy would leave Britain out in EC debates and would not serve Britain’s best
interests (Daniels 1998). Labour candidates advocated deeper integration in the EC while
Conservative EP candidates, who tended to be more Europhile than the predominating
trend at party headquarters (Thatcher 1993), were caught in the shifting ideological tide
of Conservative European policy.
As discussed above, Labour’s decision to adopt a pro-European position in the
1989 elections was a mix of electoral opportunism and ideological conversion. But
Labour became able to maximize the benefits of its own ideological shift, particularly by
contrasting it with that of the Conservatives’, for electoral gain. Meanwhile, Labour had
also come a long way in its willingness to identify itself with the mainland socialist
parties. While in 1984 Labour had reluctantly and with reservations signed on to a joint
election manifesto with the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC, it did not use
this manifesto as its campaign platform for the British EP elections. In 1989, by contrast,
!

"%*!

Labour used the joint manifesto it had signed with the European socialists as its British
campaign platform (Tindale 1992).

Thus, on issues such as the social charter and ERM

“the Labour Party showed itself to be much closer to the evolving EC agenda. In short,
Labour was far more in tune with ‘Europe’ and it could exploit Tory divisions to assert its
own credibility” (Featherstone 1999, 6).
Once the votes were counted, Labour gained more seats in the EP election than
did the Conservatives, winning forty-five seats (40.2 per cent of the vote) to the
Conservatives’ thirty-two seats (34.8 per cent) (George and Haythorne 1996). While the
electoral turnout was low Labour’s margin of victory allowed it to take the result as a
sign that voters were beginning to view them as a credible alternative again, though they
could not discount the idea that it was as much if not more a sign of dissatisfaction with
Conservative policies and with Thatcher herself as an expression of favorability towards
Labour. Nonetheless, it also confirmed to the party leadership that their new European
policy was being received well, and encouraged it to continue along the pro-European
path (Holden 2002).

Labour’s ERM policy
Following on the success of the party’s pro-Europe policy in the June 1989 EP
elections, at the Labour Party conference in the autumn of 1989, shadow chancellor John
Smith convinced the party that it was time for Labour to advocate entry into the ERM.
This change in policy occurred in October 1989, after the party leadership removed
Bryan Gould, a euroskeptic and unrepentant Keynesian, from the position of shadow
Industry Secretary from which, aided by his role as the chair of the economic policy
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group for Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, he had exerted some influence over the
party’s ERM policy. Upon his removal, the more market-oriented economic opinions of
Smith and Kinnock prevailed, after which “Labour embraced the ERM with the zeal of a
convert” (Shaw 1996, 185).
Labour had long objected to ERM because it violated the party’s pledge of
achieving national economic self-sufficiency and because of its deflationary bias, which
party members believed to adversely affect jobs and growth. Now, the party leadership
had become convinced that restricting British monetary policy within the ERM gave the
country some protection against currency speculation, and would provide price stability
(Shaw 1996). Moreover, ERM membership removed devaluation as an option for
improving British industry’s competitiveness in the export markets, which made inflation
less of a risk, and offered Britain the prospect of “stable economic growth” (Tindale
1992, 280). While the Thatcher government had achieved economic growth, the
economy was not considered stable. John Smith, the shadow chancellor, held out
membership of the ERM as a means of achieving both, and by achieving both, Labour
would have more leeway to pursue its social democratic goals (Tindale 1992).
Advocacy of the ERM had the added benefit of giving the Labour Party some
externally-imposed credibility as managers of the British economy (Featherstone 1999),
or at least that was the party leaders’ plan, since the 1987 general election results had
made it clear that the voters still did not trust the party in this area (Shaw 1996). Labour
also saw sterling’s membership in the ERM as a way to fight the influence of
international capital and multinational corporations in the British economy. Tindale
writes, “The need to tame these Leviathans was a potent source of support for European
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integration, and was seized upon by Neil Kinnock to justify his volte-face on the
Community: ‘In the age of multinational capital, democracy must be multinational too’”,
he said (Tindale 1992, 284).
On October 5, 1990 the Thatcher government took the pound into the ERM. As
this had been one of Labour’s European policy aims since the previous year, both
Kinnock and the shadow chancellor, John Smith, grudgingly applauded the move. Since
Labour’s support of the ERM lay on the basis that it would provide economic stability
and thus allow inflation to decline, which was precisely the Thatcher government’s
argument, Labour leaders had to focus their attacks on the Government in a different
direction. They claimed that Thatcher had gone back on her own “Madrid conditions”
that she had set out at the June 1989 EC Madrid summit, specifically her assertion that
Britain would not join the ERM until the inflation rate had dropped (by October 1990 the
inflation rate was rising, not falling) (House of Commons Debates October 15, 1990).
However, though his party, like the Government, supported ERM membership by
October 1990, Labour was not yet ready to endorse the next step of European economic
union that Delors was already advocating: the creation of a single currency. Kinnock
himself, much less the party’s rank and file, was still ambivalent about the merits of the
single currency, and in the House of Commons stated his opposition to an independent
central bank in Europe, another intermediary step in the establishment of a single
currency, as well (House of Commons Debates October 23, 1990). Labour tolerance of
European economic integration was still evolving.
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Kinnock's central role in the transformation of Labour Party policy
While some, such as Tony Benn, maintained that Kinnock sacrificed ideology for
political expediency as he transformed the Labour party during the 1980s, others argued
that such a trait was necessary to making Labour a viable political party after the
devastating electoral loss in 1983 (Farndale 2009).15 By the party’s third consecutive
general election loss to the Conservatives in 1987, even more people in the Labour party
had become at least resigned to the changes on which Kinnock and other Labour party
leaders were insisting (Gowland and Turner 1999). This was certainly the case with the
party’s position on Europe. “By the time that Kinnock stood down in 1992, the party had
started to see EC membership as an opportunity rather than as a constraint, and to discuss
the issue in terms of the type of Europe that it wanted to see rather than in terms of
whether Britain ought to be a member of any type of EC” (George and Haythorne, 1996,
119).
Interestingly, Kinnock’s willingness to change Labour party policies so
comprehensively was recognized to be essential for the party, but did not lead the public
at large to vote for Labour under Kinnock’s leadership. This was most damning in
Labour’s narrow fourth consecutive loss to the Conservatives in 1992, after which
Kinnock resigned as party leader. Some, argued that the very trait that made Kinnock’s
leadership key for turning around Labour’s political fortunes, his ideological malleability,
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Benn said, “Politicians are divided into signposts and weathercocks. Neil Kinnock gave
up everything he believed in to get power and ended up with no one believing him about
anything. That makes him a weathercock. Margaret Thatcher was a signpost. The trouble
was, I thought her sign pointed in the wrong direction.” At
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/6004384/Tony-Benn-makingmistakes-is-part-of-life.html.
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was the reason why people would not vote for the party while he led it – they did not trust
him (Shaw 1994). Nonetheless, he made the party a viable governing option again, and
set the stage for future “new” Labour leaders, most notably Tony Blair, to bring Labour
back into political power at last (Cronin 2004).
While critics like Benn asserted that Kinnock’s principles moved with the
political tide, others of his peers believe that, on the matter of European integration at
least, Kinnock’s conversion was both genuine and lasting. Kinnock had started off as a
protégé of his predecessor as Labour leader, Michael Foot, a hard left politician opposed
to Britain’s membership in the EC, and Kinnock articulated that position as well. But
after the 1983 electoral defeat, it was Kinnock who took the party all the way to support
for increased EC integration by the time Kinnock stepped down in 1992.
Kinnock, indeed, claims that he began to change his mind on Europe before 1983,
having decided that the “political costs of withdrawal, let alone the economic costs of
actually withdrawing, were too high” (Tindale 1992, 277). Regardless of whether his
was an election-day epiphany or a reversal of longer standing, however, Kinnock began
to try to shift Labour’s policy on Europe shortly after being elected party leader (Tindale
1992). Longtime euroskeptic Labour MP Barbara Castle reflected later that, in one sense,
Kinnock had a similar transformation as Prime Minister Thatcher herself from being a
pragmatist on European issues to an ideologue; only their attitudes went in reverse. In
any event, Kinnock began a pragmatic skeptic and ended a EU Commissioner devoted to
European integration (Gowland and Turner 1999).
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Part VI. Conclusion
By the end of the 1980s, Labour was a party of Europe. A small skeptic remnant
persisted but had little influence over party policy. While some hard left Labour
parliamentarians, including Tony Benn, Dennis Skinner, Peter Shore and Austin Mitchell,
continued to oppose membership of the EC and to disbelieve the professed benefits of
membership, by the late 1980s, the party’s euroskeptics no longer played a role of any
weight in the leadership of the Labour party (George and Haythorne 1996). Bryan
Gould, the leftist euroskeptic who had opposed membership of the ERM, ran for party
leadership in 1992, only to lose to the europhile John Smith. By 1992, “the majority of
Labour MPs and party members now appear genuinely convinced of the merits of
European integration,” and considered European policy to be a key element of Labour’s
overall plan for Britain (Tindale 1992, 300).
Tindale argues, “the Europeanisation of the British Labour movement was
primarily a response to prolonged and serious failure” (Tindale 1992, 288). After losing
so disastrously to the Conservatives in three consecutive general elections, Labour had to
reverse its policy on Europe. This change in European policy may have begun out of
electoral necessity, “designed to convey the image of a party which is modern, credible
and fit to govern”, but it eventually became an ideological transformation as party leaders
found that they could meet their (new) goals within a pro-European stance (Daniels 1998,
79). However in order for Labour to become a, much less the, ” party of Europe” in
Britain, not only did the Labour Party need to change, but the EC needed to change as
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well. It did so under EC President Jacques Delors, who introduced social goals to the
free market agenda of the single market (Tindale 1992).
In addition, in the course of Labour’s successful transformation, the party took
advantage of the Conservatives’ own shift on European policy to advance its electoral
interests, and managed to rid itself of its own party management issues over Europe only
for the Conservatives to take them up (Featherstone 1999). This successful management
of its own cleavages and the exploitation of the Conservatives’ growing divide over
Europe became a weapon the party was to use to increasing advantage in domestic
politics for the next decade-and-a-half, so that Labour’s successful transition in European
policy reaped dividends well beyond what anyone might have expected as the painful,
incremental adjustments were being made to it over the course of the 1980s.
Both Labour and the Conservatives experienced significant cross-cutting
cleavages over Europe, as party members split over each party’s policy on European
integration. While this meant that there were both euroskeptics and europhiles in each
party, counterparts in opposing parties did not unite to advance their common cause
during the 1980s, mainly because those holding each ideological position tended to be
disorganized. In addition, their reasons for skepticism or support for the EC were too
different: Labour skeptics tended to come from the left of the party, while Conservative
skeptics tended to be to the right of theirs, while the reverse was true of europhiles
(Forster 2002).
In addition, cross-cutting cleavages within each party tended to result from the
fact that European policy did not lie easily within the traditional ideological boundaries
that defined each party. Labour might support regional aid to Wales, for instance,
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particularly as this supported depressed mining communities, but opposed the Single
Market. Other Labour skeptics, especially early in the decade, might object to regional
aid (and overall membership in the EC) as well, on the grounds that any interference in
British politics undermined British sovereignty and also Labour’s ability to achieve state
socialism (Tindale 1992, Forster 2002). These cleavages became more complicated as
Labour sought to shift its base in order to become electorally viable again: Labour’s
efforts to attract the middle class, for instance, complicated its ability to speak for its
traditional working class and union base on both EC and other issues. It became more
complicated again as the EC began to shift from a primarily market-focused enterprise to
one that widened its net to social policies and to monetary integration.
Both parties experienced these cross-cutting cleavages over Europe: the
important issue, from the Thatcher to the Blair eras, was which party managed its
divisions better. While the Conservatives would seem to have done so through much of
the 1980s, the fact that Labour was forced to make such big changes in order to regain
credibility allowed it to address its cleavages and formulate a European strategy that most
of its members would promote, especially since these members had learned that the
alternative was political oblivion. The Conservatives, however, were in power, which
arguably made big shifts in European policy more difficult as it would seem to admit that
the Government had been mistaken before. The previous chapter, indeed, showed the
fissures that began to multiply and deepen within the Conservative Party as Prime
Minister Thatcher sought to change the Government’s EC policy midstream. Thus, while
by the beginning of the 1990s Labour had managed to contain its cross-cutting cleavages
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and present a largely united front on EC issues, the Conservatives’ cleavages over Europe
were about to get much worse.
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Chapter Four:
Conservatives 1990 – 1997: Maastricht, the Single Currency and Implosion
Part I: TEU negotiations, December 1990 – December 1991
In late November 1990 Major won the Conservative party leadership contest,
succeeding Thatcher. However, Major’s election as Conservative Party leader was by no
means an end to the growing euroskeptic – europhile divide in the Conservative party
delineated in Chapter Two. Major was the second choice for Thatcher supporters, who
had wished to retain her as prime minister, and when in the second round of ballots he
won more votes than Heseltine or Hurd both resigned from the race, so that the party did
not hold the third round of balloting. This may have done Major a disservice in terms of
leadership, since the lack of a third round prevented him from winning the votes of
Heseltine’s and Hurd’s supporters and thus meant, in one sense, that he had not secured a
mandate from the bulk of the party (Heppell 2008). Thus Major inherited a party of
Thatcher supporters and Heseltine supporters, rather than a loyal following of his own.
One reason why he succeeded in the leadership race, however, was that before and during
the leadership election he deliberately encouraged MPs of widely varying political
convictions to believe that he supported their respective positions (Young 1998), a tactic
he would continue to employ during his premiership.16 He also ran a well-organized
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Young (1998) writes, “dating from [Major’s] time as Chief Secretary [of the Treasury],
a journalist recalled an evening at a party conference when he had ‘bumped into one of
the most pro-European Tory MPs’ and later ‘had a drink with a fiercely Euro-sceptic
!
"&*!

campaign, particularly in comparison to Hurd and Heseltine, and his agreeable demeanor
seemed a welcome change after 11 years of Thatcher’s combative style as prime minister
(Hurd 2003, Lamont 1999). Overall, though, it was the support of Thatcherite
euroskeptics, believing him to be Thatcher’s ideological heir (an impression Major did
nothing to dispel), which propelled him to the party leadership (Heppell 2008).
On the other hand, Major’s ability to appeal to a broad spectrum of Conservative
MPs did not translate into the creation of a loyal followership. After the leadership
election those Conservative MPs who supported Hurd (who was mildly euro-skeptic in
the sense that he opposed the single currency but was otherwise pro-Europe) and
Heseltine (a strong europhile) did not support him fully. These MPs did not retain their
loyalty to those two leaders in particular but did remain pro-integration after the election,
while those who had supported Thatcher during the leadership election remained by and
large both euroskeptic and supporters of Thatcher, even as she entered the House of
Lords after the 1992 general election. Her elevation to the House of Lords did not
prevent her from remaining active in politics and expressing her by now unfettered
euroskepticism, and did not stop her supporters in the party in the Commons from turning
to her for inspiration, particularly on European matters. In other words, few MPs were
committed Major adherents, but rather former supporters of other Conservative leaders.
In December 1990 he began negotiations with the other 11 European Community
leaders on the Treaty on European Union (TEU), more commonly known as the
Maastricht Treaty. The treaty was to bring about further political integration and the
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right-winger’. Both had been impressed by the little-known Mr Major. ‘Why? Because
he had given both of them the impression that he agreed 100 per cent with their views.’”
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creation of a single currency, later to become known as the euro. According to Young
(1998, 429), EMU was not just one aspect of the treaty to be negotiated, but rather was
“at the heart of Maastricht, its central purpose”. Major came in to the negotiations at the
head of both a party and a nation that traditionally had opposed deeper political
integration, and in these negotiations Britain often stood alone in opposition to the
direction of negotiation. Only Denmark also opposed the creation of a single currency.
Major continued most of Thatcher’s policies going into the negotiations, such as
opposition to: deeper political union; relinquishing the national veto; expanding qualified
majority voting (QMV); and in general the creation of any federal structure in the EC.
Like Thatcher, he supported the single market. Also like Thatcher, he knew that the
negotiations on the treaty were inevitable, however undesirable they might be to the
British. Moreover, even had his personal opinions been different, Major could not do
anything that would promote rebellion in the Conservative party this close to the next
general election (Gowland and Turner 1999).
Negotiations on TEU continued for nearly a year (Forster 2002). The treaty was a
compromise for Britain, since it was unable to prevent the establishment of a single
currency but was given the option to “opt-out” of the currency. Specifically, the treaty
specified not only the goal of creating a single currency but a timetable for doing so. On
this there was no compromise that would be acceptable to the British, so Major had to
negotiate an opt-out while other member states proceeded. This was a change from a
longstanding British policy of insisting that there would be no “two-speed” Europe:
every member state should proceed at the same pace or not at all. The same applied to
the “Social Chapter”, which Britain also opted-out of while other member states moved
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ahead. While Major proclaimed the outcome of the Maastricht Treaty as a victory for
Britain, in fact it was a more limited success because Britain had to give up on its longheld one-speed principle (Gowland and Turner 1999).
Overall, while his peers in the EC pressured Major, he was more influenced by
domestic considerations at home, especially the Thatcher legacy. His negotiating stances
during the Maastricht negotiations were “always subject to pragmatic political judgments
based on party management criteria and considerations of electoral advantage. And the
ultimate price of these domestic considerations proved to be the expedients of an opt out
on social policy and EMU, with Britain leading the way to the very two-speed Europe
which she had set out to oppose” (Forster 1999, 172). Clearly, between party division
and lack of unison in Europe, Major considered a two-speed Europe the lesser of two
evils. Ironically, once the ratification process began, he had both.
By November 1991, Major took the unprecedented step of presenting his
negotiating stance to Parliament for its approval before the Treaty had been completed.
At that time only six Conservative MPs voted against it. At this time the Government
majority in the House of Commons was 95, so the significance of a euroskeptic rebellion
against the government was negligible. “In December 1991 seven Conservative Eurosceptics voted against the government in a two-day debate on the treaty in the House of
Commons” (Aspinwall 2004, 123). But once the May 1992 election wiped out most of
the Conservative majority, the skeptic rebellion began to gain momentum as its ability to
influence the outcome of votes rose substantially (Aspinwall 2004).
The House of Commons passed the motion to approve Major’s negotiating stance,
but in truth the stance as presented to Parliament was both broad and non-specific,
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making it easy to approve, but did not reflect the true scope of the government’s position
at Maastricht. However, Major succeeded, for a time, in achieving his mandate from
Parliament, since he gained a majority of 101 in the final vote, with only six conservative
skeptics opposing it. (Forster 2002, 97).
Major took care to keep the details of negotiations secret from Parliament, even
from most of his own government, so that potential opponents even (perhaps especially)
on his own side were not in a position to object (Forster 1999).[Why the new line
here?]However, the skeptics, at this time quiescent but who were later to object
strenuously to the treaty and to complain about having been duped by Major, were
partially at fault in this, since this information was readily available had they only looked
to the Continent, where other member states were making details of the negotiations
available to their own politicians (Forster 2002).
At this time the Conservative skeptics were not in the habit of looking to the
Continent for anything, and it apparently did not occur to them to look there for
information (Forster 2002). By this time Labour had established a habit of cooperation
with allies in other EC countries as discussed in the last chapter, but Conservative
skeptics had not. This was in part because those European groups of any significance
that opposed the Maastricht Treaty tended to be so far to the right, such as Jean-Marie Le
Pen’s Front National in France, that British euroskeptics wished to avoid any affiliation
with them. While nationalism could be a strong rallying point in other European
countries, in Britain it was viewed with suspicion, a fact that worked against the British
euroskeptics later on as they tried to drum up popular support against the single currency
in the general population (Williams 1998).
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Externally, at the second level, Major faced tremendous pressure from peers in
Europe as the successor to Thatcher in particular to show that Britain could cooperate on
an agenda favored by most of the other EC members. Jacques Delors, the President of
the European Commission, and others were pressing for increased European political
union, to be cemented by economic union through a single currency. The TEU
encompassed a number of pillars besides EMU, including reform of the European
Parliament, judicial affairs, social issues, and a common defense position. But the EMU
was a major step towards integration, and it captured popular and political attention in the
UK as well as in other member states.
During the treaty negotiations, other country delegations plotted without the
British because of their obstreperous reputation (Forster 1999); also the British lacked a
strong positive proposal of their own but instead opposed the establishment of any treaty
at all, so they were continually on the losing side of EC initiatives. After months of
negotiations it became hard for the British, standing alone, to reject the whole treaty after
so much work and so much pressure from other member states had taken place, if indeed
refusal to endorse the treaty had ever been feasible. The sheer volume of work to be
achieved pressured member states to approve parts of the treaty without much
negotiation, and this pressure made it still more difficult for any country to object the
overall treaty as too flawed. The prevailing sense at the negotiations was that an
imperfect treaty was better than no treaty at all (Forster 1999).
Major kept his EC colleagues, other heads of government, apprised of the
difficulties he was having with euroskeptics in his own party as well as with the Labour
Opposition in an attempts to garner understanding of his predicament and give Britain
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some advantage in the Maastricht negotiations. If Britain did not receive an opt out on
EMU, these dispatches indicated, the British government would be in an untenable
position. While this did promote understanding, however, Major’s revelations also
unwittingly depicted him as a weak leader incapable of controlling his own party, much
less his country, so the ploy did him little service at the EC level (Forster 1999, 67-8).
Delors offered Britain a way out, introducing the notion of a two-speed Europe,
which suggested that the rest of the members could go ahead without Britain rather than
allow it to be an impediment to the greater goal of political integration. (Forster 1999)
This was a partial defeat for the British, who had wanted a generalized opt-out from the
for any member country which chose not to join the single currency, but British
negotiators lost this point in the usual 11-1 vote. While overall EC leaders considered
Major to be a good negotiator, when one of his aides intemperately declared at the end of
negotiations that Britain had won “game, set and match”, this did not endear the British,
Major in particular, to other European leaders like French President Mitterrand and Ruud
Lubbers, the Dutch prime minister and chairman of the Maastricht summit meeting
(Young 1998). The main dissatisfaction at the British level would arise during the
ratification process: at the time of negotiations, most euroskeptics accepted the result and
applauded the EMU opt-out Major had achieved (Young 1998; Lamont 1999; Wincott et
al. 1999).
Later, as Conservative skeptic MPs sought to block the treaty’s ratification, Major
attempted to give Parliament a sense of the realities of two level politics and how the EC
acted as a formal outside constraint that shaped British politics. On November 4, 1992, in
the course of the ratification debate in the House of Commons, he said,
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I know that it is the wish of some that the Maastricht treaty might not have
been proposed by others in the Community. The fact is that it was. It is
equally the case that we got the best out of it that we could in our own
national interests.17 Those who argue that, because we did not propose the
treaty, we should take advantage of present circumstances to ditch it do so
in the belief that we could have everything we want in Europe and
sacrifice nothing. I have to tell them that that argument is not real in
regard to the way in which the Community conducts its business (House
of Commons Debates November 4, 1992).
Major, like other British prime ministers, was caught between the imperatives of
domestic political and EC level pressures.
Finally, Major came to identify himself and his political leadership with the
success of the Maastricht treaty (Young 1998, 434; Williams 1998), which explained
some of his decisions at the domestic level as he tried to get the treaty ratified. Some of
these decisions would permanently alienate parts of his party. Forster writes,
The real problem for Major was that although his close control of
information about the negotiations and avoidance of any real
parliamentary – or indeed public – debate on most issues during the period
1990 and 1991 certainly paid short-term dividends in terms of controlling
a potentially volatile domestic audience, it did so only at the cost of
building up even greater suspicion and resentment for the future. The
feeling of deception among Eurosceptic backbenchers, built up over 12
months of the IGC negotiations, was an important part of the backlash
during the Maastricht ratification debates. And by the time the Maastricht
Treaty had been ratified, the opportunity for calm and reasoned public
debate about the issue of Europe was gone (Forster 1999, 181-2).
Major involved himself to a great degree in the negotiations over EMU, a task
most leaders delegated to their finance ministers. Major had just left the post of British
Chancellor to become Prime Minister just prior to the start of treaty negotiations, and
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Formal outside constraint shaping UK politics.
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moreover did not seem to fully trust his chancellor, Norman Lamont, with the details of
the EMU negotiations, which in any case Lamont did not appear to relish. It did mean
that Major became more personally vested in the EMU negotiations in particular, than
other EC leaders, and certainly he was personally vested in the success of the treaty
overall (Forster 1999). His dedication was less due to his conviction of the need for a
single currency or of his opposition to it: Major claimed that while he wanted to keep the
pound and thought that the EC as a whole was not ready for a common currency, he also
thought that Britain would have to join it someday anyway (Major 1999).
In summary, first, Major did a good job in the two-level game (Putnam 1988) at
the European level at least. In its final form, the treaty was considered to be the best the
British could get since the vote among the EC member states over treaty matters was
most often 11 to 1, with Britain as the lone opponent. Moreover, at the EC level of the
two level game Major did a decent job negotiating with his cohorts but the “game set and
match” quote attributed to Major (though uttered by a British civil servant) was offensive
to the European partners (Young 1998). Second, the Conservative euroskeptics were
quiescent at this point, satisfied for the most part with the opt-out Major had negotiated
from the single currency. Finally, Major became vested in the success of the treaty
(Young 1998, 434; Williams 1998), which explained some of this behavior at the
domestic level in trying to get the treaty ratified, moves that would permanently alienate
parts of his party as time went on. But Major could not achieve a permanent resolution to
the two-level game problem: solving it at one level put Major in an untenable situation at
the other level. The compromise over the single currency that the prime minister struck
at Maastricht soon exploded at the domestic level, while subsequent interactions at the
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EU level meant that Britain’s estrangement from its European partners grew wider than
ever. The prime minister’s attempt to balance this two-level conflict only succeeded for a
short time.

Part II: TEU ratification and complications 1992-1993
In December 1991 the intergovernmental council delivered the completed treaty
to EC leaders at the Maastricht European Council. Major duly presented the treaty to
parliament, and in a parliamentary debate on the treaty on December 18 Conservative
objections to the treaty were limited. This was due in part to the proximity of the general
election, which would take place four months later, and which led Conservative
dissidents to fall into line in the broader interests of the party (Gowland and Turner
1999). But it was also due to the lack of skeptic oversight on the Treaty, discussed
above, and to skeptic conviction that given the government’s majority in Parliament, any
objections would be, like those over the Single European Act in the 1980s, pointless
(Forster 2002).18 Meanwhile Labour objected to Major’s negotiation of an opt-out from
the Social Chapter, but otherwise supported the treaty as presented. However, Labour
leaders had no intention of making the ratification process easy for the Conservative
government.
In February 1992 Major signed the Treaty in its final form and introduced the
European Communities (Amendment) Bill (or EC(A)B, the Maastricht Bill) Paving
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Forster cites Teresa Gorman, one of the most colorful Conservative euroskeptics, as
saying, “with a majority of 100 a rebellion was futile. But with a majority of twenty
Conservatives, a group of MPs can change government policy” (Gorman 1993, 36).
!

"')!

Motion, the vehicle meant to pass the treaty through Parliament. It took one year to ratify
the Maastricht Treaty, with 70 parliamentary votes and 61 Parliamentary debates taking
place before Major at last achieved his goal (Forster 2002, 99). This was in contrast to
the speed and relative ease with which the Single European Act had sailed through
Parliament under Thatcher in 1986 (Gowland and Turner 1999). This was in part
because backbenchers and government alike soon became consumed with the campaign
for the next general election, which the Conservatives sought to win for the fourth
consecutive time. The Conservatives had been in office for 13 years and the public had
grown tired of the party’s rule, but was not necessarily convinced of Labour’s fitness to
govern, especially since the Conservatives had a reputation for sound economic
management that the Labour party had lost when last in power in the 1970s. However, in
the early 1990s the country was in the midst of a deep recession, and it looked as though
the voters might jettison the Conservatives in favor of Labour. The Conservatives,
banking on Major’s personal appeal as the anti-Thatcher (i.e. congenial rather than
combative), focused their campaign almost entirely on the prime minister (Foley 2002).
As mentioned above, Major won Parliament’s approval for the government’s
negotiating stance on TEU, but by the time he brought the treaty back to Parliament for
ratification, the political landscape had changed. While initially after the completion of
treaty negotiations in December 1991 Major met with limited resistance from within his
own party, with only seven Conservative euroskeptics voting against the government, not
long after introducing the ratification bill into Parliament the prime minister began to face
opposition from his own side (Aspinwall 2004). While the treaty did not change between
the end of negotiations, when most euro-skeptics accepted it, to ratification, when it
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became a point of contention, circumstances did change. Major could have rushed the bill
through parliament prior to the 1992 general election but chose not to, believing that it
would unnecessarily disrupt passage of other laws like the repeal of the hated poll tax
instituted by Thatcher. It was a decision he came to regret (Aspinwall 2004).
Primarily, the power structure had changed in the Conservative Party. In the
general election of April 1992, the Conservatives lost the sizable parliamentary majority
they had held the previous November when Major put the negotiated treaty up for a vote
(and won handily, 351 to 250). Now, the Conservatives held only a tiny majority in the
House of Commons. This gave the skeptics on the party’s backbenches unusual power,
which they used to oppose the Treaty. Moreover, the composition of Conservatives in
the House of Commons had changed, as some Euro-enthusiasts had retired or lost their
seats while incoming Conservative MPs tended to be more skeptical (Wincott et al,
1999).
On April 9, 1992, the General Election took place. The Conservatives remained
in power, but barely: their majority in Parliament fell from 88 to a mere 21 seats, soon to
fall further as defections, retirements, and most of all a series of by-election defeats took
place. Indeed, by the time the Conservatives lost the Staffordshire South-East by-election
in April 1996, the Government’s majority declined to one. This constrained the
government’s ability to pass bills in a way that Thatcher, shepherding the Single
European Act through Parliament, did not have to face, and had serious repercussions for
Major’s attempt to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. Conservative skeptics who had kept
quiet during the negotiation of the treaty and in the run-up to the general election now
were emboldened by the government’s small majority to voice their opposition to the
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Treaty. Moreover, a number of the new Conservative MPs coming into Parliament, such
as future party leader Iain Duncan Smith, were more seriously Euroskeptic, which shifted
the nature of the party in Parliament towards a more Euroskeptic position (Gowland and
Turner 1999).
Meanwhile, Britain’s economy continued to perform sluggishly throughout the
spring and summer of 1992, and increasing numbers of backbench Conservative MPs
linked the economy’s performance to Britain’s membership in the ERM, thus tying the
party’s Europe policy in with the fate of the British economy. With such a narrow
majority constraining his ability to ensure ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Major’s
personal leadership abilities soon began to be called into question by members of his own
party and by the public (Gowland and Turner 1999).
On May 21, 1992 the second reading of the Maastricht Bill took place.19 This
time, 22 Conservative skeptics voted against their own government. This was larger than
the Conservative majority in Parliament, but the Labour party abstained from the vote, so
the outcome was 336-92. Labour abstained because it supported the Maastricht Treaty
but wanted to exploit the divisions in the Conservative party as much as possible,
especially since they had now lost four consecutive general elections (Forster 2002, 99).
Rose (2001) notes that it is extremely unusual for MPs to vote against their own
government. Usually those who do are not taken seriously, but in this case because the
Government majority in Parliament was so small the dissident Conservative MPs had
more influence over Parliamentary outcomes. One reason why dissidents have had little
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In the British Parliament bills go through three readings in the House of Commons;
normally, the second reading gives MPs a chance to debate the bill’s general principles.
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influence in British political decision making is because postwar British politics had
developed a tradition whereby prime ministers usually do not introduce bills that are
likely to create divisions, instead presenting bills that achieve a broad consensus not only
within the governing party but across parties as well.
But Major was in a difficult position in two level game politics: he knew that
there was growing resistance to the Maastricht project at home, but his only alternative at
the EC level was to refuse to participate in the negotiations altogether, which would also
be detrimental to Britain’s interests as an EC member. He sought a compromise and
achieved opt-outs to the two most contentious parts of the treaty, the single currency and
the Social Chapter (which imposed uniform labour standards across all EU countries) as
most of the rest of the EC went ahead on these. However, circumstances compelled him
to present it to Parliament, knowing that there would be divisions.

Danish ‘no’ vote
These divisions did not take long to manifest themselves. Having objected to the
Maastricht Bill’s second reading, the Conservative skeptics were about to receive a big
jolt energizing their efforts. They had sought to take advantage of the Government’s
small majority but with Labour abstaining from the vote their actual ability to influence
the outcome was limited to making a statement. [But on June 2, 1992, Danish voters
narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum required by the Danish
constitution. 20 Technically, under EC rules, the entire Treaty was stalled if a single
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The Danish constitution requires a referendum to be held if one of five factors exist:
the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was held in accordance with Section 20 in the
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member country rejected it,21 and British skeptics seized on the Danish outcome and the
resultant limbo status of the Maastricht Treaty to try to prevent Britain from ratifying the
treaty as written.
In early June 1992 Conservative euroskeptics introduced a “Fresh Start” Early
Day Motion in Parliament calling on the Government to renegotiate the British position
in Europe: eighty-four Conservative MPs signed the motion (Baker 2003). Though it
was defeated, the significant number of MPs supporting the motion meant that the
government could not ignore the level of resistance to the treaty within its own party.
When Prime Minister Thatcher passed the Single European Act through parliament,
skeptics had neither the numbers nor the clout to raise any noticeable resistance. Now,
however, the Danish “no” vote emboldened would-be skeptics to act, however briefly,
and skeptics, including now-Lady Thatcher, used this outcome to demand that the
Government hold a referendum on euro membership. In doing so, Conservative skeptics
united with the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, who had already been
calling for a referendum on the subject (Gowland and Turner 1999).
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Constitutional act, which requires a referendum to be held “when ceding sovereignty”.
(Folketing: The Danish constitutional act and referenda, at
http://www.euo.dk/euo_en/dkeu/referenda/constitution/).
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The French public narrowly passed the treaty in a September 1992 referendum, giving
a scare to the Mitterrand government whose credibility rested on the outcome. Other EC
member governments, most notably the Germans on whom the single currency would
have potentially the most impact, declined to give their voters a say in the matter.
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Fresh Starters
Emboldened by the Danish ‘no’ vote, a group of Conservative skeptic MPs
immediately introduced a “Fresh Start” motion in Parliament calling for the government
to renegotiate the Maastricht Treaty on the grounds that the Treaty, rejected by the Danes,
was no longer valid.
A survey of Conservative MP opinions showed that while Fresh Start members
diverged significantly from the rest of the party as a whole in their stance on economic
issues (being more free market oriented than the average), their economic positions were
nonetheless very close to those of the other euro-skeptics in the party. In this sense the
Fresh Start rebels were not “atypical extremists” but instead in line with the positions
held by most of the party’s growing number of Euroskeptic MPs, a fact that ought to have
worried the government’s whips: “For if Fresh Starters/rebels are not distinct from the
rest of the party’s sceptics a real potential exists for any future rebelliousness on the antiEC wing spreading much deeper into the Euro-sceptic opinion group” (Garry 1995, 185).
Major, however, disagreed with the Fresh Start position because he thought that if
he demanded renegotiation of the Maastricht treaty all the demands for additional
integration from the French and German governments had made during negotiations
would be renewed and the British might have even more trouble winning what
concessions they had gained on federalism the first time around (Gowland and Turner
1999). He knew better than his party how isolated Britain was in negotiations at the EC
level. The party’s euroskeptics, meanwhile, largely refrained from arguing that Britain
would be better off out of the EC entirely. The sole exception was Norman Lamont in
1994, but by then he was not taken seriously (Wincott et al., 1999).
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The Fresh Starters were not merely an ad hoc aggregation of disaffected skeptics,
but were instead a well-organized political group. Instead of one protest, over the
ratification process the Fresh Start group introduced more than 500 amendments to the
EC(A)B bill, and presented 100 new clauses for consideration. Moreover, the group
challenged the nature of party management over the single currency issue:
…the Fresh Start Group broke the party whips’ rule book on loyal dissent.
They did not inform the whips of their voting intentions, and they did not
simply abstain, but were willing to vote with the opposition. Their strategy
was hence both premeditated and coordinated. … [They] occupied
Parliamentary time over Maastricht, so that the government’s commitment
to the treaty could only come about at the cost to its legislative
programme. In all, they voted against the government 985 times and
abstained on some 1,515 occasions in order to thwart the bill” (Forster
2002, 87).
Fresh Start members, as mentioned above, were not the only source of euroskeptic
activism in the Conservative party. Former prime minister Thatcher continued to inspire
euroskeptics, and after having said, however unwillingly, that she was ‘delighted’ with
the Maastricht treaty upon completion of negotiations, not six months later she came out
in opposition to it and the government’s efforts to ratify it. Her initial lukewarm support
may well have been due to the upcoming general election, but she had retired from her
seat in the House of Commons in the 1992 elections, which perhaps gave her freer rein to
make a speech on May 15, 1992 in The Hague that opposed the treaty and thus the
Conservative government’s efforts to ratify it (Wincott, Buller, Hay 1999). Once in the
House of Lords, Thatcher continued to rally the Conservative euroskeptics to oppose
ratification.
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The ERM crisis
In the late 1980s, even as Prime Minister Thatcher began to articulate her
objections to monetary union, the Conservative parliamentary party as a whole was
largely agnostic regarding the euro. This changed in the 1990s, as the number of euro
agnostics decreased, and this happened in large part due to the outcome of the 1992
general election. The newly elected euroskeptics supplemented the numbers of existing
parliamentary skeptics, and while ultimately they did not prevent the treaty from being
ratified, they had a considerable impact on their party and on the issue of monetary
integration by changing the terms of political debate. This was one aspect—a political
aspect—of the changing tides of the Conservative party’s attitude towards European
monetary integration, the political aspect of the change. The economic aspect that
spurred change in the party’s attitude towards the euro took place on September 16, 1992,
when Britain was forced to exit from the ERM (Wincott et al. 1999, 99).
Following on the narrow general election victory, which had left the Government
with a narrow majority in Parliament, and the Danish no vote, which gave impetus to
Conservative skeptics, the Government and its efforts to pass the Maastricht Treaty
through Parliament suffered a further setback in September 1992. On September 16,
1992, subsequently known as “Black Wednesday”, the pound was suspended from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
Several factors led to the crisis that all but extinguished the ERM in the early
1990s: the dollar’s decline put pressure on European competitiveness, German
reunification raised interest rates, Denmark’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty triggered
doubts as to whether European Monetary Union (EMU) would succeed, and so on. Due
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to these factors and attacks on the pound sterling by currency traders, who recognized
that the British government had little political capital with which to raise interest rates to
the heights required to defend the narrow currency bands of the ERM, Britain’s
membership in the ERM was put under serous pressure and eventually collapsed. Within
two years of Major’s decision to bring the pound into the ERM, the speculative attacks on
the pound on September 16, 1992 (George Soros alone is estimated to have made over a
billion dollars from his attacks on the pound on that day) forced Britain out of the ERM,
triggering a serious recession in the country. (Gowland and Turner 1999).
On September 16, Major’s euroskeptic chancellor Norman Lamont, who was in
charge of the country's monetary policy, had advised the prime minister that Britain
should suspend its membership in the ERM, but Major refused. Instead, he followed the
advice of europhile ministers Kenneth Clark, Douglas Hurd and Michael Heseltine and
raised interest rates for a second time that day, to 15 percent and poured more money into
the defense of the ERM peg (Young 1998). That move failed, and eventually Britain’s
membership in the ERM was suspended. While Lamont offered to resign, Major insisted
that both should stay on. Major was personally vested in the ERM as he had become
personally vested in the success of the Maastricht Treaty, and “would not apologize for
the collapse of a policy that just six months before had been descried in his party
manifesto as ‘central to our counter-inflation discipline’” (Williams 1998, 30).
This to date had been Britain’s biggest commitment to European unity and
economic integration, and it ended poorly, taking several years for the country to emerge
from the recession that followed. The Conservatives’ long-held reputation of
successfully managing the economy was shattered. Kenneth Clarke, a committed
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europhile who wanted Britain to join the single currency, became Major’s chancellor and
the economy over the next several years began to climb out of recession, with inflation,
interest and unemployment rates all beginning to decline. The debate within the
Conservative party over Europe, however, was beginning to increase in volume and
acrimony and would eventually contribute to the Major government’s massive defeat at
the hands of Tony Blair’s New Labour.
Conservative skeptics seized on this event to declare that this was the inevitable
outcome of European monetary integration. “Having consistently argued that EMU – the
centrepiece of the treaty – was a wholly unrealistic goal, [Conservative skeptics] could
now claim that the ERM fiasco offered a salutary warning of what would happen if the
EU persisted in its efforts to move towards a single currency” (Gowland and Turner
1999, 282). But Major had not been a Government whip for nothing. Despite the
negative fallout from the ERM and Danish events supporting the skeptic cause, he
proceeded to consolidate supporters within his party. On October 29, for instance, he
won the support of the right wing 1922 Committee, a group within the Conservative
parliamentary party, for ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Shell 1994). He did so,
however, by employing the tactics that had served him well in the leadership election in
1990: by portraying himself to this group as a confirmed euroskeptic, while making
similar representations to the europhile branch of his party as needed (Williams 1998).
Finally, the September 1992 European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis
destroyed the Conservatives’ long held advantage of being perceived as the party the
British people trusted to run the economy. Even though the Conservative government’s
policies led to an economic recovery within a couple of years, the damage to the party’s
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reputation was done. Also, Britain’s forced withdrawal from the ERM gave the skeptics
another reason to vindicate Thatcher’s opposition to ERM and to point to monetary
integration with Europe as a policy that would have a negative impact on Britain.
Nonetheless, on November 4, 1992, the skeptics rebelled over a vote on the
Maastricht Treaty Paving motion, which was an invitation to proceed with the bill. Most
of those 84 signees of the Fresh Start motion in June voted with the government,
confirming Rose’s (2001) assertion that ultimately MPs vote with the government
virtually all of the time. Despite this, this time, however, the number of skeptics would
be sufficient to defeat the government as 26 eventually voted against the government and
three abstained (Forster 2002). The government only won when Major promised to delay
the third reading of the bill until after the Danes had voted again on the Maastricht Treaty
– and come back with a positive outcome.22 The Danish re-vote was scheduled for May
1993. Major made the passage of the paving motion a confidence vote, forcing some of
the Conservative rebels to vote yes in order to preserve the government; this also allowed
the Labour opposition to vote against the bill since Labour parliamentarians could claim
that they were voting against the government rather than against the Maastricht Treaty,
which it supported. The government won the confidence vote by three, and had to count
on votes from Liberal Democrat MPs to do so (Gowland and Turner 1999).23
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According to Baker et al. (1993), however, after two level game pressure from the EC
Major said that the third reading would take place in May 1993 even if the Danish
referendum was delayed, as Danish politicians warned it might be because of their own
upcoming general election.
23
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Meanwhile on the second level of the two level game, Major held the Presidency
of the EC from July to December 1992, a position which rotated among member states
every six months. This was an uncomfortable position for him as leader of the most
recalcitrant member state, unable to promise fellow EC leaders that he could deliver
ratification of the Treaty. However, at the December 1992 EC meeting in Edinburgh the
members made arrangements to address Danish reservations about the treaty, which
resulted in opt-outs from the Common Defense policy and the single currency for
Denmark (Shell 1994).
On February 15, 1993 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that even if the House
of Commons passed the amendment excluding the Protocol on Social Policy from the
Maastricht Treaty bill (The European Communities (Amendment) Bill, or EC(A)B), it
would be not block ratification of the treaty (Shell 1994).

On February 17, 1993 the

House of Commons debated a motion on the constitutional effects of the Treaty (Shell
1994).

Government loses a motion
Meanwhile, proposed amendments to the treaty proliferated. Bill Cash, the most
tenacious of the euroskeptic MPs, alone introduced 240 amendments to the bill (Young
1998). On March 8, 1993 the Government lost, 314-292, on a 15th day committee stage
of EC(A)B on Amendment 28 saying that appointees to proposed Committee of the
Regions (proposed in the Treaty) must be elected members of local authorities.
Government ministers had wanted to appoint whomever they wanted to the Committee of
the Regions. This was significant because it was the Major government’s first legislative
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defeat on the House floor (Shell 1994). Subsequently, on April 18 1993 the Government
changed its policy and decided to stop resisting amendments on EC(A)B that it knew it
could not win in order to deprive the opposition—both within its own party and the
official Opposition—of the momentum victory provided (Shell 1994).
In a further sign of the Conservative government’s declining fortunes, on May 6,
1993 the Conservatives lost, by a considerable margin, in local county elections, the first
time since the ERM collapse that voters had an opportunity to express their opinion of the
Government (Shell 1994). Trying to stem the government’s unpopularity resulting from
the ERM disaster, on May 27, 1993 Norman Lamont resigned as Chancellor at Major’s
request, replaced by the Europhile Kenneth Clarke (Major 1999, Shell 1994). Clarke’s
promotion to the second-highest governmental position gave europhiles greater influence
in the government against the surging euroskeptic tide.

EC(A)B Third Reading
On May 18, 1993 the Danish government held its repeat referendum, presenting
the Maastricht Treaty to the Danish voters again with opt-outs on the single currency and
on a common defense policy it had secured for the country. This time, with these optouts, the Danes voted yes. This meant that the treaty could now formally be ratified, and
that the Major government could move ahead with the Maastricht Treaty in Parliament,
which it promptly did. On May 20, 1993, the House of Commons gave the third reading
of the EC(A)B, which won 292-112 (Shell 1994). Forty-one Tories voted against their
Government with five abstentions. Sixty-six Labour MPs, who defied their own whips
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by voting “no” rather than abstaining as instructed by Labour party leadership, joined
them (Forster 1999).

House of Lords
On June 8, 1993 the Maastricht ratification process moved to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords began its two-day Second Reading debate on the EC(A)B: 120 peers
made speeches on the topic of the Maastricht Treaty (Shell 1994). On July 14, 1993
House of Lords debated an amendment requiring a referendum before the government
could accede to the TEU. The amendment was moved by Lord Blake and supported by
now-Lady Thatcher, but was rejected in the largest- ever division in the House of Lords.
It was defeated 445-176, with a record 691 peers recorded in attendance that day (Shell
1994).24
Thatcher had expressed a conviction in parliamentary sovereignty as prime
minister, arguing that Britain only used referenda for constitutional matters, but that the
issue of the single currency might become a matter for a referendum (Margaret Thatcher
Foundation, accessed January 2011). A year after resigning as prime minister, when
Major brought his negotiating stance on the Maastricht Treaty to Parliament for its
approval, Thatcher said during the House of Commons debate that if the three main
parties in Parliament all at some point agreed to support a single currency then the people
at the ballot box on election day would have no true representation, no real choice in the
matter. Then a referendum would be called for (House of Commons Debates November
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The House of Lords has the power to revise bills introduced in the House of Commons;
however, the bills return to the lower house before the final vote (Leach et al. 2006).
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20, 1991). Once in the House of Lords, she called for a referendum on the Maastricht
treaty on the grounds that it relinquished too many parliamentary powers without the
opportunity for the people to voice their opinion (House of Lords Debates June 7, 1993).
On June 19, following the defeat of the referendum amendment in the House of
Lords, Lord Rees-Mogg petitioned for a judicial review of the bill, which would take the
EC(A)B outside the legislative sphere of parliamentary sovereignty, for another
opportunity to find the bill invalid. This effort failed, but it showed the degree to which
euroskeptics were willing to remove the issue from traditional parliamentary practices in
order to circumvent the treaty’s ratification (Forster 2002, 103).

Government loses another motion
The EC(A)B returned to the House of Commons after the Lords approved it, but
on July 22, 1993, even as the prolonged effort to ratify the Maastricht Treaty seemed to
be nearing an end, the government suffered another setback. At this point the EC(A)B
had been approved and as such was no longer a bill but an Act and had received the
Royal Assent, but had not been formally ratified yet (House of Commons Debates July
22, 1993). The Opposition introduced an amendment in the House of Commons that
would require the government to adopt the social protocol or Britain could not ratify the
Maastricht Treaty. A vote on approving the amendment tied 317-317; the Speaker of the
House’s tiebreaker was used, per tradition, to not create a majority vote on a policy issue
where a majority did not exist, so she voted against the amendment and therefore
supported the government’s motion in its original form (Shell 1994, House of Commons
Debates July 22 1993).
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The Government then introduced a motion stating that the House approved the
Government’s existing policy on opting out of the social protocol. The House defeated it
324 to 316, even though the same House had already approved the Treaty of which the
opt out was a part. Twenty-three Conservative rebels were willing to vote against the
government’s motion and with Labour on its amendment in order to thwart the
government’s ratification efforts, engineering “a humiliating defeat for the government”
(Gowland and Turner 1999, 283), “the largest defeat of a sitting Conservative
government in the twentieth century” (Forster 2002, 99). The Tory rebels voted no in
order to delay the ratification of the overall treaty and to try to force a referendum on the
Maastricht Treaty, according to one of the rebels, Sir Teddy Taylor However, not all
Conservative euroskeptics voted against the Government: MP Michael Lord, for
instance, argued that to vote with Labour would not prevent the treaty from being ratified,
but would cause damage to the government and to the party. Other euroskeptics argued
that they could not, in principle, vote for an amendment that they would oppose if it
appeared in other circumstances. (House of Commons Debates July 22 1993).
Having lost the main motion, Major promptly put forward a new resolution that
expressed support for the Government’s position on the social chapter, observing that a
majority of the House had already voted in favor of ratifying the overall treaty. Major
then announced that the next day’s debate would be a confidence vote in the government
as well as a vote on Labour’s social protocol amendment, meaning if the government lost
either the social protocol motion or the Opposition amendment, the Major would seek to
dissolve the government. The following day, the House voted again on Labour’s
amendment that would prevent the Treaty from being ratified unless Britain signed on to
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the Social Chapter: the House rejected the amendment 339 to 301. The Government
then introduced the confidence motion, which stated “that this House has confidence in
Her Majesty’s Government on the adoption of the protocol on social policy’. The
Government motion won 339-299 (House of Commons Debates July 23 1993).
Indicating Rose’s (2001) point about the rarity of intra-party parliamentary
rebellions, of the 23 Tory rebels of the previous day, 22 supported the government while
one, Rupert Allason, was absent, so that he had the Conservative whip withdrawn from
him for a time (Shell 1994). When confronted with party loyalty and the fact that the fate
of the Conservative government was at stake, most skeptic rebels fell in line. But it was a
blunt use of power in the interests of party management, and while the Major
Government won the battle within its own party on Maastricht Treaty ratification, the
prime minister’s use of blunt force on several occasions created lasting resentment within
the party that plagued his government for the next several years.
Meanwhile, this was the final hurdle for the government in its efforts to ratify: in
voting yes, the House finally managed to ratify the Treaty on August 2 (Gowland and
Turner 1999), which came into effect in November 1993 (Forster 2002). Britain was the
last of the 12 signatories to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (Forster 1999, 101).

Maastricht ratification: Analysis
What had taken place before during Maastricht Treaty negotiations and
ratification so that by the end of it Conservative party was largely euroskeptic? First, in
the 1992 General Election a number of europhile Conservative MPs, such as Chris Patten
lost their seats, while of the few Conservative MPs coming in, a number had been
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inspired by Thatcher’s increasing euro-skepticism in the late years of her premiership.
The Conservatives’ overall numbers decreased dramatically, and the parliamentary
party’s composition skewed more dramatically towards a euro-skeptic position than it
had in the 1987-1992 parliament.
Second, the ERM crisis damaged the argument that European economic
integration was in Britain’s best interests. The economy had already been on shaky
ground, and the ERM crisis worsened a recession that had begun after Britain had joined
the ERM in October 1990. Even observations that the recession may have been caused
by the government choosing the wrong rate at which to join the ERM were used by
euroskeptics to claim that joining at all had been bad for Britain.
Third, Major’s heavy-handed enforcement of party loyalty, such as through votes
of confidence, however necessary for passage of the Maastricht Treaty, created lasting illwill within the party and a distaste even among those more mildly skeptical (Forster
1999). His methods continued even after the treaty’s ratification, for example when he
removed the whip from eight euroskeptic rebels in 1994, to be discussed below.
Fourth, Thatcher’s determination to continue as a political force even once
removed to the House of Lords allowed skeptics to rally around a figure that while
divisive was very popular within the party and among the more strongly euroskeptic
Conservative MPs. In her maiden speech in the House of Lords, on July 2, 1992, she
supported the rights of sovereign states like Denmark to reject the treaty, thus aiding the
momentum of the rebellion against the Maastricht treaty, keeping support for it alive the
months between the Danish ‘no’ vote and the ERM collapse (Wincott et al. 1999, House
of Lords Debates July 2, 1992).
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Major’s position
Major has been accused of being without any particular ideology and, as such, of
fighting for the Maastricht Treaty only because it happened to come up when he was
prime minister and it was his job to manage the process. In other words, he had a
lukewarm enthusiasm for European integration, but was more interested in measuring the
domestic political barometer than for pushing through a strongly held conviction of his
own on the subject (Young 1998). Understandably, Major himself rejects this
characterization, claiming that he was pragmatic regarding membership in the EC: he
believed that it was good economically for Britain, and was willing to relinquish some
domestic powers in order to be a member of the EC (Major 1999). Williams (1998)
concurs, arguing that Major viewed EMU as a matter best solved through cost-benefit
analysis, as opposed to Thatcher and other ideologues who viewed it as a political
decision. But Williams says his “agnosticism” on the single currency was
“unconvincing” (Williams 1998, 34).
Major indicated on a number of occasions that he did not believe that the
timetable set out at the EC level for the establishment of the single currency was feasible,
and dismissed the notion that the EC would create a single currency by the end of the
decade (House of Commons Debates July 22, 1993). He was mistaken, but this disbelief
allowed him to confront euroskeptics and europhiles alike, who wanted to halt or hasten
Britain’s move towards joining the single currency, with the notion that in pragmatic
reality their positions mattered little, since the single currency was not going to come
about any time soon.
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Major writes he did not want a federal Europe and was wary of the idea of
political union, and was reluctant to increase the power of the European Commission.
However, like Thatcher, he wanted European Community expansion to include the newly
free central and eastern European countries, something other EC member states were
reluctant to agree to, so he had to make some concessions in order to gain an agreement
on enlargement (Major 1999). He made this argument in the House of Commons,
arguing: “Without the Maastricht treaty, there would be no enlargement of the
Community—and every hon. Member knows that it is right to enlarge the Community,
and that it is in our interests to do so. Without the Maastricht treaty, we would have no
means of developing co-operation between member states outside Community
competence—and we want to develop co-operation outside Community competence”
(House of Commons Debates November 4, 1992). This was the area in which the UK
hoped to promote its own agenda within the EC rather than always resisting the proposals
of other member states.

Cross party coordination: Skeptics
Labour had skeptics on Maastricht as well but they were not well-organized like
the Conservative skeptics were, so they had little effect on the issue despite defying their
own party whip on key votes on the treaty. Ultimately, “what was striking and as the
vote of confidence made clear, was that party allegiances retained their hold, and this
worked to impede the development of cross-party co-ordination amongst Eurosceptics.
In this way, the potential for an alliance based on the Bruges agenda [which would build
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on Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988] apparently in the cards at the end of the 1980s
remained unfulfilled” (Forster 2002, 102).

Impact on the Labour Party
The single market put big strains on the Labour party (and the implication of currency
union as part of this capitalist agenda bumping up against labor interests) in the 1980s,
which the party had to resolve, and indeed the party did split over it in the late 1970s.
During the Major premiership Labour was unable to keep its divisions over
Europe completely to itself despite Labour MP Peter Mandelson’s glib commentary to
the contrary (Major 1999)25, but then the party was not in office and had more leeway to
sort its conflicts out privately, even if the pressure to remain a viable party capable of
being elected and forming a government was high. Conservative strife was in some way
more visible (and of more weight, certainly), because the party was in power.
Labour had just finished its transition from euroskeptic to europhile party when
Maastricht negotiations were ongoing and as a result remained quiet and caused Major
little trouble. During this period and ratification they objected to the opt-out the
government negotiated from the Social Chapter but otherwise had few objections to the
Treaty, so they kept quiet. They had no interest in helping the Conservative government
with its problems with its own party, but ultimately were interested in ensuring the Treaty
was ratified (Forster 1999).
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According to Major, “‘Why do the Tories keep banging on about Europe?’ asked Peter
Mandelson. ‘We’re divided too, but we keep it under our hats’” (Major 1999, 590).
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However, the Parliamentary Labour Party still was not united on the Europe issue,
and in terms of overall numbers of MPs at least was “more seriously divided than the
Tories. Eighty-five Labour MPs signed a pro-Maastricht Early Day Motion in January
1993, while 66 defied the party whip and voted against the treaty on the third reading.
Hurd’s jibe in the third reading vote that Labour MPs had rushed to the house ‘from all
over the Kingdom to abstain in person’ was well directed and prompted one Labour rebel
to point out that, in effect, there were more Labour rebels than Tory” (Baker et al. 1994,
11).
Even the shadow cabinet contained dissidents from the pro-Europe party line.
John Prescott pressed for the Labour leadership to change its position on the referendum,
while Bryan Gould, who had also run for the position of party leader, actually resigned
from the front benches in protest over the Maastricht treaty following the ERM disaster.
Gould charged the Labour leadership of not supporting amendments concerning the
Social Chapter in an effort to ensure that the treaty would be ratified. While Labour
leaders dismissed his accusation as nonsense, the Conservative leadership less
convincingly claimed that Gould’s subsequent meeting with Tory cabinet euroskeptic
Michael Portillo was likewise unimportant. Gould objected to EMU because not only did
it remove control over Britain’s monetary policy from the British government, but it also,
by pursuing an anti-inflationary policy, would “undermine the main planks of the Labour
Party’s policy platform.” Ironically, Baker notes, “Labour’s U-turn over Europe in the
1980s, conducted partly in the hopes of outflanking Thatcherism on the back of EC social
and industrial policies, may have had the paradoxical effect of delivering them and their
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supporters into the arms of a policy regime whose priorities are financial stability and
lower public spending, not employment or growth” (Baker et al. 1994, 11).

Maastricht’s legacy for euroskeptics
As a result of the Maastricht ratification process the various euroskeptic right wing
groups such as the Friends of Bruges and the European Reform Group, who previously
had very little to do with each other, became much better organized, cooperated more,
and gained more financial backing. Thus the groups were able to present a more
effective opposition to the government’s Europe policy. “[W]hile the different groupings
never merged, there was sufficient overlap of membership and unity of purpose to have a
devastating effect both for the government’s European policy and party unity” (Forster
1999, 182).

Part III: Conservative Party turmoil 1993-1997
During the Maastricht parliamentary process, “back-bench resentment was given
full reign and ratification finally revealed the depth and bitterness of the fissures in the
Conservative Party” (Forster 1999, 182). Like any party, the Conservatives had
ideological differences within its ranks, but it was the division over European policy,
specifically in this case the decision to integrate more closely with Europe through the
Maastricht Treaty, that caused the party’s most serious problems. Indeed, the divide over
Europe shaped all the other fissures in the Conservative party in the 1990s; that is,
Conservative MPs saw other issues through a primary lens of the European integration
issue. Europe, or as the Major years wore on, the issue of whether to join the single
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currency, dictated alliances within the party and shaped the prime minister’s
considerations of party management, electoral strategy, and policy direction (Garry 1995;
Forster 1999; Foley 2002).
In November 1993 the Maastricht Treaty came into force and the work required to
establish a single currency continued in earnest at the EC (now EU) level (Forster 2002).
In Britain, the country’s putative membership in the single currency became the central
European issue at stake in national politics. The opt-out that the government had
negotiated at Maastricht inevitably gave rise to questions of whether Britain would join
and if so, when.
The Conservative euroskeptics were determined to compel the government to
declare that Britain’s opt-out from the European single currency would be permanent.
Any hope that the euroskeptics would be silenced by their defeat over the Maastricht
Treaty was dashed as their numbers grew and their determination to keep Britain out of
the single currency redoubled after the treaty came into effect.
Major adopted an official “wait and see” policy regarding the single currency:
Britain should hold back until the economic conditions were seen to be either clearly
right or wrong for Britain to join the single currency. Major argued that this was the right
policy independent of any political consideration (Major 1999, 603); however, “wait and
see” had the happy advantage of allowing Major to hew the middle ground between the
pro-and anti-euro factions in his party, particularly since monetary union could be proven
to be neither unambiguously bad, or good, for Britain (Aspinwall 2004, 136).
By the time the government began campaigning for re-election in 1996 Major
tried a new approach, altering the government’s policy on the single currency from “Wait
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and see” to “negotiate and decide” (Major 1999), but it was unclear what, if any,
difference the new phrasing indicated. Rather than giving the government some
breathing room on the issue, it only intensified debate as “commentators and politicians
pored over the precise meaning of certain words and phrases with all the zeal of late
mediaeval scholastics in their battle over the interpretation of texts” (Williams 1998,
167). People could not decipher the difference between the two policies or what it may
say about the government’s readiness to take the country into the single currency;
meanwhile, the obsession of the political class over such minuscule differences
reinforced the public impression of government out of touch with the real concerns of the
country (Williams 1998).
Nonetheless, Major persisted with “negotiate and decide” or, as Williams (1998,
171) quips, “‘divide and rule’” throughout the election campaign. This policy allowed
him to deliver different interpretations of the single currency debate to different
audiences. For instance, when speaking to the europhile MacLeod group of Tory MPs he
would bemoan the fact that the public debate always emphasized the cost of entry, rather
than the cost of staying out. Meanwhile Major could declare to euroskeptic groups that
he too was a dedicated euroskeptic persuasively enough that his Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd, believed that he had become decidedly more euroskeptic over the course
of his premiership (Hurd 2003).
The “wait and see”, or “negotiate and decide” policy was a carry-over from
Thatcher’s policy on the ERM, which declared that Britain would join when the timing
was right, and was also a way of minimizing the heat of a decision that would divide the
party (Thatcher 1993). Finally, Major’s policy was also a foreshadowing of Chancellor
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Gordon Brown’s “five tests”, during the Blair premiership, which aimed to assess
whether joining the single currency would be good for Britain but allowed the
government to delay making a divisive decision indefinitely.
However, both Thatcher and Blair managed the “wait and see” delaying tactic far
better than Major did. When Major refused to commit on the single currency issue he
came across as being indecisive. Changing tactic slightly, Major then argued during the
leadership contest against John Redwood that it was essential to not rule out membership
even for the duration of the current Parliament in order to retain Britain’s ability to
represent its interests effectively at EU-level negotiations. But this was a false
representation of the facts, and contributed to euroskeptics and europhiles alike losing
respect for the prime minister.
On the single currency, there was nothing left to negotiate, it had all been settled
at Maastricht. Other EU member countries already had proceeded along the path of
monetary union, “on the assumption that they could meet, or indeed fudge, the
convergence criteria” (Holmes 1998, 137). Since they were already on this path, the
conditions of monetary union would not be renegotiated, particularly at the instigation of
a member who had received an opt-out from the single currency project to begin with
(Holmes 1998). The only debate remaining on the single currency concerned what
European countries would be allowed to join later, and the UK would not, as a member of
the EU, be excluded from this discussion. Holmes (1988, 137) concludes, “Major
subordinated public policy—whether in favour of the single currency or against it—to the
preservation of a phoney party unity.”
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However, Williams argues, Major’s decision to raise the specter of Britain’s being
left out—again—at the European level proved effective in scaring some Tory MPs:
“repeated often enough, the mantra of losing influence acquired a persuasive, if
unexamined, force” (Williams 1998, 116). Britain had a long history of being accused of,
and fearing, being left behind as Europe advanced toward deeper integration, so Major’s
choice of tactic had some effect.
While Major did not wish to commit either way, unwilling even to giving a rough
timeline on when the government might reassess the opt-out (as Brown eventually did
with his five tests), his decision proved costly. Notes David Smith of the Sunday Times,
The puzzle, the great `what if?' of the Major premiership, is why he did
not rule out Britain's participation in a European single currency for as
long as he was prime minister. Had he done so, he would have met no
opposition from his chancellor: Norman Lamont was an avowed opponent
of EMU. The biggest pro-Europeans in his cabinet, Kenneth Clarke and
Michael Heseltine, both of whom wanted an early return to the ERM, were
in no position to force through their views. Heseltine was weakened by his
handling of the autumn 1992 pit closures; Clarke would have been a lone
voice (Sunday Times April 20, 1997, in Holmes 1998, 137).
At the time, Major had sufficient political capital to do so, and ruling out the single
currency for the duration of his premiership, or even of the remainder of the current
Parliament, would have allowed him to put the issue aside and use his political capital on
other policy matters. In such as way the Blair government was able to set the euro issue
aside by promising an assessment of the five tests by a certain date (though this proved
difficult to pin down for some time). Instead Major’s apparent indecision and refusal to
demarcate the issue with any specificity meant that the issue never went away, instead
fuelling the battles within his party. Moreover, the division over the single currency
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obscured any other accomplishments the government might have achieved. Major, for
instance, complains that despite the improvement of the economy from 1993 on, his
government did not get credit for the recovery (Major 1999). But no one, whether in the
public, Parliament, or the government itself, could distinguish a policy agenda that was
separated from the Europe issue (Holmes 1998, Williams 1998).

Party management: Prime minister’s relationship with the cabinet and backbenches
By negotiating the opt-outs in the Maastricht Treaty instead of confronting the
party’s euroskeptics or europhiles head on, Major “seriously undermined the authority of
the government”, though as discussed, several of the factors that fueled the party
divisions were not of the prime minister’s making (Baker et al. 1994, 13). This was to
affect the rest of Major’s premiership, for although the treaty was ratified on August 2,
1993, as far as the Conservative euroskeptics were concerned the battle was just
beginning. In particular, the skeptics’ focus shifted almost entirely to the single currency.
Post-ratification, the prime minister faced opposition from three separate entities
within his own party: the backbenches, the cabinet, and the chancellor. While his
relationships with the backbenches remained bad from mid-1993 to 1997, the prime
minister’s relationships with his cabinet worsened as his attempt to manage his message
regarding the single currency foundered due to his inability to prevent the europhile
chancellor as well as euroskeptic ministers from deviating from the official government
line.
Overall, Riddell (1992) calculated that following the general election of 1992
backbench euroskeptics numbered roughly to 80 to 85 MPs, of whom 20 had on at least
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one occasion either abstained or voted against the government on European matters,
whether the Maastricht Treaty ratification or the ERM. Of these, 10 were among the 63
new Conservative MPs who had just been elected to office in April 1992. These numbers
were already uniquely high among other Parliamentary Conservative Party subgroups and
gave an early indication of the strength of the Europe divide burgeoning in the party. As
some MPs openly defied the government and others jumped ship for less troubled parties,
it was imperative for the prime minister to manage the division over Europe that was
splitting his party.
It is important to note that for all the attention paid to the rebellions within the
party, the majority of MPs did vote with the government the majority of the time, so that
the euroskeptic backbench rebels, however much attention they received, comprised a
small number of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (Cowley 1999). Also, Forster
(2002) observes that only one euroskeptic cabinet minister, John Redwood, resigned in
the course of these battles over the single currency, and that was to run against Major in
the 1995 leadership election. For the most part, even the euroskeptics were willing to put
party over policy. Nonetheless, those MPs that did rebel managed to have influence
beyond their numbers because of the small majority the Conservatives held in Parliament,
and because the prime minister seemed unable to effectively deal with them.
Following the exhausting and lengthy Maastricht Treaty ratification process, and
minutes after winning the vote of confidence that ensured ratification and preserved his
government, on July 23, 1993 Major appeared in an interview on ITV. After the
interview, not knowing that the wire was still live, Major revealed his candid opinion of
the euroskeptics in his party to the reporter, a discussion that was later leaked to the
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public (Routledge 1993). The prime minister offered his assessment of his problems in
government, as revealed by the ratification process just past, the foremost difficulty being
the small Conservative majority in Parliament. He said that his hands were tied: if he
pursued various policies that people had suggested then the party itself could break apart,
and then he would be blamed for it. As prime minister, he governed a party that had a
small majority of only eighteen, but that was “harking back to a golden age that never
was, and is now invented,” referring, apparently, to the Thatcher years (Baker et al. 1994,
37).
As for the party’s euroskeptics, he added hypothetically, “You have three rightwing members of the Cabinet who actually resign. What happens in the parliamentary
party?... I could bring in other people. But where do you think most of this poison is
coming from? From the dispossessed and the never-possessed. You can think of exministers who are going around causing all sorts of trouble. We don’t want another three
more of the bastards out there’” (Baker et al. 1994, 37).
It was widely assumed that Major was referring to Portillo, Howard and Lilley as
the “three more” he felt unable to sack, though he might also have been thinking of
Redwood, another euroskeptic cabinet member, rather than Howard, on his list. The first
three had recommended that Britain abandon the Maastricht Treaty after the Danes voted
to reject it and again after the ERM disaster (Young 1998; Gowland and Turner 1999).
Meanwhile, troublesome backbenchers included one of Major’s “dispossessed”: Norman
Lamont, the former chancellor who had been fired over the ERM crisis. Aided by
bitterness over his ouster, Lamont’s euroskepticism was fully unfurled once he was no
longer constrained by being in government. Both his former position and the manner in
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which he was removed from it lent his criticisms power, though he was likewise tainted
by his role in the ERM debacle (Gowland and Turner 1999, Williams 1998; Young
1998).
Major’s decision to force ratification of the Maastricht treaty through his party by
making the survival of the Conservative government contingent on the passage of some
bills damaged the relationship between the prime minister and his party. One
conservative journalist called Major’s confidence vote on Labour’s Social Chapter
amendment “his hijacker’s ultimatum to the Eurosceptics—‘take me to Maastricht or I
kill us all’”, and this had ramifications for party management as well (Baker et al. 1994,
13). The chief of these was “to transform the question of European integration from a
troublesome and divisive issue into a matter of conscience. Indeed, the exceptional
means that parties have used has created a type of martyr effect. Sceptics especially in
the Conservative Party have routinely had to pay a heavy penalty for persistent adherence
to their views” (Forster 2002, 138).
The Conservative Party historically had barred staunch euroskeptics from
government positions and during the Major era this remained true. Skeptics like Bill
Cash, Jonathan Aitken, James Cran, Teddy Taylor, and Iain Duncan Smith all remained
out of government.26 Although skeptics such as Portillo, Howard, Redwood, and Lilley
occupied some of the senior ministry positions in the government, they had not been as
vocal, public and consistent in their votes against the government during the Maastricht
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26
Duncan Smith did gain power after Major stepped down as party leader, and indeed
later became party leader himself in 2001. However, by then the party had fully
embraced a euroskeptic identity.
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process (Forster 2002). By creating martyrs out of dissidents, Major strengthened the
hand of the euroskeptic wing of the party.
Party management was an issue not only of euroskeptics versus europhiles, but
also the length of time the Conservatives had been in power: by 1992, they had been in
government for 13 years. Some ambitious MPs in the party became bitter over the
realization that they would never attain positions of influence in the party—Major’s
“never possessed”. This created problems for Major as it had for Thatcher on the Europe
issue among others, seen in the rebellion over Maastricht as well as the poll tax for
Thatcher near the end of her tenure (Baker 2003 (cites Berrington and Hague 1998, 656)).
In addition, the relative cohesion of the Labour Party—in public, at least—on the
single currency meant that Major could not count on rebellious Labour MPs to boost his
majority in Parliamentary votes on European issues, again strengthening the skeptic
rebels’ hand against the government (Baker 2003). Moreover, while some Conservative
MPs held small majorities in their constituencies following the narrow 1992 Conservative
electoral victory, a number of the Tory rebels enjoyed safe seats, some with majorities of
over 20 percent. This strong political base gave them confidence to rebel against the
government with less fear of facing an unhappy constituency at home (Baker 2003). But
overall, Major’s party management problems were mostly a result of the small majority
his government held in the House of Commons that gave dissidents within the party more
power.
Throughout negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty Major deliberately included
many of his cabinet members in the negotiations. This reined in the instincts of
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euroskeptic ministers who might otherwise have objected to the treaty, since their
involvement in negotiations now tied them to the treaty’s fate (Forster 2002). On the
other hand, it also meant that Major had relinquished veto power over key parts of the
Maastricht treaty to cabinet members. For instance, Michael Howard, one of the cabinet
euroskeptics, had veto power over the Maastricht Treaty’s social policy compromise that
Major had painstakingly negotiated with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (Forster
1999).
Major’s relationship with the Conservative back benches had declined during the
ratification process but his cabinet had held ranks with him during that period, at least
publicly. Even during ratification, however, some members of the cabinet “made no
secret of their Eurosceptic sympathies, conducting a form of guerrilla warfare against the
official line through a combination of coded messages and open dissent” (Gowland and
Turner 1999). Moreover, once ratification took place, Major’s hold over his peers
diminished as the battles over the single currency divided the cabinet.
While the supposed “bastards” were the ones who most clearly opposed the
government line during ratification after ratification more euroskeptics began to emerge,
so that by 1995-6 euroskeptics comprised the majority of the cabinet as ministers who
had been previously on the fence gradually allied themselves with the skeptic movement
(Riddell 1992, Gowland and Turner 1999). These included Malcolm Rifkind and Gillian
Shepherd, and even a former europhile, Stephen Dorrell. All followed the general shift
of the backbench Conservative MPs to a solidly euroskeptic position (Forster 2002).
Major finesses this, claiming that most cabinet members were like himself, opposing the
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single currency but believing Britain’s entry to be inevitable (Major 1999). There is little
evidence beyond his own assertion to support this claim (Gowland and Turner 1999).
As the euroskeptic tide rose in the party, euroskeptic “ministers flouted the Prime
Minister’s authority and Major seemed, by inclination or because of the circumstances,
quite incapable of exercising any authority over them. They routinely broke the agreed
Cabinet line on the single currency and many provided support for backbench MPs who
were even more free to speak their mind, semi-openly campaigning against government
policy in fringe meetings both at the party conference and in constituency association
meetings as well as in Eurosceptical groupings” (Forster 2002, 110). But europhile
chancellor Clarke also habitually and deliberately strayed from the government message
regarding the single currency, and Major did nothing to stop him either (Major 1999).
The issue was not so much of a rebellious euroskeptic wing, though this was true, but of a
leader undone by the Europe divide.
Since Major had spent his political capital forcing through the Maastricht
ratification, and had little room to recover due to his small majority, he did not feel able
to sack cabinet members who strayed from the party line, as he himself stated in the ITV
interview and in reference to two junior ministers who publicly disavowed the single
currency policy during the 1997 election campaign (Major 1999). Major was also
concerned that if he were to fire a euroskeptic in particular from the cabinet then he
would lose not only that individual’s support but that of the former minister’s faction
among the backbenchers. With the small parliamentary majority Major had to remain
cognizant of prevailing attitudes on the backbenches – if he fired a skeptic minister with
strong backbench support, Major might create a rival with the capacity to challenge the
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prime minister “for the political and ideological leadership of the party”. Thus, “Major’s
sensitivity to the attitudes of backbenchers and his preoccupation with maintaining a
united front in the Cabinet were therefore interlinked, since the influence of ministers was
determined by the extent of back-bench support they could attract” (Forster 1999, 169).
In an effort to manage the nuances of the party’s divisions over Europe but also
due to personality differences, Major deliberately contrasted his style of cabinet
government with the approach Thatcher had taken before him. Major observed that
while Thatcher announced her views at the beginning of a cabinet meeting, he preferred
to let everyone speak before offering his perspective, if indeed he did so (Major 1999).
This apparent openness could be deceptive, however. One way in which he tried to
manage the euroskeptics in his cabinet was by limiting their arena for disputing his
leadership. Accordingly, cabinet euroskeptic Peter Lilley reported, Major ensured that
any agenda items for cabinet meetings were vetted in advance so as to ensure that no
unexpected discussion broke out (Williams 1998).
In any case, if his intention was to increase government amity, he failed: The net
effect of Major’s style of cabinet government consultation was to highlight and
encourage divisions rather than the reverse, and since the worst of these divisions was
about European integration and the single currency, Major’s style exacerbated the
Conservative Party’s Europe crisis (Foley 2002, Williams 1998). Foley writes,
But probably the greatest difficulty that Major encountered with his
conception of cabinet government was that the very reason for its adoption
ultimately subverted its operational effectiveness. Major’s striving for a
post-Thatcher consensus was in effect predicated upon the existence of
internal tensions and divisions. By adopting a more open-textured and
conciliatory posture, Major not only acknowledged those strains but also
contributed towards their legitimation. For a prime minister so explicitly
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dedicated to accommodation and stability, it was important not to reveal
his position too early for fear of disrupting the process of collective choice
or of sending opposition underground. Nevertheless, the net effect of this
discretion was to give greater rein to dissent, and to provide further licence
to splits, to leaks and to a lack of finality in decisions (Foley 2002, 55).
Major’s perceived power was weakened by this approach, as it was by his determination
to avoid a commitment on the single currency. Accordingly, his ability to manage
dissidents and disputes declined as people lost respect for his leadership (Foley 2002).
Major used a number of tactics in his efforts to manage the party and cabinet.
One way in which he sought to keep the ramifications of the Europe divide in check was
by changing faces in the cabinet as needed to indicate that the government was pursuing a
fresh approach without changing the overall composition of euroskeptics and europhiles.
For instance, “A 1993 Cabinet reshuffle brought the Euro-sceptic Redwood into the
Cabinet and removed the Euro-sceptic Lamont from it. The same reshuffle moved the
Euro-sceptic Michael Howard to the Home Office but balanced that by moving the Europhile Kenneth Clarke to Chancellor” (Aspinwall 2004, 138).
After ratification the party and the cabinet tilted further toward the skeptics as
fence sitters began to identify themselves with the skeptics, and Major had to
accommodate this change. Young (1998) argues that in the fall of 1993, after the
“bastards” leak and treaty ratification, Major started to turn himself into at least the
appearance of a skeptic, but it was unclear as to how much of this was political
calculation versus true conviction. Major launched this alteration by writing a skeptical
essay for the Economist, and while British readers might not have been persuaded of his
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conversion, it at least indicated to other EU member states that in the five years since
Thatcher’s Bruges speech the British position on European integration had not changed.
As another management tactic, Major often presented himself to one side of the
Europe divide as being captive to the will of the other side so as to deflect responsibility
for his position on the single currency. For instance, when he spoke to euroskeptic
ministers such as John Redwood, he deliberately gave the impression of being
“checkmated” by cabinet europhiles Heseltine, Clarke and sometimes Hurd, in an attempt
to appease the party’s skeptic wing by giving the impression that, but for these europhile
ministers, he would have pursued a more strongly euroskeptical course. This was also a
way in which he sought to defuse any threat to his authority from within the cabinet.
Williams (1998), indeed, asserts that Major wanted and fostered a divided cabinet so as to
play one side against the other and to appear as the great unifier.
However, because he felt under threat, Major isolated most of his cabinet,
creating an informal inner cabinet, consisting of Hurd, Clarke, Howard and Heseltine,
which he consulted when making policy decisions. This created more resentment in
those left out, including the lead cabinet euroskeptics Lilley, Portillo and Redwood
(Williams 1998). This in turn only deepened the cabinet divisions over the single
currency policy. All in all, while the prime minister was adamant that he put formulating
a European policy that best served the country’s interests ahead of party management, “as
time went on it was increasingly difficult to draw any conclusion other than the reverse
one: that party management came first, and more pointedly, that party management was
impossible to disentangle from the national interest” (Aspinwall 2004, 138). Baker
concurs: “Much of UK party management over Europe has been less about the issue
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itself and more about holding divided governing parties together in the face of the
necessity to do deals with our European partners, or in the run up to electoral contests
which necessitate an appearance, at least, of party unity” (Baker 2003, 13).

Leadership election
First and foremost, this leadership election was about Major’s European policy. It
was because of the party divisions over Europe policy, especially about further
integration through the single currency, that led Major to believe that a leadership
election was his only option to restore his authority in the party. Major’s power over his
party continued to diminish until by summer 1995 “the Government had lost all authority
and Major all credibility” (Williams 1998, 81). Government mismanagement of its
European policy had given rise to circumstances wherein backbench euroskeptics like
Teresa Gorman and Bill Cash were perceived as having more influence than any given
cabinet minister (Williams 1998).
In an effort to regain control over his own party, Major tried two tactics. The first
was the leadership election, in which he took the unusual step of resigning as party leader
(though not as prime minister, a which led some to question the constitutionality of the
move) in June 1995. He thought that by going through a leadership election he could
through victory silence those who criticized his leadership, but this strategy proved
unsuccessful (Baker 2003).
Major had been plagued by rumors of leadership challenges every autumn—when
under Conservative Party rules a leadership election could be called—since the ERM
crisis in September 1992. Anticipating that a challenge might be made in the fall of
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1995, Major decided to try to catch rivals within his party off guard by calling an election
early, in June of that year. These continual rumors of leadership challenges damaged the
prime minister’s “authority and therefore his legitimacy” in the party (Heppell 2008, 99):
by 1995, the prime minister felt that he had to run or he could not rule. He had tried other
ways of neutralizing the salience of European policy in Conservative Party politics, to no
avail. This was an extreme but, he hoped, definitive means of defusing the party’s
divisions over Europe (Heppell 2008).
Major’s three goals in calling the leadership election were to boost his authority
and his legitimacy as party leader and to secure his tenure as prime minister. In the end,
he only achieved the third. These were not party goals, but personal ones, though they
would impact the party’s well-being (Heppell 2008). Major hoped that no other
Conservative MP would run against him, which would solidify his authority. When it
was clear that this hope was unrealistic, he modified his hopes to that of achieving a
resounding victory, one that would make it clear that the only opposition he received was
limited to a far right, euroskeptic fringe of the party. This did not happen either. Finally,
he declared that he wanted at least 215 MPs to vote for him to consider the result a
sufficient vote of confidence. This he achieved, though barely, as 218 Conservative MPs
voted to retain the prime minister as party leader (Williams 1998).
The vote for who would next lead the party, like nearly every other decision in the
Conservative Party at that time, was a vote about Europe. Not only had divisions over
Major’s chosen European policy (especially monetary integration) led the prime minister
to take this step, but also in deciding whether to run or how to vote in the election,
Conservative ministers and MPs based their decisions on their relative positions on
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Europe. In other words, European policy was the most salient ideological issue at hand
(Heppell 2008). Second, however, he did not propose any changes in his policy on
Europe or the single currency in his campaign. In addition, he did not offer a change in
policy or leadership style if he won so that there was no fresh start for his leadership or
for the party when he did win.
John Major resigned the leadership of his party to try to force the euroskeptic
opponents out into the open, but the ploy was not as successful as hoped. Even prime
minister Tony Blair in his memoirs observed that Major did it only half right because
while he boldly called for an election, “Major made the same error as Labour had in the
1980s: he appealed for unity rather than a mandate. So the bold tactic was not
accompanied by a bold strategy. Redwood was defeated; but not for a cause” (Blair
2010, 102). Williams (1998) agrees: Major offered no manifesto in his leadership
campaign, presented no argument as to why the parliamentary party should re-elect him
as party leader other than that he already held the position. Because he offered no
manifesto, nor any pledge to change his leadership style or policies, there was no
possibility of restoration of authority or legitimacy when he won. It was too late for the
prime minister to regain authority because the perception of his weakness had been too
long ingrained in his party, and the sense of betrayal over the manner in which Major had
forced through the Maastricht Treaty ratification cast a long shadow from which he could
not recover. He might have been able to offer a plan for the party’s renewal, a strategy
for overcoming the divisions over Europe (or at least setting them aside for the present),
but instead he opted for the status quo and thus left himself vulnerable to the same
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criticisms from both sides of the party of the government’s policy on European
integration that had been destabilizing the government all along (Heppell 2008).
Third, the election was not conducted on a level playing field, so that it didn’t
truly test the extent of his authority, or grant him authority when he won. In 1991 the
leadership election rules for the Conservative Party had been changed to make it harder to
challenge the incumbent Conservative Party leader than it had been when Thatcher was
unseated (indeed, it was partly in reaction to the unceremonious exit of that longtime
leader that the party had changed the rules). Now any challenger to the party leader had
to have at minimum the formal support of ten percent of the party’s MPs in order to
launch a challenge. This ensured that most backbench would-be rivals would find it
difficult to reach the threshold of support. Meanwhile, those in the cabinet capable of
winning at least 10 percent of the MPs to their side, such as Clarke, Howard and
Heseltine, were unwilling to risk their cabinet careers against an incumbent prime
minister. They might have been willing to enter the race in the second round of voting,
but that required finding a middle ground candidate who could win at least 10 percent of
the MPs to run in the first round, but who would then be willing to step aside in the
second round. None proved willing to play the stalking horse role, as this would risk that
MP’s career on an even greater gamble – that the stronger candidate stepping in during
the second round could both defeat the sitting prime minister and then prove willing to
reward the stalking horse (Heppell 2008, Williams 1998).
Even though the leadership contest was somewhat rigged – few were willing to
take on the prime minister of their own party – cabinet minister John Redwood decided to
enter the election as a matter of principled objection to Major’s challenge to the party’s
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euroskeptics to, in his own words, “put up or shut up”, with its implication that if no
minister protested his European policy now, he would not be allowed to object to
government policy later (Williams 1998; Young 1998, 458). Redwood considered this to
be a violation of traditional prime minister--cabinet courtesies: a further mismanagement
of the party on Major’s part. Redwood, a euroskeptic, also entered the contest because he
sought to spur change, particularly in the government’s European policy (Heppell 2008).
Major tried to use leadership election as a way to call out the skeptics in the party
and then by defeating them, silence their opposition to the government (Young 1998).
He beat the euroskeptic candidate, John Redwood, but his victory did not put the dispute
to bed as he had hoped. While Major won the leadership contest decisively, it was by no
means as wide a margin of victory as it should have been, given that Major was the
incumbent prime minister who possessed the power to lean on party members through the
party's’ parliamentary whips, whom he did not hesitate to use. Redwood, meanwhile, had
to resign his cabinet position in order to take on Major and was left scrambling for
resources once he lost his ministerial office.
More than one third of Conservative MPs did not vote for the prime minister, who
got 218 votes, either voting for Redwood (89) or spoiled their ballots (22) (Heppell
2008). This indicated that in the years since the 1990 leadership election, where he was
the “least unacceptable option”, Major had failed to gain many supporters of his own
(Heppell 2008, 112). In 1995 as in 1990, there were no “Majorites”, no cadre of devoted
Major supporters for him to draw on. He lacked a consistent power base in the
Parliamentary Conservative Party. In the 1995 leadership contest, therefore, the same
occurred: Major was the “least unacceptable option”, so he won But this did not lead to
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an increase in his authority in the party; rather it indicated the degree to which across the
Parliamentary party, from europhile to moderate to euroskeptic, a significant number of
backbenchers as well as cabinet ministers lacked faith in their leader. The outcome of the
1995 leadership election could be considered a “default victory in a fundamentally
unequal contest rather than a vote of confidence” (Heppell 2008, 109).
Fourth, then, when he did win, the party’s divisions over Europe did not cease.
The net result of the election was that challenges to his authority and his policies,
primarily on Europe, continued after the election. The only thing Major secured was his
own tenure in office: it did nothing to decrease the likelihood of the Party’s losing power
in the next general election (Heppell 2008). In the end, while Major had triggered the
leadership election in order to silence the divisions in the party over the government’s
European policy, the outcome did not dampen party squabbles in the least (Wincott et al.
1999). While Major retained his position as party leader and prime minister, he gained no
political capital by undertaking the leadership election and his ability to control his party
remained as weak as ever (Rose 2001).
The high number of MPs who did not vote for Major belied the government’s
claim that the divide in the party was only due to a few persistent rebels from the party’s
backbench fringe – Major’s “never possessed”. When Redwood resigned from the
cabinet to run it also undermined Major’s dismissal of the party’s “dispossessed”, for
Redwood voluntarily dispossessed himself of power in order to try to change leadership
and policy in the party. Although Major had promptly portrayed Redwood as a
euroskeptic extremist during the campaign, the fact that the prime minister himself had
chosen Redwood to be a member of his cabinet undermined the effectiveness of this
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charge: if European extremism was so objectionable, what was Redwood doing in
Major’s cabinet to begin with? Also, since Major had to win over a number of the party’s
euroskeptics in order to retain power and authority, he had to be careful in drawing a line
in his dismissal of Redwood’s objection to the single currency, which many Conservative
MPs shared (Heppell 2008, Williams 1998). Major was not likely to build political
capital among the party’s euroskeptics by taking his characterization of Redwood too far.
Many MPs might be unwilling to take a chance on a relative unknown, but that did not
mean that they disagreed with his views on Europe.
In addition to the unsatisfactory outcome for the prime minister himself, the
leadership election did not on net help the Conservative Party as a whole. For one thing,
holding the election damaged the public’s perception of the party, because it laid bare to
voters the extent of the battle over European integration that had come to divide and
define the party since Major had become prime minister. Prior to the election political
analysts tended to think that there were roughly 20 MPs who were critical of Major’s
leadership based on the votes against the government that had taken place over time.
After the election results emerged, it was made clear to everyone that the number of MPs
critical of Major was far higher – 111 MPs had declined to vote for their prime minister,
roughly a third of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (Heppell 2008). Thus Major
didn’t get a mandate but a stay of execution.
Second, within the party itself “the consequence of this unnecessary contest for
the leadership (and the troublesome Government reshuffle) was to institutionalize their
conflict: as such, we can argue that it constituted a divisive rather than a healing process”
(Heppell 2008, 109). In one sense the leadership election might never have been able to
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defuse the Europe debate because Major had such a “small and shrinking” majority in
Parliament (Aspinwall 2004, 140). But Major’s tactics ensured that whatever advantage
might have been gained—and even Blair as opposition leader briefly worried that he
might gain one—did not materialize.
Ultimately, the leadership election failed to right the listing Conservative
government, and it limped along to its electoral trouncing in May 1997. Major failed to
neutralize, or even to address, the party’s divide over Europe. Heppell (2008, 114)
concludes, “Put up or shut up was a strategy for personal victory. It would do nothing to
prevent the inevitability of defeat at the next general election”.

Withdrawing the whip
The second tactic by which Major attempted to regain control over his party,
following the leadership election in summer 1995, was to make the November 1995 vote
on the European Community (Finance) Bill—the EU budget—a vote of confidence. At
this point the Conservative majority in the House of Commons was down to fourteen, so
Major wished to take no chances of a defeat (Young 1998). When eight euroskeptic
Conservative MPs still refused to vote with the government Major [withdrew the whip
from the rebels, meaning that that the eight MPs “were no longer members of the
Parliamentary Conservative Party” (Williams 1998, 72), only to reinstate it six months
later, a restoration that some consider as bungled as the withdrawal had been.
Many abhorred Major’s heavy-handed approach, especially since withdrawing the
whip meant that the Conservatives’ already razor-thin majority in the House of Commons
shrank to next to nothing (Williams 1998, 72). Moreover, disgusted at the way the party
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had treated the eight rebels, a ninth MP, Richard Body, voluntarily resigned the whip in a
show of solidarity. In addition, withdrawing the whip from the rebels not only damaged
the party’s parliamentary majority, but also gave the rebels the freedom to speak out
much more openly against the government’s position on the single currency, arguing for
staying out of the single currency indefinitely, than they could have had they still been
bound by party discipline. Furthermore, the outlawed MPs could now claim to be
martyrs for the euroskeptic cause, a role they played to the hilt (Major 1999). Finally,
“others were encouraged by their example to challenge the leadership” (Forster 2002,
110).
Withdrawing the whip weakened Major’s base of support in Parliament and made
party management harder. Major could not tolerate dissent—it upset his carefully
constructed appearance of consensus—so came down harder on skeptic dissidents than
another leader might have, to the detriment of his own greater party interests. He didn’t
see the rebels in terms of the ideas (and objections) they raised, but rather just as
“mischievous grandstanders who courted publicity at the expense of their own party’s
reputation for governing competence” (Foley 2002, 57). Because of that, he could not, or
would not, address the concerns that they raised about the government’s Europe policy.
Forster asserts that the Labour party has historically been much less likely to
formalize its party divisions by withdrawing the whip from dissidents, including over
Europe even in the divisive governments of the 1960s and 1970s when the party was
divided over the European market. “Indeed, even under New Labour, ‘soft’ Eurosceptics
like Gordon Brown and Jack Straw have attained the highest-ranking government posts”
(Forster 2002, 139). Major did appoint a number of euroskeptics to cabinet positions, but
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as with the leadership election, which institutionalized the party’s conflict over Europe,
Major’s decision to withdraw the whip from the euroskeptic dissidents brought to the fore
and formalized an internal party division. In doing so, he deprived the Parliamentary
Conservative Party of even its narrow majority and thus a chance of winning votes on the
broad array of other, non-European issues that came before the House. Thus Major’s
decision ensured that the party could not escape the Europe issue even if it tried.

Prime minister’s relationship with the chancellor
European monetary integration divided the party, and the chancellor’s power
made him a big player in whether that division might be alleviated or expanded. In
Clarke’s case, he chose to expand the divide. The chancellor plays a key role in setting
government policy on—and limiting prime ministerial power over—the single currency,
and Clarke was no exception, a successor to Lawson and precursor to Brown who each
likewise strongly shaped government euro policy. Because of the power wielded by the
chancellor, prime ministers cannot always get what they want (Heffernan 2005), though
in this case Williams (1998) at least suggests that Major had what he wanted in his
chancellor: someone to blame for why he did not take a stronger line on ruling out the
single currency.
Major first appointed Norman Lamont as chancellor when he came to power in
late 1990: Lamont held this position throughout negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, in
which he played a key part despite being a euroskeptic. Like other members of the
cabinet at that time, however, he abided by government policy on European integration.
This is in part because Major did not begin to have serious problems with maintaining
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party discipline in his government until after ratification of the treaty. Major had fewer
problems in terms of dissension from the party line with Lamont than he did with Clarke,
though he thought more highly of Clarke and let him get away with more.27 This was in
part because the overall level of party rebellion was relatively lower during the Lamont
years than when Clarke was chancellor, so that defection by the chancellor was
potentially less damaging at that time. Also Major had less control over the party in later
years, which enabled Clarke to break away from the government line more easily
regardless of the depth of his own power base in the party.
Major fired Lamont on May 27, 1993, several months after the ERM collapse.
Public opinion remained negative about the fallout from the disaster even as the economy
began to recover due to the measures Lamont put in place to address the economic crisis.
Lamont had become a liability as he became the focus for public ire over the
government’s mishandling of European monetary integration through ERM (Major
1999). Lamont was the only major cabinet member that Major sacked during his time in
office, though the ex-Chancellor achieved some measure of revenge in his resignation
speech in the House of Commons when he noted persuasively that the government from
which he had just been ejected gave “’the impression of being in office but not in
power’” (Young 1998, 443).
After sacking Lamont, Major appointed Kenneth Clarke as the new chancellor.
“By that single act, just five days after the Third Reading of the Maastricht Bill [which all
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
Lamont did, however, publicly claim to have been “singing in the bath” when Britain
finally exited ERM, despite having strongly defended membership in the currency regime
just months earlier in his official capacity (Young 1998, 443).
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but sealed the treaty’s ratification], he showed contempt for the chasm that now existed
between the Government and the Tories’ Euro-sceptic backbenchers. He advanced the
Cabinet’s most Euro-phile member to the office of state where he could most enrage
them” (Williams 1998, 41). By appointing a strong europhile to the second highest
position in government, Major encouraged rather than alleviated the party’s divisions
over the single currency. Major (1999) seemed to look at the succession only in terms of
personality fit: he said that admired Clarke and believed that he and the new chancellor
would work well together even when they disagreed on an issue. Major makes no
mention of Clarke’s position on the single currency, writing only that “his sharp political
intellect was shaped around long-held principles”, without addressing what these
principles were (Major 1999, 681). This seems either shortsighted or disingenuous,
considering the timing of the appointment, just as the government was forcing ratification
of a treaty that explicitly deepened European integration through Parliament.
Major may also have been trying to balance the euroskeptics and europhile
influences in the party by appointing Clarke to the second highest government position.
This move also allowed Clarke to make the government’s argument in favor of the single
currency so that the prime minister did not have to, though this strategy ran the risk of
making the government look split over monetary integration, as indeed it did. As
chancellor, Clarke’s statements on the merits of entry into the single currency carried
weight; the euroskeptic ex-minister John Redwood “complained that ‘Clarke only talks
about the disadvantages of staying out. He never talks about the advantages’” (Williams
1998, 171). However, he was balanced by a growing number of euroskeptic ministers
willing to discuss the merits of retaining the pound.
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Meanwhile, choosing Clarke also meant that Major had appointed a powerful
lieutenant whom he now either had to appease or keep in line. For instance, the prime
minister could neither rule out joining the single currency during the 1997 election
campaign for fear of upsetting Clarke, just as he could not decline to participate in the
latest round of European integration, the Amsterdam Treaty (Aspinwall 2004). But this
allowed Major to deflect blame for this stance. Indeed, Major was happy to use Clarke to
justify his failure to make any significant decisions regarding Britain’s possible
membership in the single currency. “When [Major] talked, for example, of being the
‘biggest Euro-sceptic of them all’, when he described the project of Monetary Union as
having ‘all the quaintness and potency of a rain dance’, he wished to signal a wealth of
inner intentions frustrated by his senior colleagues”, Clarke in particular (Williams 1998,
33). But even though through Clarke’s appointment Major hoped to distance himself
from the difficult economic policy decisions that had to be made following the
government’s ERM mistakes as well as the single currency decision, and while Major
often privately told other ministers, particularly the euroskeptics like John Redwood that
he would take a more euroskeptical line if it were not for the pressure from Clarke and
Heseltine, at the end of the day Major, as First Lord of the Treasury, could not wholly
escape responsibility for either (Williams 1998).
While Major chose to portray himself as being held hostage to the combined
political weight of Clarke and Heseltine on the single currency as a political strategy for
easing the pressure from the party’s euroskeptics, the two europhiles did not often
collaborate and their approach to the single currency issue differed (Young 1998,
Williams 1999). Clarke was the most prominent europhile in the Conservative Party and
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Major’s right hand man, both due to his position as chancellor but also because of the
degree to which Major relied on him in government. Heseltine, the Deputy Prime
Minister, who had challenged Thatcher out of her premiership, was also a europhile but
preferred to wage war behind the scenes when he did so at all, reasoning that to
encourage a public spat over Europe only damaged the government overall. Clarke had
neither the temperament for nor any compunction against taking the same approach
(Wincott et al., 1999; Young 1998).
Clarke was a pragmatic europhile who saw European integration as the future for
Britain and had no qualms, economic, constitutional or otherwise, about ushering Britain
into the single currency (Williams 1998). He was also a forceful personality (Major
1999): he took on the skeptics in public, speaking in blunt terms and in doing so
contributed to the damage done to the government’s reputation. Indeed, he relished
taking on the party’s euroskeptics in public and in private, and did so frequently. Just as
the party’s euroskeptics regularly disregarded the government’s official line on the single
currency, so too did the second most powerful minister in government.
However, Major treated Clarke’s defections differently than those of other
government members. For instance, Major roundly condemned two junior ministers, Jim
Paice and John Horam, for going off message during the election campaign: when they
publicly stated their opposition to the single currency he “went to bed spitting with anger
at their foolishness” (Major 1999, 715). But when Clarke, on several occasions, came out
publicly against the government’s official policy on the single currency the prime
minister’s reaction was rather different. In both cases he felt unable to fire the ministers
because it would result in more damage than if he left it alone (the junior ministers
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because he feared that it would allow the euroskeptics to claim martyrdom, Clarke
because he was too powerful). However, instead of condemning the chancellor’s motives
as he had those of the euroskeptic “bastards”, junior and senior, who had defied the
government line over the years, his reaction to Clarke’s defiance of government policy
was to defend Clarke’s aggressiveness. When “his beliefs were biffed on the nose” by
euroskeptics, Major explained, the fact that Clarke then “would biff back” was an
understandable reaction to provocation. Major only complained that “The resultant flow
of blood was satisfactory to both wings of the European argument, but not to me, who
was left trying to mop it up”, thus portraying himself again as a victim of actions by his
chancellor and party skeptics, unable to control either side (Major 1999, 604). Indeed,
Williams (1998) asserts that Major did not necessarily object to Clarke’s sentiments on
the single currency, only to the public flouting of the prime minister’s authority.
According to Rose (2001, 153), “The doctrine of collective responsibility requires
ministers to be loyal to all decisions of Cabinet. While disagreements may be voiced in
private, public disagreement is deemed tantamount to resignation.” This doctrine is more
widespread than is immediately apparent, expanding beyond simply senior ministers to
“bind[s] more than one hundred MPs in government posts to the Prime Minister”. But
Major failed to enforce this doctrine effectively. Clarke rebelled against Major’s wishes,
which goes again the to the question of how much power a chancellor had. When
Lawson defied Thatcher over the exchange rate fix he did so secretly but did it all the
same. Clarke defied Major in a public manner in part, no doubt, because he thought he
could get away with it and he was right: Major was a weaker prime minister than
Thatcher was in the 1980s, when Lawson secretly defied her, and Blair for that matter
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was in the late 1990s, when Brown tested his authority. But in defying the prime minister
so openly Clarke also made him still weaker, which was bad for the party and its chances
of re-election.
Even Clarke admitted his power over the prime minister, telling Major’s
biographer “‘I am sure [Major’s] view of me was that I was stubborn and arrogant, and
how could he possibly manage the party with me on one side and those bloody
Eurosceptics on the other? [But] I had no intention of allowing the party to be captured
by the sceptics’” (Aspinwall 2004, 147). On the other hand, Lamont (1999) speculated
that it must have been frustrating for Clarke to see it as always being asked to give way
on the single currency issue, even if by only halting degrees, without seeing
reciprocation. While the overall policy changed little, Major did commit to a referendum,
which Clarke opposed, and then he at the last minute before the general election ruled out
the Britain’s entry in to the single currency in 1999 (when it was too late to do so
anyway), which Clarke also opposed (Young 1998).
Overall Major was in too weak a position to demand that Clarke resign, even had
he wished to do so (and he clearly seemed to consider the skeptics as the enemy, not the
europhile chancellor (Major 1999)). But relative strength is not the only factor governing
the degree to which a prime minister can rein in a disputatious chancellor: Blair, after all
in a much stronger position as prime minister than Major, never thought it appropriate or
worthwhile to sack Brown either.
In December 1996, several years of mistrust between backbench and government
manifested itself in the to a meeting of EU finance ministers (ECOFIN). At the ECOFIN
meeting member state representatives wished to formalize a new stability pact aimed at
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harmonizing the economies of those intending to join the single currency. Clarke
intended to go to the meeting without first discussing the government’s negotiating
strategy with Parliament. This was not uncommon, particularly since Britain had
expressed no intention of joining the single currency yet. But in part because of this
uncertainty over Britain’s potential membership, Conservative backbenchers worried that
the government—led by the europhile chancellor—planned to commit Britain to deeper
monetary integration than the majority of the party had authorized (Williams 1998).
In all, 150 Conservative MPs demanded that the chancellor appear before
Parliament and a debate be held on the government’s policy regarding the stability pact
before the ECOFIN meeting. Instead of simply allowing the debate to take place, the
government, fearing a new rebellion over Europe, overreacted and tried to pressure the
parliamentary committee that would determine the nature of the debate to drop it.
Despite the government pressure the committee voted to allow the debate on the house
floor. In the subsequent debate Clarke duly presented the government’s position that
Britain would not be subject to the stability pact unless it decided to join the single
currency. The chancellor’s statement to the House satisfied the MPs who had requested
the debate, but the damage to the government was done: by panicking about the request
for a debate it once again revealed its weakness. The episode also indicated that 150
Conservative MPs did not trust that their chancellor would represent the interests of the
party and the nation without getting reassurances from him directly beforehand. Distrust
of the government’s motives regarding Europe had thus broken beyond the smaller
bounds of the known, committed euroskeptics in the party and had inflamed a number of
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the broader, more moderate elements of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (Lamont
1999).
This was a failure in party management in two ways. First, Parliamentary
backbenchers should have been more trusting of its government that it would negotiate in
accordance with the party’s ideology. But this ideology was divided, and the fact that the
backbenchers did not trust the government was a legacy of the ham-handed tactics the
prime minister had used against his own parties in an attempt to enforce consensus.
Conservative Party ideology did not provide an answer to the question of whether the UK
should join the euro, which exacerbated the party’s cross-cutting cleavage over the issue.
Second, the prime minister repeated this mistake in his reaction to the reasonable request
of the Parliament to hold a debate on the government’s negotiating stance regarding the
stability pact. Once again the government alienated its own backbenchers as well as the
electorate—which was given another view of Conservative divisions over Europe mere
months before the general election—by coming down unnecessarily hard in terms of
party management while making threats that no one believed it would execute. Overall,
the worst outcome from the standpoint of the Conservative Party was that the episode
further alienated the public: “the Conservative Party and the Government had once again
shown themselves constitutionally incapable of running a consistent and competent
European policy in any direction” (Williams 1998, 171).
Clarke contributed significantly to the government’s credibility problem with its
own party and the broader electorate: even though he believed that his cause, defeating
the party’s euroskeptics, was right, by fuelling the divisions over Europe he weakened the
party and led even moderate Conservative MPs to distrust the chancellor. While the
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distrust was due to the overall weakness of the government, which Clarke did not entirely
or even primarily cause, he contributed to it by his habitual, public departures from the
government line on the single currency, which led the backbenchers to distrust him on
Europe even when he was being straightforward about his intentions, and the public,
noting these divisions, to distrust the party.

Part IV: Taking the Debate outside Parliament, 1992-1997
The debate over European monetary integration proved so divisive in the
relationships between prime minister, backbenches and cabinet that the prime minister
was driven finally to send the issue outside the traditional Parliamentary environment to
resolve it. While at first some in the party objected to the promise of a referendum on the
grounds of parliamentary sovereignty, gradually the notion became accepted by the
traditional parliamentary environment and folded into accepted practice rather than being
seen as unconstitutional. The referendum was a means of party management for the
prime minister, though he was responding to pressure from within the party in pledging it
(Williams 1998).
Proposals of a referendum first emerged from British euroskeptics during the
Maastricht Treaty negotiations; as mentioned earlier Thatcher and others argued that
because all major parties supported first the Treaty itself and then not ruling out
membership in the eurozone, the part of the public who opposed the Treaty or the single
currency lacked representation through the Parliamentary system. Previously, Britain had
held only one nationwide referendum, also on the European Union, in 1975, so while
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there was little precedent, what precedent existed suggested that European integration
was one issue that might require extra-parliamentary measures.
According to Major (1999), he first floated the idea of holding a referendum In
1994, but the majority of cabinet euroskeptics and europhiles alike believed that it
violated parliamentary sovereignty. By 1996, however, he found that the situation had
reversed itself and that a majority of cabinet ministers now favored holding a referendum
on the single currency should the government propose entry. Foley (2002) and Williams
(1998) offer another reason for Major’s discovery that Cabinet sentiment had changed,
one which Major glosses over in his memoirs: Major’s need to win the leadership
election he himself had instigated in 1995. Finding himself vulnerable to gaining
insufficient votes to maintain effective authority over the party (as had happened to
Thatcher in 1990) during the leadership election, Major began to make deals in an effort
to attract the euroskeptic vote. Among other pledges, Major promised privately that he
would commit to holding a referendum if the government ever decided that Britain
should join the single currency. This only applied to the next Parliament, but he also
promised to commit that Britain would give up on even the possibility of being in the first
wave of euro entrants in 1999. In making this latter promise Major was giving up little
except perhaps in his own mind, since by now that seemed effectively ruled out anyway
(Foley 2002).
However, the referendum pledge did mark a significant concession to the
euroskeptic side of the party. It also had the advantage, Major belatedly discovered, of
taking the pressure of committing to or declaring against the single currency off the
government and the prime minister himself, and it was hoped it would resurrect the
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Conservative government’s flagging popularity (Williams 1998). Accordingly, in April
1996, a year before the next general election, the cabinet formally pledged that the
government would hold a public referendum on the matter of Britain's membership of the
single currency if the government, in the course of the next Parliament, ever decided that
Britain should join the EMU. Major notes that the cabinet as a whole supported this
stance “rather grudgingly” (Major 1999, 688). This may be an understatement: at least
some in the government, like europhiles Clarke and Heseltine and euroskeptic Portillo,
continued to object to the principle of holding a referendum on constitutional grounds.
Indeed Major’s right hand man, the chancellor, threatened to resign over the referendum
pledge. Major conceded to Clarke’s demand that the promise apply only through the next
Parliament and only if the Conservatives won reelection. Clarke also demanded that
Major make no further concessions on the single currency issue. Major allowed Clarke
to set these parameters in order to balance the euroskeptics and europhiles in the party:
he needed Clarke in the cabinet to balance the skeptics. Meanwhile, the cabinet’s
euroskeptics knew that Clarke’s threat was hollow: he would not resign so close to the
next election and risk being blamed for setting off the electoral disaster everyone knew
was coming (Williams 1998).
Meanwhile, in the years since Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the Conservative
Party’s debate over whether to promise a referendum and the Major’s inability to contain
the debate within the bounds of the government itself, spilling out into the public realm,
shows another way in which the European policy divide damaged the party internally and
externally. Arguments in the cabinet over whether to hold a referendum or not were made
public and decreased the perceived competence of the government: although pledging to
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hold a referendum was meant to raise public opinion of the government, the cabinet spats
between Clarke and the euroskeptics, with a hapless Major looking on, did not.
Once Major promised to have a referendum in 1996, Tony Blair and the Labour
Party then followed with its own pledge to do the same. Major’s commitment to hold a
referendum accordingly framed the debate over whether Britain would join the single
currency thereafter—the assumption became that Britain would not join without holding
a referendum on the issue (Hurd 2003). Fundamentally, it was because the issue was
about Europe that it came to a referendum pledge at all in the end. Because it was about
European integration, which cuts across traditional party ideologies, as do all issues that
form cross-cutting cleavages, the parties were not able to resolve it through the traditional
Parliamentary processes and thus looked outside Parliament for resolution as a more
extreme form of party management.
This divisive European integration debate also, in seeking new venues, gave rise
to new extra-Parliamentary groups that advocated one side or the other of the issue.
These included the euroskeptic Bruges Group, supported by Thatcher, and enabled a
lively debate on the issue of monetary integration that the Parliamentary party leaderships
were trying to stifle. Indeed private skeptics had a network that extended beyond
Parliament into think tanks and other private organizations and were in some ways a
bigger problem for Major than the parliamentary euroskeptics whom he could stifle
through party management techniques, however imperfectly (Foley 2002). In fostering
debate on the single currency these groups eventually helped to shape the government’s
policy on joining the euro, as will be discussed in a later chapter.
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Part V: Denouement: the 1997 general election
The issue of European monetary integration created divisions in the Parliamentary
Conservative Party at all levels. Unable to overcome, set aside or resolve these divisions,
the party became electorally unviable. The electorate witnessed these divisions and how
the issue of European integration had consumed the party’s attention to the apparent
detriment of other issues more salient to the public, and they voted the Conservatives out
of office as a result.
Major delayed holding a general election as long as he could, but everyone in
Britain knew that by the time the election finally took place on May 2, 1997, the
Conservatives would lose, and lose by a wide margin. This was in part because the
Conservatives had been in power since 1979 and the electorate wanted a change, but also
because the Conservatives had managed to lose the confidence of the electorate while
Labour had managed to convince the public that it could be trusted to run the economy
again. This latter was due in no small part to the Conservatives’ mishandling of its
membership in the ERM.
One of the mistakes the government made during the 1997 campaign was
persisting in justifying stances that had long since proved unpopular with the electorate.
For instance, “The Government had never apologized for imposing the ERM on British
families and companies. Even when pressed in the middle of 1997 general election,
Major still justified it on the basis of lowered inflation” (Williams 1998, 165). Major
recognized the need to address the ERM disaster and government’s policies in its
aftermath during the campaign and did so by plastering across campaign posters
nationwide which declared “’ Yes, it hurt. Yes, it worked’”, arguing that the ERM crisis
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had been necessary in order to cure Britain of its chronic inflation woes. But “In practice
the message conveyed was one of arrogance. An elected Government had chosen to
inflict pain on the British people in order to correct the consequence of its own mistakes”
(Williams 1998, 165).
After the ERM disaster the public lost faith that the Conservatives could be
trusted with the economy, even though the economy had recovered steadily since then,
and no one believed that the Conservatives could rule effectively while so divided on the
Europe issue. The Tories chose euro policy as their obsession, refusing to learn from its
losses in the 1989 European Parliament election, discussed in a previous chapter, that the
public primarily wanted the government to focus on domestic policy issues like jobs,
health care and education, not on European integration. Williams (1998, 190) judges that
the Tory Party refused to adopt or accept the need to adopt a nuanced ideological stance
on the issue of European integration compromising between the two wings of the party’s
Europe divide. Instead party members chose to isolate themselves in rigid stances on the
euro and so brought about their own downfall. Europe served to reveal “how rudderless,
fractious and unpleasant the Tories were” (Williams 1998, 80). The electorate
accordingly chose Labour, a party that seemed willing to focus on the domestic issues
that were of greatest concern to the public.
Overall, even though it was the most volatile issue in British politics, the parties
did not formally discuss Europe during the 1997 general election campaign. The
Conservatives would not willingly bring attention to their divisions, knowing that the
voters would respond negatively. Labour, meanwhile, was not going to bring up Europe
because the party did not want to raise any euroskeptic trouble of its own (Young 1998).
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Nonetheless, unofficially Conservative party fights over Europe continued right up to the
1997 election, even during the official campaign (Wincott et al. 1999).
While the single currency did not feature prominently in either party’s platform
(Dale 2000), Europe cast a strong shadow over the campaign. “Europe was proxy and
proof for other things, to do with leadership style and party credibility, with competence
and with plausible purpose. On all those counts, it did more than any other issue to
wreck the Tory Government and obliterate any possibility of it being re-elected” (Young
1998, 468).

But that was the Conservatives’ own doing: the Conservatives were unable

to refrain from attacking each other on Europe, which thus “defined the Tories and their
introspective domestic conflicts as a family at war.” As a result, “Britain’s new, large
middle class felt abandoned” (Williams 1998, 80). During the campaign Conservative
MPs seized the opportunity to attack each other and thus to leave any pretense of cabinet
unity far behind. In a speech in Zurich on September 18, 1996, for instance, Foreign
Minister Malcolm Rifkind observed that if monetary union took place, many existing and
future members, due to the convergence requirements, would be ineligible to join
irrespective of Britain’s choice, and thus the EU would be divided. He added that
Europeans had been unwilling thus far to consider the repercussions of this inevitable
division but would have to do so if monetary union took place (Economist September 21,
1996). Rifkind’s remark caused a furor in Britain’s highly charged political environment
for its departure from the carefully noncommittal government line, and Clarke in
particular was furious at this public expression of euroskepticism (Williams 1998).
Even if the electorate had been willing to accept the Conservative Party’s
obsession over European integration, the country’s mood had changed since 1992
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election: now the public wanted a strong leader, not a conciliator (Foley 2002, 62).
Major was accused of habitually avoiding tough decisions, which some attributed to his
former occupation as a whip (Foley 2002), although others (Williams 1998) observed that
a number of party leaders had once been whips but were not similarly afflicted with
indecision in times of crisis. Overall, the 1997 election loss was a thorough discrediting
of the prime minister’s leadership abilities. Young (1998, 467) observes, “For the man
whose chief credential, when he became party leader, was supposed to be his mastery of
the arts of political management, ironic is hardly the word to describe his fate. Over the
seven years, the Conservative Party, under his decent and well-meaning hand, had all but
disintegrated.” This was worse still for Major, who not only had proudly disavowed any
pretensions to ideological aspiration but who also had declared that for him the
preservation of his party was most important of all (Major 1999).
However, Major’s control over his party continued to erode. Sir James Goldsmith
created the Referendum Party explicitly aimed at calling for a referendum on the single
currency, which “rekindled open rebelliousness, with a third of Conservative candidates
issuing personal manifestos ruling out a single currency” (Baker 2003, 10). Even
ministers began to pledge to oppose membership of the single currency independent of
the official Government line. This amounted to open rebellion as even government
members lost faith in the government’s ability to save their seats (Williams 1998, 186).
This rebellion in the ranks put further pressure on the Government to alter single
currency policy but Major declined to formally go further than his promise to hold a
referendum, perhaps in deference to Clarke’s insistence on the subject. Major (1999)
argued that by not taking sides on the single currency debate he prevented the party from
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splitting. Accordingly, even while defining the single currency debate as “’the most
important issue that any Government has been asked to make for generations’” (Williams
1998, 185), Major still refused to state his own position on the subject, even during the
general election campaign.
Informally, though, whether by mistake or not, Major did indicate a shift further
to the euroskeptic side. Major had attempted to toe a fine line between favoring and
opposing European monetary integration throughout his premiership, but some accused
him of losing his step near the end. In a New Yorker interview in late 1996 Major
declared that he would not want to be chancellor once Britain had joined EMU because
he would no longer have control over interest rates, but would still be answerable to the
public for the effect monetary policy had on the domestic economy. This seemed to the
hypersensitive British political community to imply a shift in government policy towards
ruling out membership of the single currency, and Clarke and Helseltine, disapproving of
Major’s slip, swiftly stepped in to pressure the prime minister to backtrack. Heseltine,
the deputy prime minister, publicly denied that the government policy on the single
currency had changed, but this allowed Blair to question Major during Prime Minister’s
Questions whether his deputy prime minister’s assertion was correct. With the mass of
his predominantly euroskeptic Parliamentary party sitting behind him, Major was forced
to support Heseltine’s declaration, thus backtracking on his euroskeptic gambit while
once again publicly revealing the split over Europe within his party’s ranks. “An ocean
of shortly to be unemployed Tory MPs sat forlornly behind Major. ‘That’s it,’ said one
of them, Michael Brown. ‘This is the day we lost the general election. From sceptics to
tepids, the Tory Parliamentary Party had convinced itself that, in the absence of any other
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serious domestic policy, only Europe could win them the next election. Now their leader
denied them even that possibility” (Williams 1998, 172).
Major’s grip on the matter of the single currency slipped further. At a press
conference on April 17 1997, days before the election, Major seemed to commit to
allowing a free vote on EMU if it ever came before the Commons, thus giving up on
attempting to maintain even the semblance of party discipline on the single currency
issue, but also attempting to absolve himself of responsibility for the outcome (Bevins
1997).
In January 1997, in the run up to the general election, Labour leader Tony Blair
had told a senior advisor “that the way to really do in the Tories was to announce during
the campaign that we would make the Bank of England independent, and we would not
be joining the first wave of the euro” (Campbell 2007, 154). Labour then would be seen
to be willing to make a pledge that Major could not or would not bring himself to make.
The fact that the openly pro-EMU party was willing to rule out membership of the euro in
the first wave while the leader of the predominantly euroskeptic party was unwilling to
make even such a limited declaration was a fitting indication of the Conservative Party’s
problems with its prime minister and with Europe. To all onlookers, Major had become
completely indecisive about the very issue that defined his party, had lost control as a
result, and the party as a whole was about to lose power in a decisive manner.
Labour won the general election in a landslide. The Conservative result was so dire that
56 percent of readers of euroskeptic tabloid The Sun voted Labour. The Conservative
Party divisions over European policy left even euroskeptical voters with the conviction
that as regards Europe they might as well vote Labour as Tory. The latter party’s
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handling of what they had chosen to make their signature issue, the issue they thought
could win them the election, led to their defeat (Williams 1998).
In an indication of the public disinterest in the Europe issue as well as the distrust
the Conservatives’ handling of that issue had engendered, election results were bad for
Tory euroskeptics and europhiles alike. The party’s main europhile, Kenneth Clarke,
and one of its most vociferous euroskeptics, Teresa Gorman, who had both enjoyed
substantial majorities in their respective constituencies, held on to their seats by only a
narrow margin (Williams 1998). After so many years of devastating fights between the
two sides of the Conservative Party over European integration, the public declined to
distinguish between the two wings, ignoring the bitter divide that so defined the party.
The issue of the single currency had come to define the Conservative Party, but it had
also come near to destroying it.
Part VI: Major and the cross-cutting cleavages challenge
As mentioned, cross-cutting cleavages (and their resultant challenges for party
management) will be an increasing problem in big tent parties as European integration
increases (Aspinwall 2004). The ease or difficulty with which party leaders manage
these cleavages depends on institutions, actors and the degree of outside momentum for
European integration. The most common British party management technique in the face
of these cross-cutting cleavages, as in other FPTP systems, has been to delay making a
decision on the issue of European integration as long as possible in an effort to avoid
having a known difference within the party come to a head at all (Aspinwall 2004). Thus
a cautious euro policy is a deliberate policy byproduct of party management in a FPTP
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system: Major and Blair both employed this tactic, as did Thatcher as she put off her
cabinet colleagues regarding joining the ERM. Only Thatcher in her last years as prime
minister struck a bold approach in her blunt opposition to European monetary integration,
and increased divisiveness in the Conservative Party resulted. Correspondingly,
Schattschneider (1960, 71) noted, a clear way of lowering the salience of a party division
or prevent “the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it”: no conflict, no
cleavage. Blair followed this prescription as he shut both Labour backbenchers and
cabinet members out of the decision-making process entirely.
Since the cross-cutting cleavages over European integration will remain as long as
integration remains on the agenda, one can expect to see more attempts to delay decision
making on future European integration matters from future prime ministers dealing with
party divisions over the issue. What other lessons can be drawn from the cases in this
study on how to manage the euro cross-cutting cleavage? Because Major’s situation was
the most difficult of the prime ministers examined, it is worth considering what his
options were in the face of the euro cleavage in order to assess what a future prime
minister in a similar position might do.
Of the prime ministers considered in this study, Major faced the toughest scenario
with a small parliamentary majority and a high level of outside pressure on euro
integration, the effects of which he exacerbated through poor party leadership. In such a
position party leadership becomes key, but a party leader must “create a coalition of MPs
and voters with more or less diverse views – and to manage that coalition once in office.
Coalition politics is consensus politics. But consensus politics is not static: the pressure
of events from the world beyond Westminster sees to that, and so too does the
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intensifying effect of long-term structural changes,” such as the effects of European
integration (Rose 2001, 144). These constant changes of cross-cutting cleavages over a
given issue, especially one as contentious as the euro, means that no prime minister can
rest on the policy of the previous prime minister but must adapt policy to the changing
imperatives of European integration.
As the reiterated problem solving method suggests, “The response of each Prime
Minister leads to changes in public policy, and to the political values by which
government policy is justified. As each Prime Minister accepts much of the legacy of
predecessors, the result is a moving consensus” (Rose 2001, 144). Major’s decision to
pledge a referendum on the euro issue in response to pressure from the party euroskeptics
who had been stirred to activism by Thatcher is an example of this phenomenon. In turn,
Major’s pledge compelled Blair to follow suit, but the Labour leader used the referendum
promise to better party management effect than his predecessor in relieving some of the
euro integration pressure on his party. This was in part because Major finally made the
referendum pledge so late in his tenure that it did not affect the outcome of the next
election (Aspinwall 2004).
Blair (2010) observes that Major spent all his time trying to conceal the divisions
in the Conservative Party rather than trying to fix them. But could they be fixed? Blair
defused his divisions by taking the wind out of the single currency sails far more
effectively than Major had through use of the referendum pledge, but with his small
parliamentary majority, Major had fewer options than his successor. Major found it
difficult to achieve a middle ground during the 1990s balancing the institutional
weakness of a minuscule parliamentary majority and the intense pressure to join the
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eurozone. He resisted siding with either the europhile or euroskeptic branches of the
party too closely, but neither did he make a virtue of the party’s division by allowing a
free vote on Europe matters (Gowland and Turner 2000).
Aspinwall (2004) says that Major could not pick sides between europhiles and
euroskeptics because that would have split the Conservative Party; instead, he argues,
Major should have allowed party members a free vote on European integration issues to
give—and capitalize on—the impression of an open, democratic party for electoral
purposes. In addition to electoral advantage, a political party is “less beset by strife”
when leadership gives up trying to hold the party together on an issue in which the
tensions are high and the members are clearly not united and allows a free vote,
especially if the party has a small Parliamentary majority (Aspinwall 2004, 172). Thus,
as a solution to the continuing cross-cutting cleavages challenges for British parties over
European integration Aspinwall proposes that prime ministers should acknowledge party
management issues openly, rather than pretend that a big tent party is unified. this has an
added advantage for the country as a whole: “Broad church parties might be hell for
party leaders, but they are wonderfully vibrant democratic groups, where debate thrives
among a variety of opinions. By including Euro-sceptics and Euro-philes in the same
party, the level of democratic legitimacy is raised: this strength should be flaunted”
(Aspinwall 2004, 171).
Aspinwall compares Major’s situation with those of the Conservative Heath and
Labour Callaghan governments in the 1970s. Both prime ministers were faced with
European integration pressures while possessing only a small parliamentary majority and
a divided party. Neither attempted to fight the existence of their small majorities.
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Indeed, far from fighting the divisions in his own party Heath counted on cross-cutting
cleavages to win Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC),
bypassing opponents in his own party and using Labour’s europhiles to pass the measure
in 1973. Later, Callaghan allowed Labour Party parliamentarians a free vote on the kind
of electoral system to be used for European Parliamentary elections, but there was less at
stake in that vote since Parliament and nation had already agreed to the greater
integration issue of membership in the EEC (Aspinwall 2004).
Despite these examples, parties do not often promote the virtues of an open,
democratic intra-party coalition. The Conservative Party purged europhiles while in
opposition during the Blair years, but Labour likewise rid itself of euroskeptics during
that party's years in opposition, a strategy that proved successful by the time the party
came into power because of the Blair government’s big parliamentary majority and
subsequent success in managing the issue’s salience. This success allowed the Labour
party to act as if the party was unified on Europe, though it was not entirely: remaining
skeptics were merely marginalized. This approach to party management, however, took
place while the parties were in opposition: with Major leading the party in power, would
a free vote approach, as Aspinwall argues, have served him better?
Major faced two different situations in his battle over the European integration
cross-cutting cleavage in which he could have allowed the party an open vote: the
negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the potential vote over Britain’s
membership in the European Monetary Union. Realistically, Major could not allow a
free vote during ratification for the sake of his own political reputation and the pressure
from the EU level and because, unlike Heath, he could not rely on the opposition party to
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supply enough votes to guarantee that the ratification measure would pass. Major only
achieved ratification by making the issue a confidence matter for his parliamentary party,
staking the fate of his government on the outcome of the vote.
Major’s dilemma reflects the cost of European integration pressure imposed from
outside. If on the other hand Major had allowed a free vote on Maastricht, the treaty
might not have been ratified, and the prime minister then would have had to return to his
cohorts at the EU level to report that because of one country the treaty could not become
EU law. Even today in an EU of 27 member states it is difficult for a country to stand
out against its fellow members, but during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations Britain was
one of only twelve member states, and already had a reputation for being a regular veto
against the others’ initiatives. Being the outsider in such an endeavor can have
uncomfortable repercussions (Miles 2005; Rawnsley 2001). Even for a leader like
Thatcher, who would have relished taking on the other EU leaders, being the one veto in
a small group committed at least nominally to a project of increased integration would
have led to increased divisiveness over the issue in domestic politics, especially within
the ruling party.
Failing other countries’ support, the EU likely would have found a way to pass
the Maastricht Treaty without Britain. At this time a fear that a “two-speed Europe” in
which Britain was left behind in the slow lane was already strong in British political
circles; thus, not only would Major have had to face EU-level opprobrium, but would
have faced censure from europhiles at home, including in his own government, at his
perceived mishandling of such a major event. Thus, especially given his small
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parliamentary majority, Major was unwilling to risk a defeat over the Maastricht Treaty
ratification.
After ratification, Major perhaps could have allowed free vote on the euro or on
European issues more broadly, but the risks of giving more power to either the europhiles
or the euroskeptics in the Conservative Party by doing so were high. In any case, from his
party’s perspective it may have been too late: his heavy- handed party management
tactics during the ratification process had alienated much of his party and increased party
divisions over Europe. The willingness of the two sides to cooperate with each other may
have remained limited after the bitterness of the long ratification debate, even with the
promise of the free vote.

Meanwhile all these disputes took place in the public eye,

which harmed Conservatives’ reputation as the governing party.
The Blair government’s five tests framework allowed Blair to delay euro
membership while not ruling it out altogether. Major could have followed a similar
policy by ruling out Britain’s membership in the eurozone for five years or until the next
Parliament, which, since in the mid-1990s there was some question as to whether the
single currency would come about by its scheduled launch date of January 1, 1999.
Major’s control over the euro cross-cutting cleavage was however so precarious that he
was unable to win the cooperation of his europhile chancellor Kenneth Clarke over even
such a modest step. Clarke threatened to resign if Major made such a definitive, however
limited, step towards the euroskeptic side of the party (Gowland and Turner 2000).
The best that Major could manage, over Clarke’s objections was, by late 1996, a
statement that it was “’very unlikely’” that the euro would even come into being in
January 1999 and that without economic convergence among prospective member
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economies the UK would not join. At that late date Clarke would have been reluctant to
appear to be the reason for derailing the Conservative Party’s election prospects in the
spring 1997 general election; but by the same token, Major’s mild effort at party
management came too late to manage the Conservatives’ euro divisions in time for the
voters to cast their verdict (Williams 1998).
Whether a future prime minister could manage the euro cross-cutting cleavage in
such a scenario better than Major is debatable, but while the viability of the party suffered
greatly due to Major’s party management techniques, the party survived. According to
Major, the preservation of the party from an outright split over the euro was his most
important goal, and he achieved it, where another leader who took a more forthright
stance might have driven the party apart. In this situation, even the declaration of a free
vote as Aspinwall (2004) recommends might have proved unable to ameliorate the
party’s divisions, and it was clear to all observers the depths of the party’s divisions over
Europe. Major held the Conservative Party together at least enough to allow it limp
home to the next general election in 1997 but not beyond. In terms of party management
Major held the party together but was not able to present a cohesive party either to
outside or to inside observers. The demands of the party’s euroskeptics outstripped what
he was willing to do in regards to European integration, but the same was true of the
ambitions of the smaller group of europhiles.
In the 1997 Conservative Party leadership contest following Major’s resignation,
Clarke himself proposed a free vote on the euro if he became party leader, but the party
did not take up his proposal, in part because they were unprepared to accept it coming
from a man who was a confirmed and adamant europhile (Gowland and Turner 2000).
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What Aspinwall (2004) proposed as a viable solution for Major’s party management
woes did come, but too late and from the wrong actor.

Part VII: Conclusion
Overall, European monetary integration proved too divisive for the Conservative
Party and negatively impacted the prime minister’s relations with backbenchers, cabinet,
chancellor, and indeed with the government’s European partners, though the two level
game is not the primary subject of this piece. Because the party could not reconcile its
euroskeptic and europhile wings, and because the prime minister made poor party
management choices in response to these divisions, the euro divisions took over the
party, the government, and the effective leadership of the country. It set in place a legacy
that would take years to alleviate: only when the Blair government effectively ruled out
the euro for the foreseeable future in 2003 was the Conservative Party able to move past
its divisions over the single currency and become an electorally viable party again.
This chapter also delineates the nature of relationships within the parliamentary
party: of the power of backbenchers when the government has a small minority, and of
the chancellor in particular of all the ministers to shape party policy, and of the
importance of a strong leader to keep these all in line not just by laying down the law but
by cooperative leadership – something Major lost when he used heavy handed tactics to
ratify the Maastricht Treaty and withdrew the whip from the eight euroskeptic rebels.
This alienated his own party, even those who did not rebel against Government policy on
Europe, a fact made clear in the 1995 leadership election where more than a third of his
own Parliamentary party failed to vote to retain him as prime minister.
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The concept of cross-cutting cleavages explains why the Conservative Party and
even the Labour Party in this time period had trouble with the issue of European
integration and whether to join the single currency. The issue does not fit simply into
either party’s core beliefs. This is demonstrated in part by the divergence even within the
Conservative skeptics of reasons why they opposed the euro, much less the rest of the
Conservative party which ranged from moderate to strongly pro-euro. In other issue
areas, however, the ideological stances of these same individuals aligned. The necessity
of addressing European integration created a dissonance among parliamentarians, and not
only in the Conservative Party. The fact that 66 Labour euroskeptics defied the Labour
Party whip (albeit when the outcome was not in doubt) on the third reading of the
Maastricht Treaty bill indicates that even though the Labour party had seemingly solved
its divisions over European integration by the 1990s, dissonance remained, and it would
re-emerge in a new form once the party gained power in 1997 (Baker et al. 1994).
It may be true, as Major (1999) claimed, that a leader with stronger views on the
single currency, whether for, like Thatcher or against, might have split the party
altogether. Major claimed that his management style was an attempt to revive the
consensus-based Cabinet style of government, but this approach merely made him appear
ineffectual at a time when high integration pressure and small parliamentary majority
meant that the government could ill afford a weak prime minister. Foley (2002) argues
that by the 1990s the time for Cabinet-style consensus government had already passed,
and it was made to seem even more unworkable through Major’s attempts to revive it. In
part, however, as Rose (2001, 20) observes, “The record of John Major is a reminder that
collective leadership requires cooperative Cabinet colleagues as well as a non-assertive
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Prime Minister.” Major had neither a cooperative cabinet nor an accommodating
parliamentary party, and his management of the euro cross-cutting cleavage reflected
these facts.
However, Labour managed its Euro divisions even though, as mentioned above, it
may well have had more rebellion than the Conservatives over Maastricht. Being in
opposition certainly took the pressure off the party, but as a previous chapter has shown,
being in opposition had not prevented Labour from almost imploding over Europe in the
1980s. The Labour Party, however, was able to manage and overcome its divisions over
Europe to become perceived as a party able to address the policy issues that most
concerned the public, while the Conservatives squandered their previous advantage in
this area though mismanagement of the European integration issue.
Blair, succeeding Major as prime minister, would show how a leader could
effectively defuse the salience of the issue in order to tackle other agenda items
considered more pressing by the electorate. A massive Parliamentary majority certainly
aided Blair while a tiny majority hurt Major’s party management, but that was not the
only factor in the Conservatives’ inability to handle their divisions over Europe. Major
lost the respect of his Parliament party by the end, and could not contain the European
integration divisions. While Blair eventually lost the support of much of his party over
Britain’s engagement in the Iraq war, despite a public division between himself and his
powerful chancellor over the euro, Blair managed to avoid the party divisions that
plagued Major on that issue. By lowering the salience of the issue he did not fully
alienate his party’s dissidents on the euro, and thus managed to defuse the matter to a
large degree.
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In conclusion, the enduring problem of the euro cross-cutting cleavage emerged
forcefully in the Conservative Party in particular in this time period, as the necessity of
taking part in Maastricht Treaty negotiations along with the formal institutional constraint
of the party’s small parliamentary majority raised the issue’s salience dramatically. Even
recognizing that the prime minister was handicapped by these considerable constraints,
Major’s attempts to solve the recurring problem failed time and again. His efforts to give
an appearance of consensus while trying to stifle dissent led to damaging public displays
of the division within the ruling party. This inability to contain or manage the issue
created huge liabilities for the Tories. In this time period, the problem of party
management, of attempting to tame the cross-cutting cleavages over the euro was not so
much about personal rivalries or the plotting of Conservative parliamentarians seeking to
promote their own careers, as will be the case in the Blair years, discussed in Chapter
Five. The core problem in the Major era was that the party was confronting an issue in
which there is a deep division within the party because the party, led by the prime
minister, had not articulated a united ideological stance on the issue of European
monetary integration. Thus, in this time period, party management was about managing
cross-cutting cleavages.
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Chapter Five: Labour 1997 – 2003: Cross-cutting cleavages resolved?
After more than two decades of party and governmental upheaval in Britain over
monetary integration with Europe, the British political system finally integrated the crosscutting cleavages over the euro into party ideology. This included, for the Conservatives,
a period of time in which it needed not only to resolve and minimize the importance of
differences over euro policy in its party, but then to defuse the salience of the issue once
the party settled into a solidly euroskeptic stance. The Conservative party needed to
persuade itself that campaigning on a euroskeptic platform would not win elections, and
then persuade the electorate that the party was capable of setting its obsession with
Europe aside in order to govern effectively in other issue areas.
While Labour largely had resolved the contention over European monetary
integration within the party by the early 1990s, it needed to learn how to defuse an issue
that had been so divisive over a long period of time. When Labour returned to power in
1997, the euro was a highly contentious, public issue in British government, parties,
press. Following the promise by both parties in 1996 of a referendum on the issue,
campaigns emerged on both side of the debate and were pressing the new Labour
government for action on EMU. Labour, led by Tony Blair, had other policies it wanted
to enact, and needed to defuse the heat, coming off the Major years, of the euro debate in
order to focus on these other matters.
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Blair and the Labour government were able to resolve the euro cross-cutting
cleavages in British policy ties by decreasing the salience of the issue in British politics.
It was able to do so in three ways, relating to the three relationships in government
discussed in the previous chapter: relationships the prime minister has with the party’s
backbench MPs, with cabinet members, and with the chancellor.
First, the Labour government defused the euro issue’s salience by pledging to
hold a public referendum on whether the UK should join the EMU rather than making the
decision through a Parliamentary vote. Removing the issue from Parliamentary hands
meant that Blair could sideline any Labour euroskeptic MPs of the sort that had damaged
Major’s authority. In this Blair had the advantage of a massive Parliamentary majority,
which would have minimized any power of backbenchers opposed to the official party
line.
Second, Blair also took the debate outside of the cabinet. This removed the
possibility of dissension within the cabinet of the sort that had also seriously damaged the
Major government by, for the most part, not allowing cabinet members to weigh in on
EMU membership. Whether this was a deliberate move on Blair’s account or an
indication of the chancellor Gordon Brown’s strength, not holding discussions over the
government’s euro policy in cabinet meetings decreased the salience of the topic there as
well.
Finally, the third relationship is where the government’s decisions on the euro
policy took place: between the prime minister and the chancellor. In fact, the decisions
were not so much collaborative as combative, as will be discussed, but the interaction
between the two resulted in a policy that allowed the government to successfully decrease
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the salience of the euro issue and opening political space for taking on other policy
matters. This was the “Five Tests” framework that the Chancellor introduced in October
1997 and which created a way for the government to at least ostensibly quantify Britain’s
preparedness to enter EMU. Even though the five tests framework meant that the
government was subject to questions from the press, the campaigns, and MPs about
whether the tests had been met, it allowed the government to delay answering until a
“formal” assessment could be made, at the time, largely, of its choosing. The Five Tests
allowed the government to define the issue on its own terms and then set it aside.
The success of the Blair government in resolving the euro cross-cutting cleavages
is evident in the sometimes-adversarial relationship between prime minister and
chancellor. In the Thatcher and Major eras, European monetary integration was the bone
of contention between prime minister and chancellor: the difference in policy opinions
was what threatened the stability of the government and thus the British political system.
In the Blair era, however, the euro debate was only one piece of the conflict between
Blair and Brown. Blair might have been more pro-Euro than Brown, but that was almost
incidental. The euro had become merely a tool in the hands of Brown to accrue more
power at Blair’s expense. By internalizing the euro issue, in a sense, it meant that it had
become just one more political issue that politicians in the same party might disagree
over, rather than one that had the power to split the party apart, which did happen to
Labour in the Thatcher era and nearly happened to the Conservatives in the Major era.
This chapter covers the chronology of the Blair government’s handling of the euro
issue while also analyzing the nature of the three relationship mentioned above and the
government’s success in resolving the euro cross-cutting cleavage in British politics.
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Part I: New Labour comes into power
New Labour came to power in May 1997 in a landslide election victory, the first
time in eighteen years that the Labour Party would form a government. A few weeks
later, Blair asked the new chancellor, Gordon Brown, to offer suggestions on how the
new government should begin to shape its EMU policy over the summer months. In a
taste of many such interchanges to come, Blair did not receive a reply until the morning
of July 17, the day on which Brown addressed the House of Commons on the topic, thus
ensuring that the prime minister could have very little impact on the content of the
chancellor’s statement. Despite this early show of power, on this occasion Brown did not
shed much light on what policy the government would pursue regarding euro
membership. Brown largely reiterated the party’s pre-election stance, which pledged to
base Britain’s decision on a “hard-headed” look at the economics of the situation
(Hansard, July 17, 1997).
By the end of the August 1997 holidays, British newspapers were
speculating enthusiastically about what the government’s policy on joining the single
currency would be. Since November 1996 Labour’s position had been to support holding
a nationwide referendum asking the public whether it wished to abandon the pound and
adopt the euro as its currency. However, Labour had given no indication as to when it
might hold the referendum, and now that Labour was in power, the speculation
intensified. Brown wanted to issue a statement saying that while Labour’s policy
remained the same, the country would not enter EMU in “the first wave”; i.e., when the
euro currency first came into existence in 1999.
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Blair was dubious about the need to offer such clarification or to make it plain
that Britain would not be joining the majority of the EU member states in the first wave.
In regards to the euro, Blair preferred strategic ambiguity, keeping the government’s
options open by declining to offer a definitive policy (Howarth 2004). This was a way of
attempting to defuse the salience of a topic so that it could be addressed under less
pressure at a later time. It was not that Blair necessarily intended to hold a referendum
during his first term, but he did not want to commit himself either way. Brown, however,
preferred to have a policy explicitly stated, and on the euro issue, he won (Campbell
2007).
Finally Blair’s staff and Brown persuaded the prime minister to authorize a
statement to go to the Times, but a misunderstanding occurred between Blair and his staff
(and possibly Brown). While Blair had not wanted to give an unambiguous pledge that
Britain definitely would not join the EMU in his first term, that is what the staff conveyed
to the Times editor. At this time, Brown’s press spokesman, Charlie Whelan, gave
reporters the impression that Brown, not Blair, was determining the government's policy
on EMU and that he had definitively ruled out Britain’s membership during the current
parliament. When Blair saw the headlines to this effect, he tried to pull back from such a
strong declaration but it was too late. This led to internal uproar among the Blair
government members, and fueled more press speculation about the government’s stance
(Campbell 2007, Scott 2004).
Sources differ about how much Brown meant his spokesman to convey his power
over euro policy, since he told Blair and Campbell that the strong message Whelan had
delivered to the Times was not his intent. Scott, Blair’s economic advisor, gives Brown
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the benefit of the doubt and suggests that Whelan had misread Brown’s intent (Scott
2004, 217); others ascribe Machiavellian levels of cunning to Brown’s power play (Lee
2007). Regardless, the effective end result soon became clear: Brown, not Blair,
controlled the government's policy on EMU.
The internal confusion between the Brown and Blair camps over the euro policy
press interview led both sides to decide that the government needed to recapture the
initiative on the EMU issue from the media, as it was beginning to seem to be shaping the
government message rather than the other way around. Finally, the tumult led Brown to
address the issue in the House of Commons on October 27, 1997, clarifying the
government’s policy on the single European currency. This statement, which offered a
more substantive take on EMU policy than had the press interview, laid out the five tests
framework that came to govern the euro debate in the UK.
Scott (2004) writes that the concept of the five tests, which came to have so much
power over the entire European debate in Britain, was thrown together over the course of
a weekend by Treasury staff. This may well have been the case, but Brown had,
apparently, been mulling over the “five tests” language for some time. In June 1997
Blair’s cabinet had debated whether to continue the troubled Millennium Dome project,
and Brown suggested a way of presenting the topic to the public: tell them that the
government would put the Dome project to a series of five tests which must be met
before going forward with the endeavor (Campbell 1997).
In any case, Brown’s statement met with success in Parliament, in the media, and
in the financial markets, which initially had roiled in response to the government turmoil
over its euro policy (Rawnsley 2001).
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The Five Tests and how Blair and Brown used them
The political implications of the five test framework were widely seen to be the
true import of the tests. However, a brief discussion of what the five tests regarding
Britain’s potential entry into the single currency were is necessary in order to assess how
the economic language presented a framework with which the Blair government could
justify political decisions. The tests were:
1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we
and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a
permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making longterm decisions to invest in Britain?
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive positions
of the UK’s financial services industry, particularly the City’s
wholesale markets?
5. In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a
lasting increase in jobs? (HM Treasury 2003)
These tests aimed to consider to what degree Britain’s economy aligned with those of the
other countries of the EU that would be joining the single currency, so that if Britain were
to join, negative economic shocks or trends would not result. As such, the first test
addressed concerns that British interest rates were higher on average than those set by the
German Bundesbank, the predecessor to the European Central Bank (ECB), as interest
rates play a considerable role in the growth and stability of an economy. The second test
considered whether the British economy would be sufficiently flexible to adjust to any
problems that might arise from the business cycle or interest rate adjustments referred to
in the first test; for example, labor market flexibility is often a consideration in dealing
with whatever job losses might result from business cycle shocks. Foreign direct
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investment was the third test: there has been a long and continuing debate about whether
firms would be more or less attracted to setting up shop in the UK if it went into the
eurozone. Given the strength of the UK’s financial services industry (known as “the
City”) the Treasury wanted to ensure that it would not be adversely affected by joining
the euro. Finally, the fifth test was a catchall, an overall assessment of EMU’s impact on
the British economy.
In his briefing to the House of Commons in October 1997, Brown asserted that
the British economy was not sufficiently in convergence with the EU economies, nor
would it be by 1999, so he ruled out any entry into the euro-zone at least in 1999 and by
implication for the duration of the first parliament (through 2001). The British economy
was simply too far apart from the EU economies structurally and in terms of
performance, he said, for entry into the EMU to benefit the UK (House of Commons
Debate October 27, 1997).
Meanwhile, Scott (2004) argued that the five tests that the Treasury came up with
were second order issues because no one in the government asked the more central
question: whether joining EMU would actually be good for the country. Indeed, he
claims that in discussions with Foreign Office staff, they made plain their conviction that
joining the euro was inevitable, so Britain might as well get on with it sooner rather than
later. Scott claims that no one at No. 10 wanted to question EMU policy either, either
because they were pro-euro, saw it as inevitable—such as Blair’s Europe advisor Stephen
Wall (though Wall’s own account of events suggests a more enthusiastic attitude towards
euro membership than that)—or viewed it as their job to carry out whatever Blair wanted
(Wall 2008). Finally, Scott recounted that No. 11 (the Treasury) might have been taking
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a sharper look at whether Britain’s joining the euro was even a good idea, but they were
even more secretive about EMU policy than they were about other economic policy
issues, so that he, as the prime minister’s representative on economic issues, could not
discuss it with them (Scott 2004).
While the five tests were presented as measures of economic performance,
instantly they were seen as primarily political criteria for membership, especially since
the euro decision itself was considered to be “a political decision” (Baker 2001, 285).
The five tests were not measurable in any simple, unambiguous way so there was
inevitably some subjectivity to the evaluation as to whether they are met or not. The
subjective nature of the five tests could be seen in part as the government’s nod to the
fact that domestic political factors such as the euroskeptic press might constrain its ability
to win a referendum, though Holden (2002, 157) points out that “in accepting that
domestic factors acted as possible policy constraints, [the government] was apparently
being over-ruled by them.” In this policy area the leadership preferred a policy of
preference accommodation rather than preference shaping, reacting to public opinion
rather than attempting to form it (Holden 2002).
Indeed, many commentators on the five tests have noted the phantom presence of
a crucial sixth test, which measured whether the government could actually win a
referendum on joining the euro zone. “This was far from a foregone conclusion. In
November 1997, an opinion poll revealed that fifty per cent of those questioned opposed
United Kingdom participation in the euro. … No fewer than thirty-five per cent favoured
outright withdrawal from the EU” (Lee 2007, p. 191).
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Some thought that Blair’s immense personal and government popularity could
have shifted the balance here. For instance, the pro-euro leader of the Liberal Democratic
Party, Paddy Ashdown, pushed Blair hard in 1997 and throughout Labour’s first term to
use his huge Parliament majority and high public opinion ratings to hold and win a
referendum. Interestingly, despite these advantages, Blair said that he was not sure he
could win (Rawnsley 2001, 76). Despite his big parliamentary majority, Blair remained
cautious about the depth and degree of Labour’s newfound support and did not want to
risk Labour’s future electoral prospects by driving away euroskeptical voters. While
Labour had won the 1997 election by a landslide, bringing in a wide array of voters who
had not traditionally voted Labour meant that Blair could not assume that their electoral
support (or their dislike of the Conservatives) would overcome the conviction of half the
population that Britain was better off out.
In addition, Blair also did not call a referendum because he was aware that to
commit to the referendum campaign was to take on the immensely influential euroskeptic
press led by the Murdoch papers, which also might harm his chances of winning reelection. These papers, most notably the Sun tabloid, would play a considerable role in
stirring up the euroskeptic tendencies of a dubious population. While pledging a
referendum had lowered the salience of the euro issue for Labour prior to the 1997
election, calling a referendum would raise the salience of the issue again dramatically,
something Blair wished to avoid. A campaign would bring to the fore not only a chance
for Blair to lose big on a major issue, but also for the remaining divisions over the euro in
his party to reappear as euroskeptics and europhile MPs would take their sides in a
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campaign, resulting in a perceived (and perhaps actual) loss of authority for the Blair
government (Forster 2002).
Blair privately had ruled out joining in the first term because he also was not sure
that he could win a referendum until New Labour had demonstrated its competence in
government, particularly regarding economic policy. After having been in opposition for
eighteen years, and having been held largely responsible for Britain’s economic woes in
the 1970s when last in power, Labour needed to persuade an electorate that its checkered
record on economic management was long past. New Labour immediately bolstered its
economic credibility by making the Bank of England independent of the political arm of
the government. Bank of England independence allowed the government to put off what
would be a difficult debate over EMU. Making the Bank independent gave British
business the message that Labour was willing to subject itself to monetary discipline,
which entry into EMU might also have achieved. But euro membership was laden with
more emotional issues of nationhood and identity that the government did not want to
take on, and which the issue of Bank of England independence did not have (Cronin
2004, 418). Also, paradoxically, the government’s very success over the Bank of
England made Blair more reluctant to risk this newly won credibility by holding a
referendum that the government was unsure of winning (Riddell 2005).
All these reasons notwithstanding, Ashdown’s assessment may have been right,
that the best chance for Britain to join the euro came at the beginning of Blair’s first term
in 1997. Electoral support for euro membership fell among Britons as time went on: a
poll in November 2000 showed only 18 per cent of voters favored joining the euro
compared to 36 percent 20 months earlier. Even the widespread public conviction that
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Britain’s membership in the eurozone was inevitable, a message the pro-euro campaign
used relentlessly, became less reliable: Fifty-two percent of those polled in November
2000 thought that the euro was inevitable, but this had fallen from a high of 66 percent
(Baker 2001). Without the government actively engaging in preference shaping,
acceptance of and support for euro membership subsided.
Ashdown attributed part of Blair’s failure to call a referendum to his leadership
personality. Ashdown contrasted the circumstances between Blair’s decisions regarding
the euro at the beginning of his premiership and those in his fight over support for the
Iraq war. On Blair’s winning the contentious House of Commons vote on Iraq, Ashdown
says: “he’s hopeless in my view when you give him a wide open goal and a roaring
crowd: he doesn’t know which goal to shoot at. But put him back against the wall
fighting for his life he’s absolutely magnificent” (Coldstream 2007). With the huge
majority and open policy options facing him in the euro issue, Ashdown suggests, Blair
vacillated. Moreover, Ashdown claims of Blair that, “on one hand he shows almost too
much moral purpose and fervor on international affairs and on the other can be quite
pusillanimous when it comes to taking decisions on domestic ones. Time and again
issues that he should have confronted early on, he failed to do so” (Coldstream 2007).
While interesting, this assessment is no doubt attributable in part to Ashdown’s
own policy agenda differences with Blair – the latter is pusillanimous when wavering on
issues such as the euro, while fervid in conducting the war in Iraq. However, Ashdown’s
observations may be attributable to another factor shaping Blair’s power even as a highly
popular prime minister, and which will be discussed later: the power of the chancellor to
constrain the prime minister’s policy actions. Brown held considerable sway over the
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shaping of domestic policy in the Blair government, which may have made Blair cautious
about the internal political power plays that would accompany any domestic move,
especially regarding the euro. But the chancellor had relatively little power over Blair’s
foreign policy, and there, as Ashdown observes, Blair strode out with decision even in the
face of opposition (Coldstream 2007).
Still, it is remarkable that even the head of an officially pro-Euro party with a
huge parliamentary majority and high popular opinion ratings did not think that he could
win a referendum, and without the prime minister’s personal endorsement the policy
could not come about. Blair planned to revisit the matter of euro membership later in his
premiership after he had achieved other policy aims and if public opinion changed, but
Brown’s seizure of control over the euro policy ensured that the opportunity did not arise
again.

Blair’s motivations regarding the euro
Even though Blair did not make a push for eurozone membership immediately, he
did favor Britain’s membership in the EMU. For Blair, the euro decision was political.
For one thing, Blair wanted Britain to join the eurozone in part in order to augment
Britain’s political influence in the EU. Moreover, Blair wanted to join the euro zone
sooner rather than later to capitalize on the goodwill expressed by other member states
for Britain’s joining the single currency: as he observed, everyone but the French
favored Britain joining EMU, but if they waited for five years or more to join then the
goodwill and good timing would have dissipated and Britain's ability to influence events
in the EU would diminish.
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In any case, he wished to leave the option of joining open for a while for
diplomatic purposes. European colleagues could not understand why a very popular
prime minister with a very large parliamentary majority could not or would not bring his
country into the euro zone, a policy he purported to support. Meanwhile, Seldon (2007)
and Scott (2004), among others, observe Blair’s failure to grasp (and utter disinterest in)
the economic case for the euro: he was interested in it as a tool for further political power
in the EU as a whole, but not as being in itself good or bad for the British economy.
Despite his support for euro membership, Blair did not want to take on the
issue—and the referendum campaign that necessarily came with it—not only for the
reasons discussed above but because delaying the euro push gave him room to achieve
other policy goals first. Blair had domestic policy goals he wanted to achieve more than
the euro, ones that might be easier to achieve before he had begun to tread “on potentially
dangerous ground as far as the electorate was concerned” with the euro issue (Holden
2002, 158). Blair saw a referendum as too much of a diversion from these policy
priorities during his first term (Riddell 2005).
Thus, Blair had reason to welcome the five tests framework even if he initially
had not wanted to state the government’s euro policy so definitively. The prime minister
used the five tests framework strategically: it allowed him to take a technocratic stance,
treating the five tests as an objective matter, declaring on every occasion that the subject
arose that Britain would join the euro when the tests were met; in other words, when the
economic conditions were right. Blair took this approach despite his considerable
disinterest in the economics of the case. The “economics” were deployed politically,
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giving him a supposedly objective measure to justify his setting the euro issue aside in
order to focus on other policy priorities.

Brown’s motivations regarding the euro
Meanwhile, Chancellor Gordon Brown, the author of the five tests, had his own
opinions on both Britain’s euro membership and how the debate over it shaped the nature
of domestic political power. While the chancellor’s October 1997 speech to the House of
Commons provided his official assessment of the euro, Brown’s opposition to joining
EMU apparently predated this speech. Riddell (2005) claims that in the beginning he
was more pro-euro than Blair, but with the success of the Bank of England independence
move he became more reluctant to pursue EMU. Lee (2007), however, asserts that Brown
was solidly against EMU membership from the start.
In any case, according to Riddell, the Treasury under Brown became “hostile to
entry” soon after Labour first came into power in 1997 and that, as discussed, he
formulated the five tests as “a shield for the government to hide behind”, an excuse for
not joining the EMU (Riddell 2005, 135). Lee (2007) supports this assertion, claiming
that Brown had no intention of approving Britain’s entry into the single currency. This
was true for a couple of reasons. First, euro membership would limit the government’s
ability to achieve its domestic policy goals. Even though the government had made the
Bank of England independent, the interest rates set by a central bank responsible only for
the British economy rather than for that of the entire eurozone block might vary
considerably, and might impede Labour’s policy goals.
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Like Blair, Brown had plans for the domestic economy that he wanted to achieve.
However, the conditions the EU established for member states wishing to adopt the single
currency—particularly the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which set up economic
requirements designed to align the national economies of would be members by limiting
allowable debt and deficit levels—would have constrained Brown’s ability to pursue his
(and New Labour’s) policies at home through the use of fiscal policy. This particularly
affected Blair and Brown’s plans for an overhaul of Britain’s public services, but also
potentially limited the execution of every other government policy.
In particular, Britain’s membership in EMU would hamper the power of the
chancellor. Lee adds a seventh test, also political, which he claims was, for Brown, the
most important of them all: “whether EMU would fatally undermine the Treasury’s
control over domestic economic and social policy choices by taking away discretion over
the design of monetary and fiscal policy. Since it would, there could be no question of
the United Kingdom participating in EMU” (Lee 2007, 191). And since Brown was the
one who would decide the result of the five tests, this automatic failure of the seventh test
meant that from the moment Brown articulated the five test framework there was no hope
of Brown changing his mind.
In order to enter EMU Brown would have to give up considerable personal
political power within the Labour government as well as power as the chancellor of the
exchequer (Lee 2007). Thus, while Brown’s first major Westminster speech declared
that the decision about Britain’s membership in the eurozone was at heart an economic
decision, in truth Brown’s primary motivation on the matter was political. It was about
Brown achieving political power relative to Blair. But this was also in relation to the
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reality of European economics. As time went on, for example, Brown became still more
concerned about the economics of the euro particularly when, in the early 2000s, the Euro
economies slumped while Britain flourished (Seldon 2007, 205).
However, “The more Brown thought that the economics mattered, the more
political the decision became (or the more important the political decision became).
Brown had guaranteed Treasury control over monetary and fiscal policy for the duration
of New Labour’s first term. More importantly, he had, at Tony Blair’s expense,
entrenched his political control over resource allocation and domestic policy design in
England” (Lee 2007, 192).
In terms of internal government politics, the five tests shifted the power balance,
certainly on the matter of euro membership. By letting Brown set up the five tests, “Too
late, Blair realized he had given Brown a veto” (Coldstream 2007). The five tests
framework gave Brown power over when any referendum would take place if at all and
thus also gave him a veto over Britain’s membership in the euro (Howarth 2007). Once
the five tests were established, Brown controlled the framework of the euro policy
debate, and it would have been politically difficult for Blair to override Brown on the
issue. It was a means both of gaining power in the Blair government, and then as a way
of reminding others of his authority in this area. Geoffrey Robinson, a Cabinet Minister
during Blair’s first term, noted, “I don’t think a prime minister is going to say no to his
chancellor on such a major issue, say no to the overwhelming unanimous pressure from
the Treasury establishment. I don’t see how the prime minister could have done that”
(Coldstream 2007).
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Brown had every expectation of becoming prime minister after Blair, and he may
have seen the preservation of this power as central to his future aims for the country. Or
he may actually have believed it was best for Britain to remain out, based on the lack of
economic convergence his assessment identified. Regardless, without Brown, it is far
more likely that Blair would have achieved Britain’s entry into the euro zone. Lee (2007,
182) offers a blunt assessment of Brown’s seizure of British euro policy: “Brown’s
political legacy as Chancellor of the Exchequer was the obstruction – repeatedly and
successfully – of Tony Blair’s stated ambition to place the United Kingdom at the heart
of Europe.”

Part II: Chronology post-Five Tests
After the flurry of speculation and the setting out of the five tests in fall 1997, the
government gave the matter of Britain’s EMU policy little public mention subsequently.
After 1997, the issue gets little mention from government members. In Parliament, for
example, according to Hansard (the official record of UK parliamentary proceedings),
Gordon Brown only gave speeches regarding the euro once in 1998 and twice in 1999,
though he did provide written answers to questions submitted by members of Parliament
on the topic several more times. The Prime Minister, meanwhile, spoke in the House of
Commons on EMU once in 1998, made a major speech about the government’s technical
preparations for changing over to the euro in February 1999, spoke of the euro once more
in November of that year, then did not give speeches about the euro or EMU in
Parliament again, though he too offered a few written answers on the topic and responded
to questions about the topic as it arose in the weekly Prime Minister’s question period
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(Hansard 1997-2007). Nor did either Brown or Blair devote much time to speaking about
Britain’s potential membership of the euro outside of Parliament: during his ten-year
premiership, for example, Blair gave only a handful of speeches in which he discussed
the issue any more than briefly.
The euro began trading on the international financial markets in January 1999, an
event which marked the official incarnation of the currency, though it did not exist in
physical form until January 1, 2002. In February 1999, Blair addressed Parliament about
plans the government had made to prepare for a potential changeover from the pound to
the euro, conceptually akin to the “Y2K” type of preparations taking place at the same
time, ensuring that computer systems and so on could adapt to the change should it occur.
This was justified as part of the government’s officially policy of “’Prepare and decide,’
which to many was only a more active version of Major’s ‘wait and see,’” (Aspinwall
2004, 150).

February 2001: Blair promises a Five Tests Assessment
Two years then passed before any significant discussion of the single currency
took place again in the House of Commons. In February 2001—less than three months
before the next General Election—during Prime Minister’s Questions the Conservative
party leader, William Hague, asked Blair to clarify a long-repeated reply the government
had used to answer questions about when a new assessment of the five tests would take
place. Government officials repeatedly had replied that an assessment would take place
“early in the next parliament”. Hague asked Blair if that meant that it would take place
within two years of the start of the next Parliament, and Blair agreed, which was taken to
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be a major concession—not least by Brown, who was reported to have been infuriated
(Lee 2007).
At this point the government or more specifically, the Treasury, was committed to
delivering an assessment of whether the country had met the five tests for convergence
with the EMU countries that the Chancellor had set out in his October 1997 speech to the
House of Commons. Assuming (as everyone expected) that Labour won reelection in
May 2001, this meant that Brown would have to deliver his verdict by June 2003.
However, while Lee (2007) claims that Blair hoped that his agreeing to a deadline for the
five tests assessment would pressure Brown into setting a timetable for entry, Brown was
determined that no such event would take place.

2001 General Election
In May 2001 the prime minister called for a general election and campaigning
ensued. Earlier, in January 2001, Campbell noted in his diary that Blair “was clear about
the agenda” he wanted to carry out in his second term as prime minister: “public service
reform, the euro if the conditions are right, international leadership because there was a
vacuum” (Campbell 2007, 487). However, while the single currency was clearly part of
the prime minister’s planned agenda Blair did not want any discussion of euro
membership during the election campaign and insisted his government not campaign on
the topic (Campbell 2007, Scott 2004).
The government’s handling of the EMU issue showed that the Parliamentary
Labour Party (PLP) still viewed Europe with caution. The government wished to kept
the new supporters it had won in the 1997 general election so it steered clear of
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discussing any changes on single currency status. The euro was “the one issue capable of
undermining the government’s electoral position, as it gives the Conservatives one issue
where they enjoy a commanding lead” (Holden 2002, 161). The Conservative party had
made the issue the centerpiece of its campaign, but Blair took care to squash that
potential Tory advantage by declining to engage in a dispute over euro membership.
Moreover, polls indicated that the voters still did not consider Europe to be a major
electoral issue (Cronin 2004).
As part of his campaign strategy Blair focused on the inter-party, Labour vs.
Conservative, debate and on mobilizing or neutralizing the press, but was less successful
in addressing his biggest intra-party challenge: namely, defusing Brown’s power within
the government and thus his ability to impede Blair’s policy aims. While the euro did not
appear to be paramount among Blair’s goals, Seldon claims that Blair made a mistake
nonetheless in clamping down on any discussion of the euro during the 2001 campaign
for a second term. Blair did this in order to defuse the Conservative campaign strategy,
which focused on the euro debate, “But by not talking about the Euro during the election
campaign (for fear of arousing an adverse press reaction) Blair had denied himself the
opportunity to claim a mandate for entry, which would have proved a valuable battering
ram against the doors of the Treasury. The odds were stacked heavily against him”
(Seldon 2007, 205). Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, concurred: he wanted to develop
momentum for the pro-euro movement, but Brown agreed with Blair and did not want to
bring up the only issue in which the Conservatives might hold the advantage (Baker
2001). Brown’s support of Blair in minimizing the salience of the euro issue meant that
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the pressure of media and public opinion was less likely to be brought to bear against the
government, allowing the chancellor’s veto on the issue to remain unassailed.
In May 2001, Labour won a second consecutive landslide victory. After the
election Campbell reports a private meeting with Blair in June 2001 during which Blair
reiterated that he was still committed to pushing for euro membership and recognized that
while economic conditions were key, he favored early entry (Campbell 2007). However,
Blair’s economic advisor Scott writes that around the same time, he briefed the prime
minister that because of the downturn in the value of the pound the currency was
beginning to converge with the euro. When Scott reassured Blair that this did not
constitute real convergence of the sort that might mean that the five tests would soon be
met, he reports that there was visible relief on the prime minister’s face, because at that
stage Blair’s focus was on public sector reform and he did not want to have to deal with
staging a euro referendum as well (Scott 2004).
Nonetheless, Blair did not intend to abandon the euro issue altogether. At the
Trade Union Conference (TUC) in Brighton in the autumn he planned to deliver a wideranging speech in which he would strongly endorse Britain’s membership of the euro.
The date on which he was to give the speech was September 11, 2001: he was making
the final preparations to deliver the speech when the severity of the terrorist attacks in the
United States became clear (Blair 2010). According to the Independent on September 12,
2001, “The Prime Minister was due to deliver yesterday what would have been one of his
strongest speeches in support of the European single currency since he took office.
However, as the scale of the atrocities in America became clear, Tony Blair cancelled his
planned address to the TUC conference in Brighton and made a statement offering his
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sympathy to the victims' families and declaring his determination to form a worldwide
front against terrorism” (Clement 2001). From then on, the likelihood of Blair using his
political capital to build public support for the euro became less and less likely as the
prime minister became focused on the terrorist threat.
While Blair’s government did instantly shift its focus towards the response to
terrorism, Blair continued to address his other priorities, and made a strongly pro-Europe
speech in November 2001 at the European Research Institute in Birmingham that left
pro-euro supporters hoping that this was at last the push for the euro referendum they’d
awaited since May 1997 (Blair 2001). After that, however, however, Blair delivered no
more big speeches regarding the euro for the rest of his premiership.
January 1, 2002 saw the introduction of the physical euro currency, which many
expected would result in a government push on EMU in light of an anticipated rise in
public support as people experienced using euro notes and coins for the first time (the
much ballyhooed “notes and coins effect”) but neither the government nor the public
evinced any lasting enthusiasm on that occasion (Mullen 2003). In November 2002 Blair
gave a speech, “A Clear Course for Europe”, that expressed a strong commitment to
Britain’s involvement in Europe, but mentioned the euro only briefly, reiterating the
government’s noncommittal stance that Britain should only join under the appropriate
economic circumstances (Blair 2002). While Blair’s aspirations for European integration
continued, he had, it appeared, set aside membership of the euro as a means of achieving
it.
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Treasury Delivers Five Tests Assessment, June 2003
By the fall of 2002 attention had moved to the Chancellor’s anticipated
assessment of the five tests, due by no later than the following June. Various media
outlets had begun to report leaks that the assessment would be negative; meanwhile,
Blair’s periodic requests that the Chancellor give him an indication of how the
assessment was going met with resistance. Only shortly before he was to deliver his
assessment to the House of Commons did Brown get back to the Prime Minister on the
topic in any meaningful way, again too late for Blair to weigh in significantly on the
Treasury’s plans (Scott 2004).
The result was what nearly everyone expected: on June 9, 2003, the chancellor
announced that the British economy had met only two of the five economic tests for
convergence, those regarding investment and financial services (House of Commons
Debates June 9, 2003). According to the chancellor’s report, “Price inflation in the
British housing market (a source of economic volatility during the past fifty years) was a
particular structural difference between the United Kingdom and the euro-zone remained
and dictated ‘a cautious approach’” and “since the housing market was one of the
principal engines of the consumption-led growth which characterised the British model of
political economy,” the Treasury’s overall assessment stated that Britain was not
sufficiently in line with the EMU economy for the government to be able to recommend
membership in the euro-zone (Lee 2007, 196).
In deference to Blair’s desire to keep the issue open-ended, Brown’s assessment
did not rule out the euro indefinitely but promised that a follow-up assessment would take
place the following year. However, it was evident that the policy window (Kingdon
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2003) for the euro referendum had closed. The promised assessment the following year
never took place, nor did a cross-country “road show” promoting the benefits of euro
membership to the public get underway in the fall of 2003, as Blair had pledged (Cook
2007, Riddell 2005). The Blair government moved on to other issues, and other
strategies for exerting influence in the EU.
In summary, euro policy was not at the top of the agenda in the Blair government
during either his first or second term, and by midway through the second term it was a
moot issue. The next section addresses what behind the scenes circumstances contributed
to this being the case.

Part III: Prime minister and chancellor
While many members of Blair’s government and staff held strong opinions on the
euro and influenced the primary policy actors, the views of those two, Blair, the prime
minister, and Brown, the chancellor who held the power to make the five tests
assessment, ultimately mattered most in shaping the government’s EMU policy.
Moreover, the two used the single currency issue as a weapon in their struggle for power
in government, so that the issue was not so much the cause of their discord (as in
previous premierships) as a means of advancing their own respective agendas.
The relationship between Blair and Brown was both a close and a contentious
one, as the two had together built New Labour into a successful political party while
competing for its leadership. The issue of the government’s EMU policy cannot be
separated from the longstanding partnership which at times descended into rivalry and an
on-again, off-again friendship between the two that was, during Blair’s premiership,
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under great tension at times. Thus it is important to understand the background and
nature of the relationship between the two politicians, both the conflicts and the
cooperation, in order to analyze what impact it had on the government’s policy regarding
the single currency.

Background prime minister and chancellor relationship:
Both Blair and Brown entered Parliament following the 1983 general election,
and both swiftly moved up the ranks of the Labour Party, which at the time was
undergoing significant shifts in policy and outlook regarding Europe. Blair, Brown,
fellow Labour politician Peter Mandelson, and Alastair Campbell (Blair’s spokesman and
director of communications and strategy) formed the nucleus of what became known as
“New Labour”, which reoriented Labour Party principles (“modernisation”, in Blair’s
own words), to fit a newer era of British life in order to win back popular support after
eighteen years in Opposition (Blair 1993). This change involved, for instance,
abandoning the long-standing language of Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution28,
which committed the party to pursuing the nationalization of industry. It also cemented
what had been a gradual shift of the official Labour Party position on the European Union
and its predecessor organizations from outright opposition to, by the time Blair’s
leadership of the party began in 1994, enthusiastic desire for further integration.
This change on European policy had fully come about by the time the Maastricht
Treaty came into effect in 1994, and while the PLP had a number of dissenters in its
ranks regarding the treaty, as noted in the previous chapter, these MPs were ineffective in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28
First written in 1918.
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influencing party policy. Labour’s policy shift from opposing to supporting further
integration with the EU was both a way of redefining the Labour Party so as to make it
electable once more and an easy weapon against the beleaguered Conservative party,
which was becoming deeply divided over Europe (Scott 2004).
While the Labour Party in opposition supported the idea of the single currency,
even once he became party leader Blair personally was never very interested in the
economics of the single currency, though he was convinced of the political benefits for
Britain. In the only major presentation of his views on Europe before becoming prime
minister, in a speech at Chatham House in 1995, Blair focused almost exclusively on the
politics of the single currency. Brown, however, was interested in both the economics
and the politics of the issue (Scott 2004, Seldon 2007).
In 1994 Labour Party leader John Smith died unexpectedly, leaving both Blair
and Brown as potential successors to the title. Some had expected Brown to succeed his
mentor, but in a meeting before the contest Blair went to Brown and presented him with a
fait accompli: Blair had gathered a sufficient number of votes to defeat Brown. In the
end, Brown agreed not to contest Blair formally for the party leadership. In exchange for
Brown’s public support in that leadership contest, Blair may or may not have offered the
future chancellor specific incentives, discussed below. Brown became shadow chancellor
in Blair’s opposition shadow cabinet but it was clear that he still wanted to be party
leader and prime minister, and widely assumed that he would succeed Blair to the post
eventually.
The personality differences between the two men formed part of the nature of
their power struggle. Blair preferred to keep his options open, while Brown preferred to
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have matters settled, as evinced by the 1997 confusion over declaring the government’s
euro policy (Blair 2010). Moreover Blair’s biographer Seldon observes that not only
differences in views and agendas complicated the two men’s relationship, but also
different communication styles. Part of the ambiguity of the Blair-Brown relationship
resulted from the fact that, people reported, following any exchange the Brown camp
would take what Blair said literally and bank on it, while Blair would say what he
thought people wanted to hear, and in turn would take from a meeting not literal meaning
but nuance. Others, however, said that Brown had a habit of hearing what he wanted to
hear, and acting on it (Seldon 2007, 206). These communication difficulties contributed
to the establishment of the five tests framework.
Particularly as relations worsened between the two, the prime minister and
chancellor also frequently used others to deliver messages to each other, holding a
conversation with someone like Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott or former cabinet
secretary Clare Short, knowing that they would pass on what they had heard. Short
claimed that Blair used her to try to broker a deal with Brown in hopes of achieving euro
entry, to no avail (Seldon 2007; Coldstream 2007).
By Blair’s second term in office, the relationship between Brown and Blair, and
their staff, was decidedly chilly. Matthew Taylor, a Blair advisor in 2003, notes that
Brown and Blair’s staffers were “like kids in a dysfunctional marriage, trying to duck
crockery flying about the kitchen” (Coldstream 2007). At times the two most powerful
members of the government, who worked and lived next door to each other, had very
little communication, even when Blair requested updates on issues such as the Budget
and EMU policy. Indeed, the rivalry of the two men often went further than just over
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euro policy: tales of Brown’s refusing to give any information on economic issues,
including the budget, to the prime minister abound. According to Riddell, “at one point
during the long period of frosty relations between the prime minister and the Chancellor
from the autumn of 2004 to the spring of 2005, Blair is said to have asked Brown about
the budget at a small meeting of senior ministers, only to have received the terse reply,
‘It’s on March 16’” (Riddell 2005, 71).
If the relationship had become so problematic, and had stood in the way of Blair’s
advancement of the single currency issue, why did the prime minister retain Brown as
chancellor? The answer is threefold, relating first to power dynamics within the Labour
Party; second to Brown’s economic policy expertise; and third to Blair’s unwillingness to
let cabinet divisions damage his government as they had John Major’s and Margaret
Thatcher’s. All of these factors made Brown “too big to fire”.

Labour party power dynamics
Back in 1994 the Labour Party recognized that Brown did not have the personal
charisma to take them to their first victory in five general elections. As a Labour whip
told then-Prime Minister John Major, “‘We won’t pick Gordon. He’s too like one of
those undertakers in old western films that measure you for a coffin before the gunfight’”
(Major 1999, 592). Brown’s intellectual understanding was widely recognized to be
formidable and his appearances in Parliament were also impressive but, as Major added,
“he carried with him an air of gloom and, in public at least, seemed to regard a smile as
an optional extra” (Major 1999, 592). By contrast, the party decided, Blair had the
personal charisma as well as the other traits needed to carry the party to electoral victory.
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But while Labour had not seen Brown as the man to lead them to victory in 1994
(an assessment partially borne out by the 2010 general election results), Brown was a
powerful figure in Labour politics and appealed to the Old Labour stalwarts in the party.
In 1994 the changes Kinnock had wrought in the party were still fairly new, and Blair did
not fit in well within the traditional Labour party as a whole, whereas Brown had
cultivated a great deal of support within the party (Riddell 2005).
Importantly, Labourites respected rather than liked Blair: he was a leader who
could win a general election but he was not a traditional Labour Party politician. Brown,
meanwhile, was a more traditional Labourite with strong ties to the unions, the traditional
stronghold of Labour power. Blair won the party leadership in 1994 because Labour
members believed that he could win a general election, and after fifteen years in the
political wilderness they recognized a need for change. But Blair had to be careful in
dealing with more the traditional Labour MPs in his government such as Deputy Prime
Minister John Prescott and Brown, both of whom had a strong following in the party
(Riddell 2005). These informal political dynamics played a big role in Blair’s
unwillingness to sack Brown even as the latter took over policy on EMU and prevented
Number 10 from even hearing about the policy, much less play a role in shaping it (Scott
2004).

Partnership: Brown strong on economic policy
Blair recognized Brown’s expertise in an area in which he had relatively little
interest, economic policy, and accepted that his government would be weaker without
Brown as chancellor (Riddell 2005, Scott 2004, Seldon 2007, Blair 2010). Blair’s
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concession of economic policy power to Brown “was partly shrewd politics to appease
his old friend, but it also reflected Blair’s lack of interest in, and of feel for, economic
issues” (Riddell 2005, 70). Economic expertise has never been a prerequisite for the post
of chancellor, which tends to be determined more based on the nature of its political
power in government, but in this case Brown fit both criteria.
Part of this sharing of power stems from a much speculated-upon conversation the
two men had in June 1994 as the two men contested the leadership of the Labour Party.
People have speculated endlessly over what, if anything, Blair promised Brown in order
to gain his support for his leadership bid in 1994, ranging from a promise that Brown
would succeed Blair as prime minister to a pledge that Brown would control economic
policy. Blair (2010) asserts that there was never any such an arrangement and that all
economic policy was formulated jointly between himself and the chancellor; however,
“there is no doubt that Blair formally ceded big areas of economic policy to Brown.
There were ‘Tony’s areas’ and Gordon’s areas’” (Riddell 2005, 16). Furthermore, even if
Blair did not “formally cede” power over economic policy to the chancellor, Brown took
it: either way, the latter gained unprecedented strength as the head of the Treasury.
Despite Blair’s assertion that he actively directed economic policy in coordination
with the chancellor, for instance, Riddell claims that not since the 1950s had a prime
minister had less input into economic policy than Blair did. This was in part because
Number 11 “deliberately excluded” the prime minister’s office from its deliberations on
the subject. Riddell adds, “This is not because Blair and Brown were not close. They
were, or at least until open cracks appeared in the relationship in 2003. They talked
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daily, often more frequently, but that was mainly about broad political issues, rather than
the details of economic policy” (Riddell 2005, 70; Scott 2004).
This division of labor, in which Blair largely left economic policy to Brown, was
evident while the party was in opposition and continued once Labour gained power in the
1997 general election. Riddell notes that ‘Tony’s areas’ and ‘Gordon’s areas’ did not
remain fixed as time passed: rather, Brown used his powers to expand his areas of
authority, first of all by making the Bank of England independent, giving the Treasury
more time to focus on social policies rather than the traditional setting of interest rates
and other instruments of monetary policy. Speaking of EMU policy specifically, Riddell
writes,
Moreover, after the Treasury was formally made the assessor, and later
self-styled guardian, of the five tests for entry into the euro, Blair had
effectively accepted Brown’s veto over one of his central political aims.
The power of the Treasury, and Brown, were unprecedented. …When you
add in the lingering resentments that Brown felt over not being prime
minister himself, which grew as Blair stayed on into a third term, then it is
clear why Blair never felt he had a free hand. He always had to consider
what ‘Gordon would think’ (Riddell 2005, 17).
From the beginning the shaping of the euro policy was a part of a contest for
power in government between Blair and Brown. The euro policy gave Brown an opening
for power because, as chancellor, he could assert his authority over euro policy
legitimately. Because it was appropriate for Brown to assert control in this area he was
able to seize more power from Blair by setting up the five tests framework controlled by
his department. He did this by stealing a march on his own prime minister, as his
predecessors had done at times before him. However, Brown took his seizure of power a
step further than they had. Lawson, for instance, defied Thatcher by shadowing the
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deutschemark but he did not use this as a means of taking over more control of economic
policy: for one thing, Thatcher was too vigilant on economic affairs for this to happen
even had he tried. In addition, other than the ERM debate, Lawson and Thatcher’s
economic policy aims remained largely the same. Meanwhile, Clarke departed from the
official party line on membership in the eurozone repeatedly, but his prime minister,
Major, was already weak and unable to prevent this defiance: to sack Clarke would have
brought a shaky government down. Brown, however, took power away from a strong
prime minister who was caught off guard by a move in an area in which he had never
expressed particular interest, leaving an area of weakness for a rival to exploit.
Brown’s greatest seizure of power was accomplished by setting the terms of the
euro debate. He established the framework for the entire greater euro debate that was
taking place not just within Whitehall or Parliament but also across the country, within
the campaigns and media, and in the EU as outsiders wondered which direction Britain
would choose. Once Brown introduced the five tests, everyone accepted his frame of the
euro debate as the basis for argument and speculation. It shaped the nature of the
referendum debate and the nature of Britain’s potential involvement in the eurozone. The
euro remained on the agenda after the Major years, but in a new and particular way. A
number of policy entrepreneurs had wanted Britain to join the eurozone, but a single,
powerful policy actor (Brown) influenced the way these entrepreneurs had to conduct that
debate (Kingdon 2003).
Despite his successful power play, however, Brown did not have complete control
over the government’s euro policy: for instance, he was forced into making an
assessment of the five tests by Blair’s 2001 pledge in the House of Commons. In
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addition, as will be discussed later, cabinet members, MPs, and even members of Blair’s
staff were able to pressure the Treasury on the five tests through informal channels (the
five tests framework had shut down formal discussions of any policy shift) such as
campaigns, the media, and internal politicking.
While Blair made no active endorsement of Brown’s seizure of the euro policy
issue, nor did he dwell on it, either publicly or privately. Following the Times crisis in
fall 1997, during which staffers Whelan and Campbell mistakenly conveyed to the media
a firm rejection of Britain’s joining EMU during the Blair’s first term, Blair seemed
resigned to the outcome, accepting Brown’s increased power over euro policy and
moving on to other policy priorities (Campbell 2007). However, this stance indicated
pragmatism rather than any support for Brown’s assertion of power. Over the course of
his first term Blair did reassure Scott when the latter expressed concern that Brown was
taking on too much control over EMU policy, telling him, “don’t worry, I’m on it”, but
his actions suggested rather that he simply moved on to other priorities (Scott 2004).

Government solidarity
Blair was willing to put up with Brown’s power plays, especially on the euro
issue, because he wanted to avoid the cabinet divisions that had damaged the previous
two governments. Blair had watched Conservative party tear itself apart over European
monetary integration from the time he had entered Parliament, and was determined that
the same would not happen to his government. Ashdown states that at the beginning of
his first term in office Blair told him, “If you look at governments they fall apart because
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the prime minister and chancellor fall out. Whatever happens, I’ve got to get on with my
chancellor” (Coldstream 2007).
Nor could Blair readily fire Brown and replace him with a more compliant
chancellor. Even though, under the British parliamentary system, the prime minister has
a great deal of power and can technically fire any minister in his cabinet and relegate him
to the back benches of the House of Commons, in practice any prime minister is
constrained by the fallout that would result from making such a move. This is
particularly the case with a minister such as Gordon Brown, who had a strong standing of
his own either in the parliamentary party or in the broader party as a whole.
Blair could not get rid of Brown because not only might he and his party allies
fatally undermine support for Blair’s government in protest, but also even if Blair
withstood that threat, Brown could stir up more trouble on the back benches with his
supporters than he would inside the government. Moreover, Brown had made the
chancellorship his fiefdom, and extricating him from this position undoubtedly would
cause him to retaliate against the prime minister. Margaret Thatcher’s experience offers
an example of this. Thatcher chose to shuffle her cabinet and removed one of her senior
government members, Geoffrey Howe, from his longstanding position as Foreign
Secretary. Even though she offered him another high-ranking position in her
government, Howe’s resentment over losing his fiefdom contributed to his eventual
central role in toppling her from the premiership. Brown held even more power within
his party, though, as discussed, part of Howe’s success stemmed from a growing party
dissatisfaction over its leadership. But Blair, as an outsider to the traditional Labour
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framework, was careful not to court unpopularity by ousting party favorites. He was
even reluctant to sack Clare Short, another minister with ties to old Labourites.
But Blair demonstrated a willingness to tolerate this rebellion by his second in
command in the interest of retaining Brown within government. He succeeded in part by
minimizing the effect Brown’s conniving had on his own agenda. According to Robert
Harris, “There’s a quality of indifference about Blair that in some ways may explain his
success: he can put up with things from Brown that would have you and I screaming and
reaching for a shotgun, and he can dispose of a friend like turning off a light”
(Coldstream 2007).29 In twice firing Peter Mandelson from his cabinet, for instance,
Blair indicated his willingness to dispose of someone, even a friend, not central to the
success of his government. According to Blair’s former deputy press secretary, Tim
Allan, “He’s incredibly unsentimental and he just does what he thinks needs to be done”
(Coldstream 2007). Blair would not have spared Brown out of personal loyalty, but the
chancellor, and his power base in the party, was essential to Blair’s government, however
divisive an effect he might have. The wars between the two were destabilizing, but not as
destabilizing as a full break would have been.
Nonetheless, Blair’s reluctance to confront Brown had a huge impact on one of
his primary policy goals: European integration. It also meant that Brown had more
leeway to challenge Blair, often openly, knowing that Blair was unwilling to remove him
from office. For instance, Brown quickly developed a habit of withholding his arguments
on or changes to policies from even the prime minister until the absolute last minute, as
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Harris, a journalist and author, turned against Blair after the prime minister twice fired
Harris’ friend, Peter Mandelson, from a cabinet post.
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he did on the government’s euro policy in 1997. When Blair brought a contentious piece
of legislation regarding university fees to the House of Commons in 2004, a vote on
which Blair had staked his authority as prime minister, Brown hid his hand to such an
extent that even going into the House for the vote Blair did not know if he could count on
the backing of Brown and his followers. In the end Blair got Brown’s support and won
the measure by five votes, but Wall noted, “I remember thinking to myself that this was a
very, very extraordinary situation that the prime minister of the day did not know whether
he could carry a crucial piece of legislation because he doesn’t know whether his
chancellor of the exchequer is going to support the government or not”(Coldstream
2007).
In summary, the ramifications of these facts for the Labour government’s policy
on EMU meant that Brown would have controlled the agenda whether he was chancellor
or not. In regards to the euro, Blair’s Europe advisor Wall claims that Blair wanted to
join and his staff wanted to do a referendum, but “every time they tried to do so they got
sort of clobbered by Brown and the Treasury for stepping out of line” (Coldstream 2007).
But had Blair removed Brown from the chancellorship in order to lift his effective veto
on joining the single currency, “With Brown on the backbenches and given his influence
in the party and over opinion outside, a referendum would never have been won” (Seldon
2007, 214). Thus, even if Blair had, for the sake of euro membership, taken on the other
costs of firing Brown from his government, he still would not have been able to win the
euro referendum. That level of party power is why Brown stayed in office: as in the
Major years, the prime minister would rather have “the bastard” in government than out
of it.
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Part IV: Prime Minister and Cabinet: Marginalized
While Blair experienced continual challenges from the chancellor, he quickly
marginalized the rest of the cabinet from the euro, and other, debates. He continued to
act on his desire to minimize the kind of cabinet divisions that had undermined his
predecessor’s government, but did so by removing his cabinet from any meaningful role
in decision-making. He eschewed a management style of collective government, in
which he as prime minister would be considered first among equals, for a format in
which, according to former minister Estelle Morris, cabinet meetings were “an
opportunity to put down a marker or to express a view, but I never saw it as a place where
decisions were made” (Coldstream 2007).
Euro policy was not discussed in the Cabinet, only in private meetings between
prime minister and chancellor (indeed, Brown did his best to leave the prime minister
himself out of any discussion). Even the foreign secretary, normally a key player in EU
policymaking and one of the most powerful members of government, was excluded. For
instance, when asked about a possible change in the government’s euro policy in summer
1997, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook replied, “That’s the first I’ve heard of it” (Rawnsley
2001, 76).
This exclusions took place in part because Cook, as an ardent europhile, wished to
press for a swift entry into the eurozone, something that neither Blair nor Brown wanted
during the first term. Brown and Cook in particular disagreed over euro policy; again
siding in the interest of appeasing Brown, Blair checked Cook’s pro-euro fervor, limiting
his ability to discuss the euro publicly, to keep divisions over the issue at bay. But Blair
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still wanted to reassure European partners of Britain’s desire for further EU integration,
so the government made a tactical decision: Cook was allowed to make pro-Europe
speeches, but he always did so outside the UK in a two level game effort to appease the
EU while not riling up euroskeptic sentiment at home (Holden 2002, 155).
Baker (2001) claims that the divisions over EMU in the Blair cabinet were not
serious, more about tactics than about policy. But this is partly because Blair (and Brown,
through the five tests framework) took care to prevent serious policy discussions from
arising in cabinet meetings. While Cook and Brown differed about euro policy, Blair
kept the dispute from flaring up finally by moving Cook from the foreign secretary post
following re-election in 2001 in order to stave off any future rows between him and the
chancellor. “Blair sought to maintain unity in the government between the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and other leading ministers on the Euro question,” and Blair’s decision to
replace Cook as foreign secretary with the more cautiously euroskeptical Jack Straw was
also seen as a way to minimize both divisions over and the salience of the issue in the
cabinet (Howarth 2007, 53).
In the aftermath of the post-reelection cabinet reshuffle, in which Blair switched
Cook from foreign secretary to Leader of the House of Commons, Cook wrote of a
discussion he had had with fellow europhile cabinet member Stephen Byers, who had
been moved from his post as trade minister to one unrelated to foreign affairs. “We were
both struck that whether intended or not the effect of the reshuffle has been to weaken the
line-up on the euro. He and I had been the most outspoken champions of the euro and
now I had been moved out of the Foreign Office and he had been moved away from the
Trade portfolio which had given us legitimate platforms from which to argue for British
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membership. If Tony really intends to have a referendum this Parliament he is preparing
for it in a very odd way” (Cook 2007, 10). Instead of using the potential power of the
cabinet to promote euro membership, the pro-euro prime minister squelched it instead.

Part V: Prime minister and backbenches: Not quite irrelevant
If the cabinet was marginalized during the Blair years on the single currency
issue, the Labour party backbenches were made practically irrelevant. Blair—and
Brown—removed the issue as much as possible from discussion in the House of
Commons, though even if they had not, Blair’s giant parliamentary majority rendered
opposition from within the Labour Party in Parliament effectively useless. Thus, unlike
Major, Blair did not have to worry about pressure regarding the euro from his
backbenchers since the massive majority marginalized any skeptic voices. For that
matter, the huge majority also allowed Blair largely to ignore pressure from pro-euro
MPs who wanted the prime minister to pursue EMU more aggressively.
Blair did not experience the degree of internal party cleavages on the euro issue
that Major had not only because of the large majority, but also because by 1997 most of
the PLP was pro-euro. Of the large number of Labour MPs who had defied the party
whip to vote against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty several years earlier, few
remained in the Parliamentary Labour Party post-1997. “By 1997 the battle had been
won inside the Labour Party,” and while a few Old Labour MPs remained opposed to
EMU, “A 1998 ESRC-sponsored survey showed the great majority of the Parliamentary
party was pro-euro and pro-European, especially the large intake of young Labour MPs;
indeed, the EU has become something of a ‘moderniser’s’ talisman” (Baker 2001, 281-2).
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While the Labour Party largely had resolved its inner conflicts over the euro, and
were certainly more united than the Major-era Conservative Party on the issue, divisions
remained both in the government, as discussed, and in the Labour backbenches (Gamble
and Kelly 2000). The backbenches expressed these divisions by establishing groups
within the party expressing support for one side or the other. These included pro-euro
group “Labour Movement for Europe”, and euroskeptic organizations “Labour EuroSafeguards Campaign” and “Labour Against the Euro”, which was established in April
2002. The flourishing of these advocacy groups within the party placed a degree of
pressure on the government that had not existed in Blair’s first term, since their existence
made “the establishment of a more committed Labour government policy line more
politically problematic than would have been the case in the government’s first term”
(Howarth 2007, 51-2). In any case it was harder to pretend the existence of a united party
in the face of this opposition on both sides.
In fact, despite the large Parliamentary majority, Blair and New Labour remained
sensitive to the euro cleavage in the party, even though skeptics were thin on the ground.
Historically the Labour Party’s deep divisions over Europe had taken place in the debate
over the country’s economic policy, and indeed had once split the party (Gamble and
Kelly, 2000). This “made the issue of the single currency particularly important, and
does much to explain the acute sensitivity of the New Labour governments of 1997
onwards to any internal dissent on the issue,” even though Labour euroskeptics lacked the
numbers to otherwise seem threatening (Forster 2002, 117-118). Because the New
Labour government remained sensitive to internal objections on the single currency, the
outnumbered Labour dissidents carried more weight than they might have been expected
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to. However, this influence took place mostly outside Parliament, in large part because
New Labour made the referendum pledge in order to neutralize this internal cleavage
(Forster 2002).
By pledging to hold a referendum on the issue of the euro and by later design,
Blair kept any votes and even most discussions of the euro out of Parliament entirely.
Even a minority of dissidents can cause problems for a government by defying the party
whips on a vote and then publicizing their objections through the media. But Blair held
no votes at all on the euro issue in the House of Commons during his entire ten-year
premiership, so even that possibility of Parliamentary dissent was neutralized.
Even as a topic of discussion, Parliamentary record indicates, the euro all but
disappeared from the House of Commons agenda. Brown delivered his five tests
framework dictating the conditions of Britain’s membership in the EMU on October 27,
1997. In February 1999 Blair addressed the House about the government’s preparations
for a potential changeover from the pound to the euro. In 2001, after Blair promised an
assessment within two years of the next election during Prime Minister’s Questions,
Brown made several statements about the euro in the run-up to the general election, all
pledging to abide by the five tests model. Finally on June 9, 2003, Brown appeared
before the House of Commons to declare that only two of the five tests had been met.
These were the only times during the entire Blair government that either prime minister
or chancellor chose to stand before the House to speak about the single currency, though
they did occasionally provide written answers on the subject when questioned by
individual MPs (Hansard 1997-2003). There were no votes on the issue and no call for a
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referendum since the government never declared that the five tests framework had been
met.
This record demonstrates that the real battle over the euro was not going on in
Parliament. Blair (and Brown) had successfully removed the backbenchers—as well as
the cabinet—from the debate. However, the euro issue was important enough that many
of the MPs disenfranchised by the Blair government refused to give up fighting for an
issue they felt strongly about, so they sought a venue in which to continue the battle. The
euro conflict thus moved to a different arena: the referendum campaigns for and against
the euro, which provided a policy venue for advocates on both sides of the issue.
Blair controlled the party and Parliament on the euro issue, so Labour dissidents
went outside the traditional party/parliamentary structure to express the continuing crosscutting cleavage over EMU. “Labour sceptics, although marginalised, voiced a number
of arguments in opposition to the single currency” (Forster 2002, 118). These included
Labour skeptic MPs former minister Frank Field, Diane Abbot, Alan Simpson, and in the
House of Lords former Chancellor Denis Healey (Forster 2002). Though marginalized in
Parliament, backbenchers thus could, and did, exert some pressure on the government
through the referendum campaigns. In fact, Forster (2002) says that pressure from the
campaigns was crucial: “in particular, without abandoning its aim of joining the Euro,
the government was forced to postpone any consideration of a referendum until early in
the Parliament of 2001 to 2005” (Forster 2002, 125). The campaigns’ accomplishment
was to maintain sufficient salience-raising efforts to combat the Blair government’s
efforts to minimize the salience of the euro debate, enough so that they were able to force
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the government eventually to commit to a five tests assessment instead of leaving the
euro issue open-ended indefinitely (Forster 2002).
Labour europhiles who wanted the government to pursue EMU more aggressively
were placed in an odd position, since the official pro-euro campaign, Britain in Europe
(BiE), was sponsored by Blair and other high ranking Labour ministers (as well as proeuro Conservative leaders such as Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine). BiE
proponents kept waiting for Blair to take the lead in promoting the single currency and
were reluctant to lead the argument themselves (Baker 2001). In the absence of a more
positive presentation of the pro-euro argument from the prime minister, Holden (2002)
argues, the strongest argument that europhiles could offer was that membership in the
single currency was inevitable.
Even though the shift to the campaign venue did allow euroskeptics to exert
pressure on the government, the government too gained from removing the issue to a
different arena. As mentioned, the government was wary of the euro cleavage in the
Labour Party, and by first pledging a referendum and then creating the five tests
framework, the government successfully lowered the stakes imposed by the euro crosscutting cleavage. Because the debate over the euro was taking place in the campaign and
media arena, not in Parliament or in cabinet, the government could keep the issue more at
arms length, certainly more successfully than previous governments had achieved. The
referendum campaign mechanism acted for the government as a pressure valve, and in
the end the pressure valve strategy worked for the government: While the government
could not escape all the pressure on the euro issue – campaigns forced the government to
shift tactics and act other than it might have intended – and while Blair did not call a
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referendum on the euro, his use of the referendum pledge succeeded in defusing the
party’s euro cross-cutting cleavage. It did not interfere with his government’s agenda, as
it had Major’s.
In fact, the pledge of a referendum was enough to minimize internal dissent on the
euro: the government did not have to hold a referendum at all, although failing to do so
meant that it could not achieve eurozone membership. Once it had dissipated the
pressure of the euro cross-cutting cleavage, the referendum pledge had done its job, as
long as Blair was willing to forgo euro membership. As the conclusion will show, he
was.
The referendum pledge and resulting campaign movements tie into all three of the
governmental relationships discussed in this chapter. Because the referendum promise
was made, Blair could remove the euro from the Parliamentary agenda. Because it was
made, Brown could construct the sort of framework he did which gave him, too, the
latitude to set the issue aside to deal with other policy issues. Because the pledge was
made and the House of Commons and cabinet were taken out of the equation it allowed
for a venue to emerge where those Labour and Conservative MPs shut out of their
traditional areas of influence could promote their policy stances on the euro.
But while the referendum pledge opened space within the traditional Parliament
and government relationships to ameliorate the euro cross-cutting cleavages, ultimate
power over the issue remained within the traditional political structures. The referendum
process did not create an alternate source of power because in the end Blair and Brown
could manage not to hold a referendum. While the campaigns successfully exerted
pressure on the government, real decision-making power regarding the single currency

!

#*+!

stayed with Brown. But in a sign that Blair and Brown had successfully defused the euro
cross-cutting cleavages, the divide between the two, and the fact that the prime minister
did not achieve his aim of joining EMU, did not cause the party to collapse or trigger a
leadership contest as it had in the past.
All this Blair achieved without actually calling a referendum. Though other
countries have found the use of referenda to be a way of dealing with the types of issues
prone to cross-cutting cleavages, in Britain, where referenda are uncommon, politicians
ultimately did not take advantage of it (Qvortrup 2005). Both political parties set up the
referendum mechanism as a pressure valve to externalize the euro cross-cutting cleavages
and thus relieve some of the pressure it caused within party and government. Ultimately,
though, the Blair government did not need to hold a referendum in order to resolve the
party’s euro cross-cutting cleavages; the pledge of a referendum was sufficient to give
both parties time to work out a way to resolve those divisions through internal party and
government dynamics, without resorting to means outside the traditional British political
system.

Part VI. Conclusion
Two level game analysis, applied to the euro cross-cutting cleavage, provides
some insight into Blair’s record on the issue of European monetary integration. Blair’s
main motivation at the European level was to achieve greater influence in the EU, which
he could have done most readily by bringing Britain into the EMU, though he was willing
to do so by other means if the euro proved unfeasible domestically. Blair’s main
motivation on Europe at the domestic level was to not let the EMU issue get in the way of
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his policy goals, or disrupt party and government as it had for the last twenty years for
Labour and Conservatives alike. Overall he succeeded on both levels of the two level
game: he improved Britain’s standing in the EU (before ironically diminishing it by
going to war in Iraq); and neutralized the euro cross-cutting cleavage in his government
and party, albeit at the cost of not achieving euro membership.

EU Level Outcome
Blair’s main motivation regarding Europe was to achieve greater influence in the EU,
which he achieved by other means than the EMU. In the end, the euro came at too high a
domestic cost to justify what membership might have achieved for Britain within the EU.
Blair chose to pursue greater influence within the EU by other means. Blair ultimately
was pragmatic about the euro. Blair biographer Anthony Seldon asks, “So what did Blair
truly think about the Euro? The answer is that, whereas Britain’s role in the EU was of
major importance to him, the Euro was merely a means to an end. ‘His paramount
concern was Britain's political position, and if the Euro was necessary for that then that
was where he came from,’ recalled one close aide” (Seldon 2007, p. 214).
For Blair, bringing Britain into the euro could provide a lasting, positive legacy
that would allow him to resign as prime minister having achieved a triumph, something
he considered after winning reelection in 2001. However, as 2002 and 2003 wore on he
began to see that this was not a feasible option, particularly as he was unable to persuade
Brown to alter his stance on EMU, and in pragmatic fashion was willing to drop the euro
issue and move on to other political aims, and to pursue his ultimate goal vis a vis
European policy—influence in the EU—through other means than the euro (Seldon 2007,

!

#*#!

Blair 2010). The EU’s eastern expansion, with the entry of such new members as Poland
and Hungary, was changing the dynamics and power structure within the EU and diluting
the power of those member states in the euro zone, which offered opportunities for a
large EU member state that was not a member of EMU to exercise influence.
In his memoir Blair (2010) devotes less than a page to explaining his failure to
call a referendum on the euro and bring the country into the single currency regime he
supported. He justifies the dichotomy between this failure and his support for European
integration by arguing that he furthered Britain’s integration and interests within the EU
in every other way. Blair’s Europe advisor Wall (2008) concurs, suggesting that through
a number of small changes Blair made Britain’s everyday dealings within the EU less
combative and more effective. Moreover, Riddell (2005) notes that, post-enlargement,
the EU as a whole was more open to the type of policies that the UK supported and which
Britain could take advantage of to achieve what was after all Blair’s main goal on
Europe: a more central, influential role in the European Union.
But in the most obvious area of European integration, that of the single currency,
Britain remained outside the central sphere of influence, and as Blair himself noted, not
being in the eurozone meant that Britain could not take part in some of the most
important decisions being made regarding European integration, decisions that affected
the British economy whether the UK was in the eurozone or out (Rawnsley 2001). This
was a fact that Blair’s other incremental integrations within the EU could not mitigate.
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Domestic Level Outcome
As discussed, Blair’s domestic level goal was not primarily euro membership but
rather management of the euro cross-cutting cleavage within the Labour Party and his
government. As Seldon concludes of Blair,
If he had been as deeply committed to the Euro as he had led his
supporters to believe, he would not have walked away so lightly after
Brown’s 9 June [2003] statement. The truth is that, with his domestic
agenda so incomplete, he seized on the Euro as a great defining issue on
which he could win over a sceptical Treasury and nation. He convinced
all parties it mattered greatly to him. It did not. He had other battles to
fight, and other, better ways of exerting British influence in the EU.”
(Seldon 2007, 214).
Seldon’s assessment reveals an essential characteristic that others, including his advisers,
have observed in Blair: his pragmatism. By the time of the five tests assessment in June
2003 his government was deeply embroiled in the Iraq war and the fallout of the failure
of British intelligence in asserting the existence of weapons of mass destruction in that
country. Moreover, Blair’s domestic agenda of public service reform was also proving
problematic and had already taken up six years of his premiership. The euro never made
it to the front of his agenda. While many claimed that he was the most pro-Europe prime
minister in thirty years, Riddell writes of Blair’s position on the euro, “Throughout his
premiership, Blair has been ambivalent. He has made speeches every six to twelve
months, or least did before the Iraq war, arguing for an end to the previous doubts about
Britain’s role in the EU…. These excellent analyses, and statements of good intentions,
did not change anything.” When he did speak of the euro he was persuasive but “There
was usually little follow-up” (Riddell 2005, 131-132). This record again indicated that
euro membership was not Blair’s top priority: in a manner far more successful than
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Major, Blair used these periodic speeches to balance the pro- and anti-euro elements in
his party, giving the former reason to hope while giving the latter—embodied in the
chancellor—little reason to fear a battle on the euro front.
Many, including members of his own government such as Foreign Secretary
Cook, had expected the prime minister to take a forthright approach in taking Britain into
the eurozone, and well into his second term continued to expect Blair to make a big push
for a euro referendum. But as Riddell observes, “Contrary to his talk of being ‘best when
boldest’, Blair had opted for a minimalist, risk-averse position on Europe, putting off
awkward positions when possible” (Riddell 2005, 148-149). Blair’s strategy of removing
the euro debate from Parliament is one such example, and it resulted in less pressure on
Blair to address the issue and less divisiveness among backbenchers and cabinet
members. However it did not prevent the issue from being used as a power play by the
chancellor, and it meant that Blair did not achieve his aim of joining the euro.

Broader Implications
As noted in the previous chapter, Major’s party suffered deep internal cleavages
on the euro issue that condemned his government to recrimination and ineffectiveness.
For the Major government, European monetary integration was the central problem. This
was not the case in the Blair government. Blair and Brown may have had disagreements
over the euro but the real division was not over the euro, but over power in general, with
euro policy serving as only one weapon in that battle. Brown’s success in taking over the
issue gave him a leg up in his war with Blair for predominance in the government, but it
was not the center of the conflict. This contrasts with another past example: as discussed
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earlier, the Lawson-Thatcher power struggle was specifically over euro integration
policy; otherwise, they largely agreed on policy issues. For Blair and Brown, the euro
was just another instrument in their larger power struggle: the euro no longer divided the
Labour party.
The cross-cutting cleavages over European monetary integration were finally
resolved after years of intra-party turmoil, and it resolved to the status quo, with Britain
remaining outside the eurozone. This came about in large part because of Blair’s efforts
to decrease the salience of the euro issue within party and government, and with the large
exception of the relationship between himself and the chancellor, the prime minister was
successful. This also translated to a decrease in the salience of the issue in the population
as a whole, particularly after Brown’s 2003 assessment. By 2005, the percentage of
voters who considered Europe or the euro to be an important or very important issue in
determining how they voted had fallen “from 30 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in 2001
and 19 percent in 2005” (Howarth 2007, 55).
A broader implication of Blair’s decision to lower the salience of the euro issue is
that by the middle of Blair’s second term, the euroskeptics in both the officially pro-euro
and the officially euroskeptic parties had won the battle over European monetary
integration that had been waged since the Thatcher era. After all the agonizing of both
parties over the issue and the transformation of each party’s policy on Europe,
euroskepticism prevailed. It is true that this meant that the status quo prevailed, which
might seem to be the easier result, but in the 2003 a large majority (74 percent) of Britons
had believed that euro membership was either “very likely” or “fairly likely” that Britain
would join the eurozone within five years, and much of the press delivered the same
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message (Howarth 2007, 57; Firmstone 2003). But because of Blair’s policies, the
inevitable did not come about. Assessing Blair’s legacy, Riddell, writing in 2005, notes
that thanks to the pro-euro prime minister’s efforts, “The whole question of Britain’s role
on the EU remained unresolved after more than eight years in office, and the British
public was, if anything, more sceptical than it had been in 1997.” (Riddell 2005, 199).
For the Conservative Party, which was now solidly euroskeptic, the result was a
victory. But more interestingly, it was the officially pro-euro Labour party that brought
about this victory for the skeptics. This means that in terms of monetary integration
Labour too was not, in effect, pro-Europe, even though most of the PLP and the cabinet
supported euro membership. But because Blair’s efforts had marginalized the bulk of the
party, these sentiments were irrelevant in the face of Brown’s skepticism.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
Part I. Main Arguments
The main purpose of this study has been to examine what effect the European
movement towards further economic and political integration in the EU has had on the
domestic politics of a member country. In Britain, it created pressure on actors whose
possible decisions in response to it were shaped by the informal and formal institutions of
British politics such as the First Past the Post (FPTP) party system of governance in
Parliament. This study argues that this outside pressure to integrate has exacerbated the
cross-cutting cleavages inherent in party politics, making them potentially dangerous to
party unity and to successful governance by making party management more challenging.
By exacerbating the cross-cutting cleavages in each party over the time period studied,
the pressure heightened existing divisions in the ruling and in the opposition parties,
eroding public confidence in each as long as they were unable to resolve the differences.
While cross-cutting cleavages are not the only dynamic shaping politics in this or
in any other case and in this time period other divisions challenged party unity for both
Labour and Conservatives, the division over the euro and its predecessor institution the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was a particularly serious cleavage.
Indeed, Aspinwall claims, “no issue in contemporary British politics has nearly the
allergenic qualities of Europe” (Aspinwall 2004, 155). The euro issue’s high degree of
salience created divisiveness in the British political system (Gowland and Turner, 2000).
No other issue in recent years has had the same power to engulf and divide parties save
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perhaps Iraq, and that issue divided only one party, Labour, to any significant degree.
Europe engulfed both major parties and dominated discussion in the broader political
sphere for a number of years. Moreover, this is an issue that, though relatively dormant
at the moment, has not disappeared from British politics altogether. As long as European
integration is an issue for EU member countries such as Britain; that is, as long as the UK
remains a member of the EU, it will place pressure on party management in a unique and
challenging way. In a FPTP political system such as Britain’s the cross-cutting cleavage
challenge will re-emerge with particular force every time European integration intensifies
(Aspinwall 2004).
This study examines in particular three factors critical to explaining Britain’s
reaction to the pressure to join the euro and the impact that the euro cross-cutting
cleavage has had on the parties and on British government. First, formal British political
institutions, particularly the size of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority but also the
FPTP electoral system that creates so-called “big tent” parties that are coalitions in
themselves. As Baker (2003, 16) notes, the division over Europe “has continued to
provide the clearest evidence of how UK political parties represent ‘managed coalitions’
rather than stable hierarchies” (Baker 2003, 16). The party leader must unite the various
interest groups that comprise the party in support of his or her policies rather than assume
that this support is given. Second, this study considers the role of actors in managing the
euro cross-cutting cleavages, especially prime ministers and/or party leaders and how
they use their informal powers to manage their party. Informal powers comprise a
considerable part of party management, involving decisions such as whether the prime
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minister insists on a party line or free vote on a matter pertaining to European integration,
as will be discussed below.
Third, this study has considered the effect on British politics of outside pressure in
the form of the movements at the EU level towards deeper economic and political
integration. This effort is largely beyond the control of domestic actors: though they
play a role in decision-making at the European level, British leaders constitute merely
one voice among many in determining the direction and intensity of deeper EU
integration. Thus, domestic political actors and parties have to treat pressure to integrate
in Europe as an exogenous factor that comes as part of Britain’s membership in the EU.
These periodic moves towards deeper integration, in the form of treaties such as the
Single European Act (SEA) in the 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty—including the
commitment to a single currency—in the 1990s, and the EU Constitution/Lisbon Treaty
in the 2000s, may come at a bad time in terms of the first two domestic political factors,
institutional issues and party leadership, such as whether the ruling party has a small
majority or a weak leader. In such cases the effects of the euro cross-cutting cleavage
will be exacerbated.
Thus, this work considers how this outside pressure to integrate interacts with the
other factors—especially how the prime minister uses his or her informal and formal
powers in managing the party and in interaction with the cabinet—as it played out in each
time period, giving an idea of what any future prime minister may face when the pressure
to integrate rises again. Based on the cases examined we can consider a mix of those
factors: what happens when the British party system is faced with a large or small
parliamentary majority, strong or weak party leadership, heavy or lighter euro pressure,
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and whether the party is in or out of power, in minimizing or managing the resultant
cross-cutting cleavages. Finally, this chapter will examine the broader repercussions of
the EU impetus to deeper integration not only in Britain but also in other member
countries currently struggling to balance the EU-level imperative of economic integration
in the eurozone with domestic political realities.

Part II. Summary of the temporal cases
Each leader, whether Labour or Conservative, in each time period faced a different mix
of the factors just discussed, affecting his or her ability to address the cross-cutting
cleavages arising from the pressure to deeper European integration.

Thatcher:
Thatcher enjoyed a large parliamentary majority during most of her premiership,
and her approach to the issue of European monetary integration was one of strong
leadership based on pragmatic assessment. At first this manifested in a relatively
dispassionate way, such as in her management of the ratification of the Single European
Act on the basis of extending the European single market, but as the drive towards
European monetary integration began to pick up momentum, Thatcher responded to it in
an increasingly engaged manner. When combined with this rise in ideological fervor
Thatcher’s strong political leadership, previously an asset in dealing with the pressure to
integrate, began to erode as her promotion of euroskepticism heightened cross-cutting
cleavages in the party over Europe.
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During Thatcher’s tenure the government and prime minister faced heavy
pressure from the European level to pursue deeper integration. Thatcher successfully
managed backbenchers through the SEA ratification and maintained widespread support
in the parliamentary party even as euro cross-cutting cleavages began to manifest in the
late 1980s. Indeed, it was the strong support of a number of backbenchers for her
leadership that led to the greater troubles over the euro cross-cutting cleavages her
successor, John Major, faced during his premiership. The prime minister’s cabinet
largely cooperated with her on Europe as well, though this broke down in the late period
of her premiership as rebellion by chancellor and foreign secretary over her European
policy spread to other cabinet members, eventually leading to her overthrow.

Labour in Opposition:
While in opposition, the Labour Party underwent a complete change in its policy
towards Europe. It campaigned on a platform of exit from the European Community in
1983, but after the party’s massive defeat in that general election new party leader Neil
Kinnock decided that a wholesale revision of the party’s economic policies, including its
position on European economic integration, was necessary if the party was to regain the
confidence of the voters.
Being in opposition gave Labour the opportunity to make these changes without
the same high degree of domestic scrutiny that the Conservative Party would face as the
governing party when it exposed its own divisions over European policy in the 1990s.
Because the party was not in power it also was insulated from the EU-level pressure to
integrate monetarily; indeed, Labour leaders such as Kinnock used new links with
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counterpart parties in Europe to highlight the opportunities present in becoming a proEurope party for its skeptical members.
Kinnock, though initially a euroskeptic himself, took an ideological approach to
the matter of Labour’s policy on European integration. Kinnock’s motivation for
transforming the party's Europe policy was to make party electable again; thus he
overrode the party’s euroskeptics over the course of a decade, an endeavor that his
successors John Smith and Tony Blair built on (Holden 2002). Moreover, the
Conservative Party’s own change in European integration policy starting in the late 1980s
aided Labour’s European transition, since, particularly in the FPTP electoral system
party, cross-cutting cleavages complicate party management. Instead, party leaders
“benefit from party unity” (Aspinwall 2004, 160). Thus, Thatcher’s increasing
expression of euroskepticism allowed Labour to become more europhile as the party
defined itself against the Conservative Party’s changing norm.

Major:
Europe has consistently split parties over the time period examined, but Major
exacerbated divisions within the Conservative Party through his method of party
management during his premiership. However, the high level of pressure to integrate
through the Maastricht Treaty during this time period, and Major’s institutional problem
of a small parliamentary majority, contributed to his weakness as a party leader. Major
experienced considerable trouble controlling the coalition within the Conservative Party
as disputes between party europhiles and euroskeptics flared during the Maastricht Treaty
ratification debates and beyond. Major tried to split the difference between the two sides
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both at the domestic and the EU levels. During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, for
instance, he secured an opt-out from single currency membership for Britain, allowing
the country to decide later whether or not to join the euro. However this opt-out soon
became a point of contention itself in domestic politics as the debate shifted to when, or
whether, the country would exchange the pound for the euro. Again, Major refused to
commit to one side or another in hopes of staving off an outright split in the party. While
he succeeded in keeping the party together throughout the raging debate, the cost to the
party’s electoral viability and to its successful functioning as the ruling party was high.
The fact that Major kept most of his own parliamentary party and even his
government ignorant of the details of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations made it easier
for him to achieve what he considered a workable British position at the European level.
He did this because of informal party dynamics: he did not want to stir up controversy
especially since a general election had to be held by 1992. However, this secrecy created
lasting resentment among the euroskeptics both on the backbenches and in his
government. Major also faced considerable cross-cutting cleavages in his cabinet as
europhiles and euroskeptics vied for influence over the government’s euro policy. All
this meant that even though Major eventually achieved ratification of the Maastricht
treaty, party management was a lasting trial for him well after ratification, as skeptics in
the party sought to remove him from power.
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Blair:
By 1997 Europe was no longer an ideological barrier within the Labour Party as it
had been in 1983.30 In that time, a Labour politician’s position on Europe served as a
“litmus test” for their potential advancement in the party (Young 1998, 484). But by the
time Blair came into power that state of affairs had reversed itself and European
monetary integration had become a less salient issue in Labour electoral politics. By
1997, incoming Labour MPs tended to be pro-euro as a matter of course. This gave Blair
an advantage not enjoyed by his immediate predecessors: the prime minister was able to
handle the party’s cross-cutting cleavages in large part because the bulk of the work had
been done while the Labour Party was in opposition. The balance of the party was now
pro-euro without the fervor that had characterized the debate over the issue in the
previous decade.
But while the cross-cutting cleavage over the euro in the Labour Party was
resolved for the most part by 1992, because of the high salience of the euro issue Blair
had to deal with euroskeptic remnants and solidify the party’s pro-euro stance once
Labour finally returned to power. He was able to do so in part because he had a huge
majority in Parliament. Nonetheless, Blair also exhibited strong party leadership based
on pragmatic assessment rather than ideological conviction, at least regarding Europe, in
all but his relationship with the chancellor, Gordon Brown. Blair used the pledge to hold
a referendum on the euro and Brown’s five test framework, in addition to other strong
party management techniques, to manage the outside pressure to join the euro and the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30
Even those Labour candidates like Blair who were not particularly opposed to the EU
had had to toe the party line and campaign on exit from the European Community in that
election campaign.
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resulting cross-cutting cleavages in the broader parliamentary party, though the cleavages
manifested as resistance from the euro campaigns.
In government, however, Blair still experienced a sizable division over European
policy with the chancellor. However, this division went beyond the euro issue into a
broader power struggle between the two politicians, in which Brown often seemed to
have the upper hand on Europe as well as on other matters.31

Conservative Party post-1997:
Hague’s election as Conservative Party leader in 1997 formally marked the shift
in the balance of power that had been taking place over the course of the 1990s in the
Conservative party to the euroskeptic side, sidelining the party’s europhiles (Gowland
and Turner 2000; Aspinwall 2004). The appointment of a solid band of euroskeptics to
the Conservative shadow cabinet formalized this shift. However, this transition took the
Conservatives farther away from electoral viability: the public disliked its emphasis on
the euro issue and distrusted its ability to govern competently in other areas.
The Conservatives had to correct themselves in the 2005 general election and
beyond because their transformation had taken them too far electorally. In order to
become electorally viable again, the party had to learn how to balance ideological fervor
with ideological rationality. It managed to do so: the party has not become less
euroskeptic, just less vociferously euroskeptic. This was in large part because the party
downplayed the salience of the euro issue as part of its political strategy. Indeed, this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31
In general, for instance, Scott (2004) says that despite Major’s weakness as a leader,
several of the Conservative leader’s advisors claimed that no one in the badly divided
Conservative government would have treated Major as cavalierly as Brown treated Blair.
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shift happened partly in conjunction with the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties:
Sherrington (2006) says that in the 2005 General Election the three major parties had a
complicit agreement not to discuss Europe during the campaign, as it would, for different
reasons, be damaging for each party. Likewise in the 2010 general election European
integration was not a major issue as the parties recognized the danger of discussing
European integration with a public more concerned with purely domestic policies. At
present, Prime Minister David Cameron has no parliamentary majority at all, but rather
presides over a coalition government. However, because he faces relatively low outside
pressure to integrate in Europe he can minimize the issue in domestic politics while the
Conservative Party maintains an officially euroskeptic stance.

Part III. Implications for the europhile-euroskeptic debate in the EU
While in hindsight the decision of successive British governments to stick with
the status quo of retaining the pound seems obvious, during the broader time period
studied the considerable pressure imposed by the European integration project gave a
sense of inevitability to Britain’s membership first in the ERM, and then in the eurozone.
The former step did take place despite the resistance of a powerful prime minister,
Margaret Thatcher, and the latter seemed likely to take place in the years following the
Maastricht Treaty ratification.
The question of the inevitability of euro membership became a focus of the
overall argument between europhiles and euroskeptics, shaping public opinion
accordingly. Even as the public continued to resist the idea of euro membership, for
instance, it also believed that it would take place. Even by 2003, when Brown ruled out a
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referendum in the foreseeable future, a large majority (74 percent) of Britons had
believed it was either “very likely” or “fairly likely” that Britain would join the eurozone
within five years, and much of the press delivered the same message (Howarth 2007, 57;
Firmstone 2003).
Europhiles used the sense of inevitability to bolster their argument that Britain
was better off in, and the sooner the better. This stemmed from Britain’s history of twice
applying for European Economic Community membership and being rejected, which
turned the question of whether Britain wanted to be a member of the European
integration project “from [one of] impossibility to imperative” (Scott 2004, 245). As a
result, evolving from an initial choice of not to join the EU’s original incarnation in the
postwar period, British elites began to fear that Britain was missing out by not being a
member, especially as the French and German economies flourished in the 1960s while
Britain’s stumbled. Eventually the country joined the EEC in 1973, but elites believed
that Britain had lost out on the chance to shape the community to its liking and instead
had to accept the structure—and the interests—that the founding countries had
established. Over the years europhiles agonized that Britain was always one step behind
its Europe counterparts in the integration impetus, a “reluctant European” (Gowland and
Turner 2000), and sought to change this tendency.
In the run-up to the planned launch of the eurozone in 1999 the fear of being left
behind formed a large part of the europhiles’ argument that Britain’s membership was not
a matter of “whether” but of “when” (Gowland and Turner 2000, 330). Young (1998, 3)
also presents increased EU integration as an “eventual, irresistible fact.” Pro-euro
members of the government such as Foreign Secretary Cook and Peter Mandelson made
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the same inevitability argument, though Brown refuted these assertions (Rose 2001). The
same argument prevailed during the debates over the EU Constitution, which followed
the Blair government’s negative assessment of the five tests in June 2003, with Blair
himself saying that there was “no alternative to the constitution” other than to leave the
EU entirely, gambling that the public would be spooked into accepting the former rather
than take the extreme step of the latter. Blair’s economic advisor Derek Scott argued that
the government’s plan was that the public could then, by the same token, be “bullied into
accepting the single currency” (Scott 2004, 248).
Part of the europhiles’ argument about inevitability involved a resultant “ridicule
and caricature of those taking a contrary view” over the decades as pro-integrationists
labeled euroskeptics nationalists, extremists and isolationists (Scott 2004, 245). For
instance, academics Gowland and Turner (2000, 325) claimed that the predictions made
by the new Conservative Shadow Chancellor in 1997, Francis Maude, about the future of
the eurozone were “assuming apocalyptic proportions” simply because Maude predicted
that the eurozone eventually would become engulfed in a banking crisis. While his
prediction seems prescient and entirely reasonable from a present day perspective, this
characterization of Maude’s assessment reflected the common europhile (and academic)
opinion at the time regarding euroskeptic opinions about the eurozone.
Europhiles claimed that euro membership is “inevitable”, but, toning down the
rhetoric, Scott (2004, 245) argues that membership is not question of “destiny” but of
“choice”. This ties in with Aspinwall’s (2004) assertion that the inclusion of the
euroskeptic side of the opinion creates a more democratic integration experience, as
mentioned above. Even though UK is viewed, with some justification, as idiosyncratic
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within Europe—a reluctant euro-outsider (Miles 2005)—euroskeptic arguments against
European monetary integration have emerged in other member countries as well. Parties
in other EU countries have been subject to cross-cutting cleavages on Euro policy as
British parties have, such as the Socialist and Gaullist parties in France: indeed, the
Gaullist party split in 1994 over Europe as right wingers from the party moved to form
their own party to oppose deeper EU integration. Other EU countries, as mentioned, are
less prone to such cross-cutting cleavages due to their use of the PR electoral system in
which skeptic opinions are marginalized to fringe parties with no input on policymaking
(Aspinwall 2004).
Nonetheless, the existence in other member states of the same objections aired by
British euroskeptics gives more authority to the skeptic argument even in PR countries:
if skeptics can be portrayed as isolated extremist groups that exist primarily in one footdragging country, then their arguments can be devalued. This has been a common
europhile strategy in Britain as in other member countries (Scott 2004). But as Aspinwall
(2004) among others has pointed out, by acknowledging that these are widespread
concerns across Europe the debate over the European integration project becomes more
democratic. Such recognition could begin to legitimize calls for a more cautious
approach by Britain as well as other member states on European integration in the face of
the prevailing arguments common to europhiles across the EU, that ever-deeper
integration is simply a matter of time.
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Part IV. Broader Implications for EU member states
Britain offers a case study showing some of the political strains the EU
integration project puts on a domestic member country. It emphasizes the degree to
which the efforts to achieve monetary union impacts domestic politics. These problems
may well continue as long as there is a divide between the degree of political and
monetary integration in the EU, a discrepancy that exacerbates underlying tensions in
domestic politics.
Although these strains are clearly evident in the current eurozone crisis, signs that
just such a crisis would eventually occur were plain to those who wished to see them well
before EMU came into being in 1999 and certainly by the time euro notes and coins were
introduced in 2002. For instance, studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the run-up
to the eurozone launch showed a lack of convergence in (among other areas) business
cycles among prospective eurozone members, notably including Greece and Portugal
(Korhonen 2001). Korhonen examined the prospects of euro membership for countries in
central and eastern Europe in his study, and noted that these two members in particular as
well as Ireland were about as integrated into the Eurozone business cycle as any of the
petitioning accession countries on the EU’s eastern fringe. He uses this evidence to
suggest that lack of convergence need not be an impediment to the entry into the
eurozone for the eastern European countries, but the evidence provided a warning instead
that the countries that had already been let in should have attained a greater degree of
economic convergence with the rest of the eurozone before being allowed entry.
Others noted the lack of economic convergence among prospective member
countries in the run-up to the launch of the eurozone and warned of the potential dangers
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a country that had not sufficiently converged risked by giving up control over its
exchange rate. In 1999 a study cautioned that “not all countries are equally far along this
path [of convergence] and so the implication is that, if European governments are
prepared to trade the costs of surrendering the exchange rate as a policy instrument for
the benefits of a common currency, monetary union should only include a small core
group of countries that have reached the symmetric league (Germany and the Netherlands
and possibly France and Austria; certainly not Greece or Portugal, and the UK is
probably not fully ready yet)” (Funke et al. 1999, 63-4). Losing the ability to devalue the
national currency, which would allow the country in question to regain export
competitiveness in an effort to restart economic grown, has been a key component of the
current eurozone crisis.
This is especially true of Greece, the key example of a country that was allowed
into the eurozone even though it had not converged with the targets on debt and deficit
levels laid out in the German-mandated Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
However, at the time eurozone advocates waved away this lack of convergence: one
academic argued, “Greece is an example of joining the ERM when nominal convergence
has not been fully achieved. Yet the markets viewed the path to full nominal
convergence as compatible with the government’s publicly stated objective of joining the
EMU on a specified date. This compatibility led to a smooth transition from the ERM to
the euro area” (Hochreiter et al. 2005, 200). Several years later, Greece’s entry into
monetary union was no longer sufficient guarantee for the markets as they responded
instead to the fact that Greece’s skyrocketing deficit levels—well outside the noweffectively abandoned SGP commitments—made it unable to repay its debts.
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However, Greece, though ostensibly managing to squeeze into the SGP
requirements in time to adopt the euro notes and coins, was not alone in failing to meet
the convergence criteria well into the late 1990s. Even France and Germany had
significant trouble meeting the very convergence criteria they had insisted was necessary
for euro membership in the run up to the 1999 creation of the single currency. Ironically,
the UK was the only large EU member state that met the convergence criteria in the years
before the 1999 launch of the euro, and it was reluctant to join (Gowland and Turner
2000).
Finally, in 2001 Arestis and Sawyer predicted “that the eurozone will face
considerable economic difficulties” and “the introduction of the euro and the associated
institutional setting could well serve to exacerbate tendencies towards financial crisis
including the volatility and subsequent collapse of asset prices and runs on the banking
system” (2001, 1). This clearly happened in Ireland, where the housing bubble was made
possible in part by Irish banks’ taking advantage of the ability to borrow without
exchange rate risk within the eurozone. Honohan (2009) notes that Ireland’s rapid
economic growth dating from 1994 on spurred a demand for housing, but the true trigger
for the housing boom was Ireland’s entry into the single currency area where the EMUwide interest rate was set too low for Ireland’s economic needs. Real interest rates in
Ireland remained below zero percent nearly throughout the period from the introduction
of the euro in 1999 through 2007. The resultant rise in consumer spending led to
inflation and in turn fuelled demand for easy credit, which the banks provided through
their extensive borrowing from within the EMU area, and the banks quickly became
massively overextended.
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Again, some observers noted such risks early on. In addition to the risks to
Ireland, some pointed to credit risks in Portugal that existed before that country became a
member of the single currency. Scott (2004) also notes that the tensions seen in the
single currency area are the same as those that were evident in its predecessor, the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism currency band. This previous case provided fair
warning of the dangers of trying to force a country into economic union without
sufficient convergence, especially after the UK and Italy were forced to abandon the
ERM in 1992.
Overall, the point is that the seeds of the current eurozone crisis were evident
when the EU member countries insisted on going ahead with deeper economic integration
without first assuring the degree of political convergence necessary to avoid outcomes
like the current crisis. But most of the EU member countries, Britain excepted, were
determined to make the eurozone work. Certainly, monetary union comes with
advantages as well as disadvantages, or countries would not agree to join regardless of a
desire to achieve deeper European union. Weaker countries can gain economic
credibility (however borrowed and temporary) by effectively adopting the monetary
policy of their more economically sound neighbors, in this case Germany. This protects
their economies against inflation and gives them credibility in the financial markets – but
these benefits, as indicated above, can be incomplete and/or transitory.
Moreover, while these are advantages that come with monetary union and thus
gave countries like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal an incentive to join the eurozone, the
overall benefits such poorer countries gained from European economic integration
arguably did not come from EMU membership at all. Ormerod (2006) claims that the
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bulk of the benefit poor EU countries gained from membership and which helped them to
catch up economically with their rich compatriots came from EU transfer payments, not
from euro membership.
Even taking into account these considerable transfer payments, one could argue
that EU membership has, at least economically, been a mixed bag for these poorer
countries, fuelling an economic boom and then bust cycle. This effort to achieve deeper
economic integration in the EU creates considerable strains in the domestic politics of
these crisis-stricken member countries and, for that matter, in the politics of the creditor
EMU countries as well. This study has explored the impact that even the pressure to join
monetary union has had on British domestic politics: for actual members of the
eurozone, the effect has been even more powerful. Britain’s experience offers another
option for EU countries desiring the benefits of economic convergence within a single
market without losing control over interest and exchange rates. For those EU members
outside the eurozone Britain’s experience offers evidence that a country can be better off
outside the eurozone with a strong economy than in EMU with a weak one.
Britain also can serve as an example to countries like Iceland that are tied to the
EU but do not belong to it. The 2008 financial crash deeply affected Iceland, triggering a
major banking crisis. Initially, the Icelandic government announced its intention to apply
for EU membership immediately, with the aim of joining the eurozone so as to be
insulated from such severe shocks. However, the country backed away from this plan as
it observed that membership in the single currency area was no panacea. Recently, in
fact, Iceland's finance minister criticized EMU leaders’ handling of the Greek crisis,
arguing that their chosen approach is bad for small peripheral countries both within and
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outside the eurozone. The European Central Bank continues to pursue a monetary policy
better suited for the large, central eurozone countries than for the peripheral small
countries that are experiencing the worst effects of the crisis. While this is
understandable given the relative populations of these countries, clearly citizens in
countries such as Germany and France are affected by the crisis as well as they are called
on to bail out weaker members.
In any case, Iceland’s government now believes that its ability to devalue the
krona has been beneficial for the country in regaining the strength of its export economy,
which has recovered well in the last two years. Also, pursuing its own solution to its
banking crisis in the face of considerable pressure from EU member states has allowed
the country to focus on what is best for Icelandic citizens rather than for the bigger
imperatives of the Euro banking industry, which the finance minister suggested is the
Eurozone’s top priority. In all, despite the initial draw of eurozone membership,
Iceland’s government now thinks that staying out of the single currency may be the
country's best option (Parussini 2011).
In addition to empirical evidence from the eurozone crisis, Britain’s resistance to
the monetary integration imperative lent credibility to this sort of stance. The UK was
hard hit by the 2008 financial crisis, but other European countries both in and out of
eurozone experienced worse. While the British recovery remains slow, the eurozone is
faced with crises in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and possibly others if the economic
crisis continues to be contagious (Wolf 2011). Currently the EU consists of 27 member
states, of which 17 are eurozone members. This means that Britain, rather than appearing
as a reluctant euro-outsider, can take the opportunity instead to become a leader of the
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non-EMU countries and, in the face of this current crisis, wield influence with the other
leading EU states as they consider how to respond to the crisis and decide which EU
countries should contribute to bailing the weaker eurozone countries out.
Thus, after the decades-long agonizing over whether Britain should pursue deeper
economic interaction in Europe, Britain’s ultimate resistance to this pressure has resulted
in an opportunity for the country to exercise influence in the EU while remaining outside
EMU. Britain has the advantage of being a larger economy than stricken countries like
Ireland and Greece, but unlike fellow large country Spain it has maintained the advantage
of shaping monetary policy to suit the needs of its own economy. This has, for now,
allowed Britain to move on from the damaging domestic cross-cutting cleavages over the
euro, though these will recur as the European integration project inevitably moves
forward. Deeper political integration, after all, is the logical next step and indeed some
degree of cooperation on fiscal policy is necessary in the EMU in order to stave off the
recurrence of crises like the current one. However, as discussed, the presence of
euroskeptic countries offer the EU an opportunity to be more democratic, to give voice to
other alternatives than the dominant imperative to deeper integration whatever the cost.
Thus, Britain’s protracted political agonizing over whether to join or not to join has given
the country a broader legacy by making the debate over economic and monetary union a
more open and democratic one, allowing this “reluctant European” a key role in shaping
the future of the European Union.
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